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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis charts the military education of junior Edwardian army officers, moving 
chronologically through key aspects of the process. It examines the detail of curricula at Sandhurst and 
Woolwich, the prevalence of entry via auxiliary forces and the military knowledge of men who gained 
commissions by that route, the training and study officers undertook after commissioning, and the 
education available at Camberley and Quetta. It thus offers a holistic examination of officer education. It 
concludes that there was a strong and growing professionalism among the junior commissioned officers, 
founded on their acquisition of skilled expertise and their expectations of advancing in their careers on 
the basis of professional merit.  
This thesis contributes to broader debates in three ways. Firstly, by going beyond existing studies 
which focus heavily on the upper echelons of the officer corps, it allows a more complete examination of 
the competence and military capacity of the Edwardian army. Secondly, it contributes to discussions on 
professionalism and processes of professionalization at the beginning of the twentieth century. Thirdly, it 
considers the nature of the training and education that the Edwardian Army undertook and seeks to 
locate this within discussions on the proper form and objectives of officer education. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The British Army in the Great War fielded a force on the European continent greater than any it 
had ever mustered. In doing so, it suffered casualties in numbers it had not experienced before, and has 
not since. The British experience of the war, and the part that the army played in the war, have been the 
focus of a vast body of scholarship. While less has been written about the pre-war army, the existing 
literature is still substantial. This work includes debates over the level of professionalism of the army’s 
officer corps and the level of military ability displayed by the army both before and during the war. While 
the balance of opinion on the subject has swung towards more positive assessments, the debate shows 
no signs of reaching a conclusion.1 The military competence and the professionalism of the officer corps 
have been argued over for decades, but much of this has centred on senior officers and sometimes 
exclusively on Haig.2 This focus on the highest levels of command, and the men who occupied those posts 
in 1914, means that there is a gap in the existing historiography, as comparatively little has been written 
on the army’s junior commissioned officers, and their training, abilities, and military aptitude. Junior 
officers played a central role in the training of small units in peacetime, and in the leadership and 
command of those units in wartime. They also constituted the majority of the officer corps. 
                                                          
1
 Recent works which make positive assessments of the British army and its officers include: Sheffield, Gary, The 
Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London: Aurum Press, 2011); Palazzo, Albert, Seeking Victory on the 
Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I (London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); 
Jones, Spencer, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914 (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2012); Badsey, Stephen, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918 (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008). Recent scholarship which is more critical of the army includes: Gardner, Nikolas, Trial By Fire: 
Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003); Samuels, Martin, 
Command or Control: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank 
Cass, 1995); Zuber, Terence, The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle (Stroud: The History Press, 2010).  
2
 Tim Travers, for example, reaches negative conclusions about the professionalism of British officers based on an 
examination of the army’s senior ranks. Travers, Tim, The killing ground: the British Army, the Western Front and the 
emergence of modern warfare, 1900-1918 (London: Allen and Unwin, 2009 [1987]); Travers, Tim, ‘The Evolution of 
British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918: GHQ, Manpower, and Technology’ The Journal of Military 
History. Vol 54, No 2, Apr 1990. pp. 173-200. More recently, Gardner has made a stronger critique of the army’s 
officers, again based on an examination of the upper ranks. Gardner, Trial By Fire. The literature on Haig is vast, and 
ranges from modern scholarly works like those of Sheffield and Harris, to works critical almost to the point of 
conspiracy theory. Sheffield, The Chief; Harris, Paul, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Winter, Dennis, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (London: Penguin, 2001 [1991]). 
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 This thesis sets out to examine the military training and education of the army in order to answer 
the question: how professional were the junior commissioned officers of the Edwardian army? It adopts 
the definition of professionalism put forward by Harold Perkin; a professional uses trained expertise and 
advances in his career through merit.3 This thesis will examine how and why men entered the army, what 
their military education involved, and the process of promotion and how men sought preferment. It will 
demonstrate that the junior officers of the Edwardian army were more professional than has previously 
been recognized. In doing so, it will offer a broad examination of the overall process of military education 
from the point that officers joined the army to the apex of formal education at the Staff College. The 
tendency to focus largely or exclusively on the highest levels of the officer corps means that there is a gap 
in the existing literature on professionalism and the military ability of British officers. There is also a gap 
in the scholarship on military education, as much of the existing literature typically does not consider 
officer education holistically, instead considering aspects in isolation, and so examining these aspects 
together will allow the connections and continuities to be drawn out from what was, for the men 
involved, a coherent whole.4  
 This will involve an examination of the syllabus for officer cadets at Sandhurst and at Woolwich, 
the focus of the instruction at those institutions, and how officer cadets reacted to it. The other routes of 
entry into the regular officer corps, including the number of men who gained regular commissions by 
these routes and their levels of military education and experience, will be examined, as will the training 
and study that officers undertook after gaining their commissions. The format and objectives of this post-
commissioning training, the reading habits of officers and the professional literature available to them, 
and the benefits and distribution of active service experience will all be considered. The system of 
promotion examinations and the influences on promotion and preferment will also be discussed, as will 
men’s reasons for selecting the army as a profession. This thesis will also discuss Staff College training and 
the benefits it conferred both on those who passed through that institution and on the rest of the army.  
                                                          
3
 Perkin, Harold, The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989). p. 4. 
4
 Some works do consider officer training as a whole. See, for example: Bowman, Tim, and Connelly, Mark, The 
Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). pp. 7-40.  
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 These subjects have been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, they are each important aspects of 
the training and education of Edwardian officers and so worthy of examination in their own right. 
Secondly, the existing literature typically does not consider officer education comprehensively, instead 
considering aspects in isolation, and so examining them together allows the connections and continuities 
in what was, for the men involved, a coherent whole to be drawn out. Thirdly, these subjects of study 
offer windows into wider issues. They shed light on questions of professionalism and discussions of 
professionalization at the beginning of the twentieth century, on debates on the ideal format and content 
of military training, as well as contributing to the debate on the capacity and competence of the 
Edwardian army and its officer corps.5 This study offers a new perspective on officer education in the 
Edwardian army and on the professionalism of the men who held commissions at the time. It also offers a 
new assessment of the capability and knowledge of men who entered the regular officer corps from the 
auxiliary forces, and it covers new ground by making a detailed examination of the syllabi of both 
Sandhurst and Woolwich which is currently largely absent from the scholarly literature.  
Despite the extensive literature on the First World War, and many studies of the Edwardian army, 
comparatively little has been written on the Royal Military College, Sandhurst (RMC) and the Royal 
Military Academy, Woolwich (RMA) in the period before 1914, and there is a particular dearth of works 
which address their curricula in anything other than the broadest terms. This lack of detailed focus on the 
material taught is problematic because debate on whether the British army was properly prepared for a 
large-scale continental war must, in part, be founded on a detailed and correct understanding of what 
                                                          
5
 On the professionalism of the British Army and its officers, and the Army’s fitness for war against a first-class 
opponent, see: Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry; Gardner, Trial By Fire; Samuels, Command or 
Control; Prior, Robin, and Wilson, Trevor, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry 
Rawlinson 1914-1918 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Jones, Spencer, (ed.) Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in 
the British Expeditionary Force 1914 (Solihull: Helion and Company, 2013); Bidwell, Shelford, and Graham, Dominick, 
Firepower: The British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2004 [1982]). On 
military training, and whether its contents should be theoretical or practical, broadly-based or specific, see: 
Converse III, Elliot, (ed.) Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the 
Modern World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998); Neilson, Keith, and Kennedy, Gregory (eds.) Military Education: 
Past, Present, and Future (Westpost: Praeger Publishers, 2002); Dickinson, Harry, ‘Athens in Sparta: Making the Case 
for Naval Education – 1’ Naval Review, 2001. pp. 245 – 249; Dickinson, Harry, ‘Athens in Sparta: Making the Case for 
Naval Education – 2’ Naval Review, 2001. pp. 337 – 341; Place, Timothy, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-
1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day (London: Frank Cass, 2000). Place’s work focuses on combat effectiveness in the 
Normandy Campaign, but his discussion of training, how it is conducted, and what it is meant to achieve, 
contributes to the wider debate on the subject.  
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officers were taught, particularly in tactics and closely related subjects. Sandhurst has received more 
attention than Woolwich, although a few studies examine both institutions.  The histories of Sandhurst 
are not scholarly works, and although two of them were written by men who had taught at RMC, they do 
not offer any particularly detailed discussion of the instruction provided or of the curriculum.6  
  Like Sandhurst, Woolwich has not been a focus of major historical inquiry, but what has been 
written is of high quality. Kenneth Maurice-Jones’s The Shop Story 1900-1939 could be classed as semi-
official history, written by an artilleryman and published by the Royal Artillery Institution. It is a valuable 
source of detailed information, especially as it draws on the testimony of former cadets, using both 
written and oral accounts, and contains several appendices listing members of staff, their periods of 
employment, and similar other details. Like the works on Sandhurst, there are only occasional notes in 
the text as to the source of information; cadets are quoted anonymously, and there is no bibliography. 
There is, however, an introduction giving a general indication of the main sources of information. 7  
Bowman and Connelly’s work on the Edwardian Army includes some consideration of the 
curricula of both Sandhurst and Woolwich. They criticise the teaching, subject matter, and calibre of staff 
at both institutions, and the aptitudes and abilities of the cadets themselves, as well as the army’s 
selection and training of officers in general. Their criticisms pertaining to educational matters during and 
immediately after the Boer War are accurate; they are based closely on the reports of the enquiries and 
commissions which followed the war, and are thus broadly in line with contemporary thinking. However, 
they apply criticisms which are valid for the first years after the Boer War to the period as a whole, 
without considering all of the changes and improvements which took place. It should be noted that their 
                                                          
6
 Mockler-Ferryman, A. F. Annals of Sandhurst: A Chronicle of the Royal Military College from its Foundation to the 
Present Day (London: William Heinemann, 1900); Thomas, Hugh, The Story of Sandhurst (London: Hutchinson, 
1961); Shepperd, A, Sandhurst: The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and its Predecessors (London: Country Life 
Books, 1980). Mockler-Ferryman did not indicate his sources and wrote very little about the instruction given to 
cadets, although this must have been familiar to him as he was a member of staff. Thomas included some coverage 
of instruction, but focused on cadets who later rose to high rank, and did not indicate his sources. Shepperd both 
attended Sandhurst as a cadet and was later a member of staff. His book lacks footnotes but includes a bibliography 
with a rough indication of the primary sources drawn upon, and is also largely silent on the details of teaching.  
7
 Maurice-Jones, K. W. The Shop Story 1900-1939 (Woolwich: The Royal Artillery Institution, 1954). Shepperd’s 
Sandhurst included some coverage of Woolwich, as it was one of the predecessors of the modern RMAS, but just as 
with the discussion of RMC, this did not include detailed examination of the curricula.  
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treatment of Sandhurst and Woolwich is fairly brief; the same chapter that considers those institutions 
also examines the Militia, Special Reserve, and University Candidate routes of entry into the Regular 
Army’s officer corps, considers the schools and military crammers which some officers attended before 
beginning their military careers, and also explores wider issues of promotion, pay, and social status in the 
officer corps.8 Their wider conclusions about Edwardian officers and officer training are nuanced but 
broadly, if moderately, negative, and stand in contrast to the more positive assessment of the Army’s 
post-1902 reforms made by Spencer Jones in From Boer War to World War. Jones’s study is of tactical 
improvements and not of officer training per se, but the divide between the two assessments of the 
Army’s condition before 1914 is notable.  
 The existing literature on the auxiliary forces is neither as voluminous nor as contentious as the 
literature on the regulars and includes several modern works which between them cover all the auxiliary 
forces.  Ian Beckett’s The amateur military tradition: 1558-1945 covers all of the auxiliary forces both 
before and after Haldane’s reforms, but says little about the Special Reserve. Bill Mitchinson’s books 
England’s Last Hope: The Territorial Force, 1908-1914 and Defending Albion: Britain’s Home Army 1908-
1919 both focus on the Territorials, although the latter does cover the Special Reserve as well.9 It is 
almost the only publication to do so in any great detail; indeed, the Special Reserve is largely absent from 
the historiography, seemingly because a lack of contemporary interest in it means there are few surviving 
records, particularly concerning its training. Some other works, on the auxiliary forces during the Boer 
War or the First World War, offer some comparison of the Militia or Territorials relative to the regulars, 
but, like the broader histories, they do not focus on the training of auxiliaries, and so consequently do not 
say a great deal about auxiliary officer training in general, or the preparation of men who sought regular 
commissions in particular.10 The exceptions to this are the studies of University Officer Training Corps 
                                                          
8
 Bowman and Connelly, The Edwardian Army. pp. 7-40. 
9
 Beckett, Ian F. W. The amateur military tradition: 1558-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991); 
Mitchinson, K. W. Defending Albion: Britain’s Home Army 1908-1919 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); 
Mitchinson, K. W. England’s Last Hope: The Territorial Force, 1908-1914 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
10
 See, for example: Miller, Stephen, ‘The South African War, 1899-1902’ in Ian F. W. Beckett (ed.) Citizen Soldiers 
and the British Empire, 1837-1902 (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012); Miller, Stephen, Volunteers on the Veld: 
Britain’s citizen-soldiers and the South African War, 1899-1902 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); 
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(OTC), which examine what men were taught, and assess the value of the training provided.11 Strachan’s 
and Hankins’s studies both offer assessments of the OTC, and this serves to emphasize that similar 
studies on entering the regulars via the Militia, the Territorial Force, or the Special Reserve, are lacking. 
Older works which deal with the auxiliaries tend to be regimental histories, or politically-motivated; the 
former Secretary of State for War, Arnold-Forster, published a book entitled The Army in 1906: A Policy 
and A Vindication to defend his unfulfilled reform schemes.12  
The key work on the Staff College remains Brian Bond’s, some forty years after it was published.13 
Other studies have built upon Bond’s research, but none has overturned or substantially revised Bond’s 
conclusions, although Martin Samuels has been critical of the Staff College, writing that it had a low 
reputation at the time and admitted too many men by nomination.14 Bond identifies a growing 
recognition in the army of the 1890s that attending Camberley was worthwhile both for the professional 
education provided and for the enhanced career prospects that graduating from the College brought, and 
that this regard for the institution and for professional education grew noticeably over the Edwardian 
period.15 Bond discusses the curricula at the Staff College, although not in depth; he outlines the subjects 
studied and notes some changes in emphasis in the decade prior to 1914, but does not focus on the 
detailed syllabus under each subject heading.16  
 There are some works which address the training of the Edwardian army in peace-time, although 
there is a larger literature on the subjects of military training and education more broadly, and studies 
which, while they consider other forces or other eras, offer some relevant discussion. Spencer Jones 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
McCartney, Helen, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
11
 Hankins, Harold, A History of the Manchester and Salford Universities Officer’s Training Corps 1898-2002 
(Doncaster: DP & G Military Publishers, 2002); Strachan, Hew, History of the Cambridge University Officers Training 
Corps (Tunbridge Wells: Midas Books, 1976).  
12
 Arnold-Forster, H.O. The Army in 1906: A Policy and A Vindication (London: John Murray, 1906). 
13
 Bond, Brian, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972). 
14
 Gooch, John, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1974); Holden Reid, Brian, War Studies at the Staff College 1890-1930 (London: HMSO, 1992); 
French, David, and Holden Reid, Brian, (eds.) The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 (London: 
Routledge, 2014 [2002]); Samuels, Command or Control. pp. 42, 47. 
15
 Bond, The Victorian Army pp. 153, 174-5, 277. 
16
 Ibid. p. 276. 
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addresses the army’s training in his book From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British 
Army, 1902-1914, arguing that it was considerably improved as a result of the tactical reforms which the 
Boer War compelled.17 Naturally, only tactical training is discussed, while the training of officers is not 
specifically addressed. Tim Travers has written on pre-war officers and training, and his most recent work 
on the subject departs from his books on the Edwardian and wartime army by concentrating on junior 
officers. He thinks little of Sandhurst in the Edwardian period, and argues that the curriculum remained 
unreformed despite the findings of the Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Education and 
Training of Officers of the Army—also known as the Akers-Douglas Report, it was the result of an official 
enquiry into the military education of the army’s junior commissioned officers—and offers the tentative 
suggestion that the training men received in their units, as well as regimental traditions and the influence 
of the battalion CO, had a greater impact on officer behaviour than Sandhurst.18 He does not explore in 
any depth what training officers received in their battalions, batteries, or squadrons, and gives no 
consideration to men who entered from the auxiliaries, despite suggesting that they comprised nearly 
half of the regular officer corps.19 A more positive, and more holistic, examination of the Edwardian 
officer corps is offered by the contributors to Spencer Jones’s edited volume Stemming the Tide, which 
examines the leadership of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from Sir John French down to the level of 
battalion and company command. It is a step towards a consideration of the officer corps as a whole, 
rather than its highest echelons, but there is more to be done in this regard. The chapter on company 
commanders discusses social background, the promotion system, the move to the four company system, 
and how company officers fared in the opening months of the war in 1914. It thus covers a lot of material 
in its eighteen pages, but, as John Mason Sneddon notes in his introductory remarks, company 
commanders ‘remain an under researched field’.20 Although it considers a period outwith the bounds of 
this thesis, Timothy Harrison Place’s Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-
                                                          
17
 Jones, From Boer War to World War. 
18
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Day is relevant because it explores the role of doctrine in determining training and the variety of 
exercises which British troops undertook.21 The types of training Place identifies, including TEWTs 
(Tactical Exercises Without Troops) and multi-day exercises which required units to function just as they 
would in the field during active service (what Montgomery called ‘under full sail’), have some analogues 
in the training the army conducted thirty years earlier.22   
 Place’s work relates to a wider literature which addresses the means by which officers are 
selected and prepared for their duties, and the style and content of the training and education that is 
available to them. Peter Hore, for example, notes that a balance must be struck between classroom 
learning and hands-on experience, and asks, ‘Should theory come before practice, or after it, or instead 
of it, or nowhere at all? At what age should future officers be recruited and how long should they be 
trained?’ Hore does not claim to offer any firm answers, but discusses the changing ways in which the 
Royal Navy addressed these questions between 1650 and 1950.23 Similar questions are raised in Forging 
the Sword, which examines the selection and initial training of officers in the twentieth century, focusing 
largely on the militaries of the great powers.24 Military Education: Past, Present, and Future goes beyond 
initial officer education and also considers further education at institutions like the Staff College.25 These 
studies, like Travers’s chapter discussed above, are suggestive rather than definitive in the conclusions 
reached about the form and content of military education. 
Within the literature focused on the Edwardian army, there is much which addresses directly or 
indirectly the professionalism of the British officer corps. Older work, some of it not of a rigorous 
scholarly nature, has tended to denigrate the officer corps as an old boy’s club of amateurs more 
interested in sports than in tactics, with promotion going primarily to socially well-connected but 
intellectually vacant cavalrymen, with deleterious effects on military ability and battlefield 
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performance.26 In contrast, a growing number of more modern works present the officer corps in a 
different light, as able and committed professionals, making earnest efforts to understand and prepare 
themselves and their commands for modern warfare—although not all recent work follows this trend.27  
Tim Travers takes a view of officers which is somewhere between that of the ‘donkeys’ school 
and that of the modern revisionists. He argues that during the First World War, the army did not give 
attention to tactical innovation, and instead desired ‘the emotionally comfortable principles of earlier 
days rather than the potential of a new style of warfare.’ 28 He makes very similar criticisms of the pre-
war army, saying that while reform did take place after 1902, the army suffered from too many officers 
with anti-intellectual and anti-modern views, who were unwilling to read widely or think critically, and 
who rejected theory.29 While he applies this argument only to senior officers, his outlook on the 
competence and professionalism of the officer corps must be deemed a negative one overall, particularly 
as he argues that promotion relied on influence, patronage, and personal connections.30  
A less edifying, but more modern, perspective on professionalism is advanced by Nikolas 
Gardner, a student of Travers, who presents a damning indictment of the officers of the BEF. He sees 
them as grossly unprofessional, to the extent that they treated the war as a chance to score personal 
points against each other and gain fame and individual glory rather than as a national endeavour to 
safeguard vital British interests.31 Not all of his criticism is so extreme; he is right to point out that staff 
officers should have known better than to risk (and frequently lose) their lives at the front when they 
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properly belonged elsewhere.32 But his overall view of officer professionalism is a highly negative one 
which is not echoed in other recent scholarship.  
Much recent work develops a very different picture of the ethos and professionalism of British 
officers, but not all revisionist views are modern. John Terraine’s Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier was 
published in 1963, and Baynes’s Morale, which takes a generally positive view of pre-war officer ethos, 
was published four years later. Neither was an academic, but Terraine’s work is undoubtedly scholarly. 
Baynes’s is somewhat less so, as it is frustratingly lacking in citations. The work of Edward Spiers also 
takes a more nuanced view than some of the critics of officers; he argues that the professionalism of the 
army in 1914 was considerably advanced from what it had been in 1899, and that ‘the source of military 
professionalism lay in the prescription of tactical and training skills appropriate to the new conditions of 
warfare.’33 He doubts the utility of imperial experience in a major European war, but recognises that the 
leadership and initiative thus learned were still useful, if not sufficient in themselves.34 His main critique 
of the officer corps after the Boer War is the comparative neglect of staff work and the lack of experience 
in handling large formations.35 While he does not take a very favourable view of professionalism and 
ethos prior to 1899, he is largely positive about both between 1902 and 1914, and concludes that the 
British army was well-prepared for a continental war by the time it broke out.  
Broadly similar conclusions are reached by Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham in Firepower, 
because although they condemn some artillery officers for focusing more on sport and horses than on 
anything ‘behind the swingletree’, they note ongoing debates in the Edwardian army over future 
continental wars, firepower, and new tactical developments. While they argue that officers did not 
always reach the correct conclusions, they stress that such mistakes as were made were not caused by a 
lack of thought. Where they discern differences in ethos, the dividing line is one of age, rather than of 
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arm, with senior officers concerned about morale under intense fire, younger officers who had served in 
South Africa concerned to be able to concentrate as much fire on the enemy as possible, and those too 
young to have served perhaps less keen on the science of warfare than on romantic gallantry.36 These 
works do not fully dispense with the ‘lions led by donkeys’ ideas about officer professionalism and ethos, 
but they take a more positive and nuanced view of the issues, and are closer to the conclusions of 
modern scholarship.  
Stephen Badsey’s study of the British cavalry has challenged many of the ideas of the ‘donkey’ 
school. He notes that a regiment might be described as ‘smart’ and have many wealthy, upper-class 
officers, but that this was no more an automatic indication of incompetence than it was of competence; a 
socially-exclusive regiment which was not militarily efficient was recognised by contemporaries as such, 
and labelled ‘traditional.’37 He argues that the ‘cavalry spirit’, far from being an inappropriately aggressive 
instinct unsuited to modern warfare, was a good example of ‘mission command’—decision by the man on 
the spot—something with which the Germans are more often credited, and that this was absolutely 
central to cavalry doctrine well before 1914.38 He stresses that many officers gave serious thought to 
military matters, and felt very strongly about the conclusions they reached—hardly the mark of an officer 
corps lacking in mental ability or professional concern. Badsey argues that officers kept abreast of 
technical developments and their likely applications.39 He makes a case that cavalry officers gave serious 
attention to the business of soldiering.  
Badsey also refutes the idea that promotion was based more on knowing people than on 
knowing one’s job, observing that there is little to indicate that cavalrymen dominated the army’s upper 
ranks. He argues that however strong a personal relationship might be between two officers, military 
competence was still the primary concern.40 This is in contrast to the views advanced by Tim Travers, who 
argues that the army, at least in the upper echelons, remained largely traditional and ‘personalized’ in its 
                                                          
36
 Bidwell and Graham, Firepower. p. 34. 
37
 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry. p. 9. 
38
 Ibid. p. 21. 
39
 Ibid. pp. 235-7. 
40
 Ibid. p. 201. 
 12 
 
methods, and struggled to adapt to modern warfare and the professional competence it required. He 
argues that even well into the First World War, ‘undue personal influence and distortions in the matter of 
promotions and dismissals’ continued to dog the army.41 A similar, if more moderate, case is made by Ian 
Beckett, who argues that promotion in the late Victorian and Edwardian era was not decided on the basis 
of merit, despite efforts to move in that direction. He notes flaws in the system of confidential reports, 
and concludes that seniority tempered by rejection remained common, and indeed that rejection 
sometimes operated in only the most serious cases.42 He considers that little changed after the Boer 
War.43  
The conclusions that Badsey draws about cavalry officers may be applicable to the officer corps 
more generally. Spencer Jones’s From Boer War to World War, concerning the tactical lessons of the Boer 
War, suggests that this is the case. He argues that wholesale reforms made the infantry more tactically 
proficient than that of any other European army, and that the artillery engaged in a period of 
introspection which resulted in the acquisition of new weapons, new and effective tactics, and a high 
standard of gunnery, marred only by a failure to introduce a uniform doctrine across the regiment.44 
Jones’s arguments about the cavalry broadly coincide with those of Badsey; the cavalry overhauled their 
equipment, training, and tactics, and because they were, like the infantry, more than a match for their 
continental counterparts by 1914, they rapidly gained an ascendancy over the German cavalry in the 
opening months of the war.45  
A modern view of the army’s attitude to technology is presented by Albert Palazzo, who covers 
the army’s development of gas as a weapon, its integration into the British search for superiority over the 
Germans, and the enthusiasm with which the possibilities of gas warfare were explored and pursued. Far 
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from finding evidence of technophobic or backward-looking officers, Palazzo argues that the army was at 
the forefront of the technological changes in warfare, because it ‘came most fully to grips with the nature 
of modern war.’46 The officer corps which responded to new circumstances in this way was very unlike 
that alleged by the ‘donkeys’ school, and Palazzo presents an army considerably more flexible, pragmatic, 
and professional than Gardner allows. The works of Badsey, Jones, and Palazzo can be taken as more or 
less representative of the consensus in modern scholarship about officers and the army. There is a broad 
understanding that the officer corps had, certainly by 1914 if not well before, a suitably serious ethos of 
intellectual engagement and desire for professional competence, and that promotion was a matter of 
ability, even if personal connections could play a role in having that ability recognised. 
As the above literature review suggests, the existing studies of military training in the Edwardian 
period typically either examine only a single facet of officer education, or examine training more broadly 
and do not address issues specific to the officers. Within the studies of particular aspects of military 
training and education, there is often not a particular focus on the details of the curricula, or how the 
curricula changed—or did not change—over the course of the period, and these studies, valuable as they 
are, lack any counterpart works which consider the subject as a whole. The debate over the 
professionalism of the officer corps has largely moved to a more positive assessment but remains 
contested. It also retains a significant focus on the senior ranks of the army, although some recent work 
has begun to redress the balance. This thesis responds to these gaps in three ways. Firstly, it offers a 
broad consideration of several key aspects of military education and training, including Sandhurst and 
Woolwich, the abilities and means of entry of men who gained regular commissions via service in the 
auxiliary forces, the training and study that men undertook once they joined their units, and the course of 
study offered to those men who achieved entry to the Staff College.  Exploration of each of these facets 
allows this thesis to offer a holistic, rather than compartmentalized, picture of the process of military 
education. Secondly, it focuses on majors, captains, and subalterns, in an effort to redress the undue 
emphasis on the senior ranks of the officer corps in the existing scholarship, and to demonstrate the 
training and capabilities that the commissioned ranks were able to employ when commanding at the 
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sharp end on the battlefields of 1914. Thirdly, it also offers a close examination of aspects of military 
education which have not yet received detailed consideration from scholars. This thesis will also 
contribute to the wider, ongoing debates about the professionalism of the officer corps, the relative 
advantages of different systems of officer education, and the competence and military ability of the 
Edwardian army.  
This thesis draws on a wide range of sources. In relation to Sandhurst and Woolwich, there are 
gaps in the primary documents available. A significant portion of the RMA and RMC papers were thrown 
out after the Second World War.  Men were ordered to clear out some rooms, the contents of which 
included the archives of both institutions. They were left unsupervised, and the end result, as reported to 
the Adjutant, was that the librarian ‘[estimated] not less than two thirds of the original correspondence 
and the majority of the registers have been lost.'47 It is unclear which registers this refers to, as the cadet 
registers survived. Whether the lost registers were duplicates, or perhaps contained details of marks or 
attendance, cannot be determined. This makes assembling and assessing evidence on the curricula at 
both Sandhurst and Woolwich more difficult. There is, however, still a great deal to be gleaned from the 
remaining documents, particularly for Sandhurst. The papers concerning RMC include a large quantity of 
correspondence between the War Office and the Commandant, between the Commandant and other 
officers or cadets’ parents, and internal papers from the College. The surviving primary documents for 
Woolwich include little more than copies of exam papers and the Academy’s magazine, which was 
published right through this period. This makes a detailed assessment of certain facets of the Academy 
more difficult, although the surviving records can be supplemented by the papers of cadets who attended 
during this time. Despite the gaps, the evidence, especially in the case of the papers relating to 
Sandhurst, does allow a fairly clear and cohesive picture of teaching standards and the curriculum to be 
built up.  
The auxiliary forces are not equally represented in the available primary documents. The report 
issued in May 1904 the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, otherwise known as the Norfolk 
Commission, is a useful contemporary assessment, but it is the voluminous minutes of evidence that 
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were published alongside it which provide the most significant single source of material. The Norfolk 
Commission, however, did not examine the Yeomanry. Both the Elgin Commission’s Report and the 
Akers-Douglas Report also comment on the auxiliaries, albeit only briefly. Material relating to the 
reorganized forces brought into being by Haldane’s reforms is more diverse, and has been gathered from 
official publications, contemporary military literature and periodicals, and the papers and memoirs of 
men who served in those forces at the time. The majority of this material relates to the Territorial Force, 
and most of the rest to the Officer Training Corps, both Junior and Senior, which allows a fairly cohesive 
picture to be built up of those two corps. However, beyond the official regulations, and certain Army 
Orders, there is very little material on the Special Reserve beyond stray mentions in personal papers and 
a few pieces in contemporary journals, and this is a notable weakness in the primary material. It is 
mitigated, however, by the fact that, among the junior officers who passed into the regulars from the 
auxiliary forces, men from the Special Reserve were still heavily outnumbered by those from the Militia, 
even by 1914. 
The discussion of training after commissioning, promotion, and officers’ outlook and 
understanding of professionalism is drawn from a range of primary sources. The first two subjects are 
examined both via official documents, published and unpublished, and through personal accounts, so 
that the Army’s view of what officers ought to be doing  can be compared with the experiences of men 
actually engaged in exercises. Equally, the official view as to the purpose and objectives of training 
exercises can be compared with what officers understood themselves to be doing while on manoeuvres. 
The examination of officers’ attitudes and their notion of professionalism necessarily draws largely on 
personal papers, letters, diaries, and memoirs, although the guidance offered to them by official 
publications, and the opinions of more senior officers, are also considered. The military literature and 
periodicals of the time are valuable, both individually and collectively. For example, individual articles on 
an officer’s experience of observing an exercise can be revealing. Equally, the considerable and growing 
scope of this body of publications is an interesting source in its own right.  
For a detailed examination of the curriculum at the Staff College, the most valuable sources are 
the ‘Camberley Reds’, books of the papers, exercises, and essays which were issued to each class there. 
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The Camberley syllabus was published at the time by the army, but the Camberley Reds provide more 
detail of what was covered—and how it was covered—than the terse subject titles and brief précis of 
course content in the Camberley regulations.48 The Reds provide a considerable level of detail on the 
course of study and the focus of instruction, as well as allowing continuities and new developments in the 
course to be examined. These key primary sources have been supplemented wherever possible with the 
personal accounts of officers serving at the time, official publications like training manuals and Army 
Orders, and contemporary books and periodicals for a professional military audience. 
 The structure of the thesis is broadly chronological, in that it addresses its subjects in the same 
order that officers would experience them as their military careers progressed. Chapter One examines 
the typical routes of entry for regular officers, namely, Sandhurst and Woolwich, and discusses their staff, 
students, and curricula. Chapter Two considers the other routes of entry into the regular officer corps and 
the military worth and aptitude of those men, and the validity of this route of entry into the regulars. 
Chapter Three addresses the training, education, and study which commissioned officers undertook once 
they had joined their battalion, battery, or regiment, and Chapter Four explores the bounds of 
professional behaviour and expectation as understood by officers at the time. Chapter Five focuses on 
the Staff College, its production of trained staff officers and men fitted to hold senior command positions, 
and considers its reputation as the pinnacle of formal military education. There are aspects of training 
and education which this thesis does not examine in depth. It offers a brief discussion of the social and 
school backgrounds of officers, and the experiences of those men who had served in the Officer Training 
Corps before entering the Army, but otherwise takes military education as beginning with entry to 
Sandhurst or Woolwich, or with entry into one of the auxiliary services like the Militia.49 It does, however, 
consider men’s reasons for joining the army, as this is pertinent to their professional outlook.  
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Certain facets of the training that the Army provided are not considered. This is not because 
these portions of training were unimportant, but rather because only a small number of men passed 
through them. The Ordnance College, for example, with a typical annual intake of roughly twenty men, is 
not discussed, and neither is the administrative course which was taught by the London School of 
Economics.50 The Staff College, however, although it also had a comparatively small number of graduates, 
is the subject of Chapter Five and is examined in detail. This is because Camberley graduates played an 
important role in the training and education of other officers, and because a Staff College education was 
regarded as a very important indication of professional ability and so was keenly pursued by able and 
ambitious officers. Camberley was intended to train staff officers, but it was also intended to train 
promising officers for future high command, and so a thorough examination of the course and what 
officers took from it offers lessons more applicable to the army and the officer corps as a whole than a 
similarly thorough exploration of an institution like the Ordnance College might do. This section of the 
thesis does not overthrow or substantially revise the conclusions reached by Bond, but rather seeks to 
add to his work by studying certain facets of the Staff College in greater detail. This thesis focuses on, but 
is not entirely confined to, the officers of the British regular army. Any study considering the whole of the 
regular officer corps of the period must engage with the auxiliary officers of the period as well, owing to 
the number of men who began their military careers in the auxiliaries before transferring to the regulars. 
The Indian army is not considered, but officers of that force have not been automatically excluded from 
this study, as attendance at Sandhurst, and the chance to attend Staff College, were common to both 
British and Indian commissioned officers. The thesis concludes by considering the relevance of this study 
to debates on the ideal form and content of education for military officers.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, SANDHURST, AND THE ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, WOOLWICH: 
THE INITIAL TRAINING OF REGULAR OFFICERS 
 This chapter will examine the instruction which officer cadets received at Sandhurst and 
Woolwich, in order to determine the value and suitability of that instruction. It is divided into three main 
sections. Firstly, the situation at the end of the Boer War will be examined, through the findings of the 
Akers-Douglas Committee’s investigation into Army education and through other contemporary opinion, 
to give an indication of the strengths and weaknesses of both Sandhurst and Woolwich at the beginning 
of the Edwardian era. Secondly, the reforms undertaken at Sandhurst will be discussed. Thirdly, the 
chapter will examine the developments at Woolwich.  
The period immediately preceding the First World War was greatly influenced by the British 
Army’s experiences during the Boer War. It was not the sole influence on developments and attempts at 
reform within the Army, but it was the most important factor. This was certainly true in the tactical 
realm, as Spencer Jones has convincingly demonstrated, but there is a case to be made that it holds true 
more generally. The length, expense, and failures of the war prompted several official enquiries, and the 
ensuing recommendations for change touched many aspects of army life. The size of force deployed and 
the length of the war, coupled with the relative paucity of imperial campaigns after 1902, ensured that 
South Africa was both widely experienced among the officer corps, and was the most recent combat 
experience that most officers had until 1914. The war thus exerted a strong influence on the army’s 
development over the next decade.  
The Elgin Commission, which issued its report in 1903, was tasked with investigating the military 
preparations for the war and its subsequent conduct, and this broad remit produced a report that 
addressed intelligence and pre-war planning, the regular army, the yeomanry and militia, weapons and 
equipment, logistics, and the organisation of the War Office.1 The Commission gave some consideration 
to the supply and the quality of regular army officers, but it was the Report of the Akers-Douglas 
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Committee which was the most important for Sandhurst and Woolwich.2 The Committee, chaired by 
Aretas Akers-Douglas MP, was given a very broad remit to examine military education, including ‘whether 
it is desirable that Sandhurst and Woolwich should be maintained’ and if so, whether the education and 
administration needed change, and if the instruction should be ‘purely Military and Technical, or whether 
it should be to some extent general, with a strong Military tinge.’3 The remit included an examination of 
entry into the Regular army via the Militia, the quality of officers who entered via that route, and 
whether that method of entry should be expanded, changed, or discontinued. The Committee was also 
given carte blanche to consider and report upon ‘any other points’ they deemed important ‘in reference 
to the provision of candidates for the Army and the education of officers in the junior ranks.’4 The 
Committee included three Members of Parliament (one of whom was also an officer), two other officers, 
and the Headmaster of Eton College and the Highmaster of St Paul’s School. They examined 73 witnesses, 
many with expertise in military education, and invited a ‘very large number of officers’, the majority of 
whom were regimental commanding officers (COs), to give evidence by circular letter.5  
The Report, which was published in March 1902, began with a condemnation of the small, and 
diminishing, sums which had been made available for military education in general, and officer education 
in particular, over the preceding decade. Only 0.23 percent of the 1890-91 Estimates had been allotted to 
officer education, which fell to 0.22 percent in 1898-99 and then to just 0.15 percent by 1901-02. The 
sum of money from which officers proficient in certain languages could be rewarded fell from £4,000 to 
only £550 over the same period.6 The Committee delicately avoided an explicit mention of the Treasury, 
but observed that ‘economy appears to have been sought without sufficient regard for efficiency’, and 
thus identified a theme of Treasury parsimony which continued to exert an influence on military 
education until the outbreak of war in 1914.7 The Report noted the almost universal dissatisfaction of the 
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witnesses with ‘the present state of education, both military and general, among the officers of the Army 
as a class’ with no distinction between the abilities of Regular or Militia officers in this regard.8 Army 
education, in other words, was underfunded and required significant improvement.  
The Committee concluded that Sandhurst and Woolwich should be retained.9 One reason was 
that there was simply no alternative; the Army required 800 officers annually, and drawing the requisite 
number of men into the regulars from the Militia was deemed impossible. The Committee felt that an 
attempt to use the Militia in this manner would leave the force with more officers than required, and, 
crucially, far more than could be adequately trained.10 Such a scheme would also be prohibitively costly, 
not least because Gentlemen Cadets paid fees while Militiamen collected pay during training.11 This was a 
good reason for retaining RMA and RMC, but it might suggest, as Bowman and Connelly have argued, 
that they were being retained for want of anything better, and not on their own merits.12  
However, the Committee did identify positive reasons to keep the two institutions. They felt that 
men had to be properly trained before being commissioned, and noted that Gentlemen Cadets were 
almost the only reserve of subalterns in the event of a war. Closing Sandhurst and Woolwich would 
deprive the Army of even that small reserve, inadequate though it was.13 The Committee gave weight to 
the arguments put forward by Lord Harris’s Committee in 1888 for retaining RMC and RMA; the 
establishments instilled discipline and obedience, habituated cadets to the administrative details of 
regimental life, and saved the time of senior officers who had less to teach newly commissioned 
subalterns. Serving officers generally agreed; when 87 commanding officers were asked whether they 
preferred men from Sandhurst or from the Militia, 50 showed ‘a strong preference for the cadet, and only 
seventeen for the Militia officer,’ with the remainder feeling there was not a great deal to choose 
between the two.14 The Report states that ‘all the arguments which may be used in favour of the 
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retention of Sandhurst apply with even greater force to Woolwich.’15 The Committee, then, was not 
simply resigned to keeping Sandhurst and Woolwich for want of anything better, but identified several 
positive reasons for doing so. 
 Indeed, the Committee recommended that RMC and RMA be expanded, which again indicates 
that they were felt to be better than any other route of entry, either proposed or already existing. The 
Committee apparently saw the officer corps as a meritocratic profession requiring appropriate training; 
Woolwich, in particular, was praised for providing ‘continuous and progressive Military and scientific 
training’ available nowhere else.16 Such professional preparation was deemed essential and the 
Committee wished more Regular officers to benefit from it, although not to the total exclusion of other 
means of entry; a broad pool of potential officers was seen as both positive and necessary. As noted 
earlier, the Army needed roughly 800 officers annually, and Sandhurst and Woolwich combined were, at 
that point, able to commission no more than 510 men a year. The resulting deficiency, which had to be 
made good from other sources, was ‘larger than is desirable’ so the Committee recommended increasing 
cadet intakes at both institutions.17  
 
Criticisms of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich 
The Committee was generally impressed by Woolwich, and their criticism fell largely on the 
physical properties of the Academy itself. Inadequate accommodation required cadets to share rooms, 
which was condemned in light of the high fees that cadets’ parents paid. There were problems with the 
chapel, hospital, and riding school, but the main issue was with classrooms which were inadequate in 
number and layout.18 In academic matters, the overall picture was a positive one. Cadets lived simply 
under firm discipline, showed ‘industry and intelligence’ and were ‘well taught on sound principles’ by 
capable instructors. The prospect of a commission in the Royal Engineers (RE) was a significant 
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inducement to hard work, and the Committee felt this incentive to be entirely adequate. It was in the 
details of the curriculum, and the focus of teaching, that there was room for improvement. 
The Committee wanted a more practical syllabus with a greater focus on tactics. The Report 
queried why Woolwich had no Military History course when the subject was taught at Sandhurst—one of 
the few instances in which the Committee criticised RMA in comparison with RMC, rather than the other 
way around. There were problems with the end-of-semester exams, particularly the ‘anomalous’ 
emphasis on non-military subjects which mirrored the imbalance in teaching time;  the 1902 
examinations gave 6,500 marks for mathematics and 2,400 marks for French or German, but only 1,500 
marks for Tactics. 19 The Committee did not give RMA a clean bill of health, but the criticism was far from 
damning. The suggested changes at Woolwich amounted to a change in emphasis and style of teaching, 
rather than a dramatic overhaul.  
 
Criticisms of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst 
The Commission was not impressed by Sandhurst, and identified a series of failings. The Report 
included trenchant criticism of broad swathes of what the College did, but teaching and course content 
were identified as particularly poor; the Report noted that ‘certain defects are at once apparent’ in the 
syllabus. Tactical instruction was inadequate, as cadets had only 60 hours of instruction on Tactics in a 
year at Sandhurst.20 Worse, 40 percent of this time was spent indoors, and the teaching of Tactics lacked 
any kind of link to Military Topography or Military Engineering, when the ‘intimate relation’ amongst the 
three subjects should have been heavily impressed upon the cadets.21 The examinations were similarly 
flawed; the Tactics paper was worth only a small share of the total marks available, and the exams were 
written in a way likely to encourage ‘cram’ rather than exacting a thorough understanding of general 
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principles.22 This discouraged independent thought and, the Committee feared, tended to instil in a cadet 
a dislike of military study ‘which too often remains with him throughout his career’.23  
The Report argued that cadets passing out should have ‘a firm foundation of military knowledge; 
under an intelligent system his education in the higher branches of military science will follow.’24 The 
Committee wished to raise the quality of teaching staff, and suggested means for ensuring that all senior 
staff were graduates of Staff College and all junior staff were ‘young and capable officers’ with ambitions 
of rising up the ranks.25 They recommended that the Commandant report on whether cadets were ‘in 
every respect fit to hold His Majesty’s commission,’ and have the power to ‘rusticate’ a cadet—i.e. to 
force a cadet to drop a semester and repeat it—or deny him a commission altogether.26 This was the 
corollary to being ‘dropped’ or rejected as unfit for failing exams, which ensured that cadets gaining a 
commission would be disciplined, physically fit, and of good character, as well as mentally able. The 
Commandant’s role should be to oversee instruction and discipline, and to manage plans for ‘combined 
tactical exercises’ and the instruction of tactics at the annual summer camp.27  
Thus, the Committee made a number of serious complaints about the curriculum at Sandhurst. It 
was deemed to be poorly focused and improperly taught, with too little attention given to Tactics and 
insufficient practical instruction. The examinations repeated these errors by awarding too many marks in 
non-tactical subjects, asking cadets to regurgitate facts instead of think, and being too theoretical. They 
were concerned by the time devoted to indoor instruction, and the fact that officers did not teach some 
subjects and failed to adequately oversee others. They also wished to see more robust selection applied 
to the staff, both to ensure that all the senior instructors had passed Staff College, and to remove any 
officer who was not performing adequately. 
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Military Education: The Balance of Opinion after the Boer War 
The Akers-Douglas Committee had a lengthy and serious list of concerns about Sandhurst and 
Woolwich, although by far the greater quantity and severity of complaint fell on Sandhurst. 
Unsurprisingly, the Report drew pessimistic conclusions about military education, finding it ‘in a most 
unsatisfactory condition.’28 The Committee’s conclusions cannot be discounted, but they can be 
tempered by placing them alongside other contemporary opinion; the Elgin Commission’s Report in 1903, 
which made an examination of regular officers during the Boer War, acknowledged that ‘there is no 
subject of more supreme importance to… the Army than the supply of officers,’ but drew conclusions 
different from those of the Akers-Douglas Committee.29  
The Commission’s findings concerning young officers were broadly positive. Field-Marshal Lord 
Roberts, General Lord Kitchener, and Lieutenant-General Sir John French all gave evidence praising junior 
officers, with Roberts noting that ‘the general standard of practical knowledge, of devotion to duty, and 
of readiness under difficulties [among junior regimental officers] was at least as high as in any Army 
which I have known, or of which I have read.’30 Kitchener was more moderate, regretting that there was 
‘too often a want of serious study of their profession by officers who are, I think, rather included to deal 
too lightly with military questions of moment,’ but he did note that junior officers were better than their 
seniors.31 French felt that junior officers displayed initiative that their superiors often lacked.32 Major-
General Robert Baden-Powell and Major-General Sir Henry Colvile, however, both felt that greater 
initiative was necessary, and criticised senior officers for stifling this on manoeuvres. Baden-Powell felt 
that ‘the large majority of officers are keen enough and intelligent enough, but want to be given a real 
job in which to make their name and develop their professional interest,’ and the Commission noted that 
a great volume of evidence supported these conclusions.33 The overall view of junior officers was broadly 
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positive; although there was certainly room for improvement, they were generally free of the failings 
identified among senior officers and some staff officers.  
While none of the points raised was directly related to military education, the fact that junior 
officers had tended to perform well, and certainly had performed better than many older men, suggests 
that perhaps the condition of military education was not as gloomy as the Akers-Douglas Report made it 
out to be. At the very least, it suggests that young men entering the army were sufficiently intelligent and 
committed to overcome shortcomings in their educations, contrary to fears that officers had been 
permanently ruined by the time they passed out. This is not, of course, to suggest that reforms were not 
needed—change was definitely required, as another contemporary publication argued. The Defence of 
Duffer’s Drift was first published in 1904 as a fictionalised guide to minor tactics for subalterns. That the 
advice it gives remains relevant today is perhaps less interesting than the fact it was written in the first 
place, to fill what the author, Captain Ernest Swinton, explicitly identified as a gap in the knowledge of 
newly-commissioned officers. As Chapter Three will demonstrate, this book was hardly unique, either in 
being written by a serving officer, or in seeking to offer guidance on military subjects. Rather, it is 
significant because of its particularly wide reach and warm reception. It was considered, although 
ultimately rejected, as an official textbook, but nevertheless was widely read in the Army and many 
infantry units adopted it as an unofficial text.34  
The story’s hero is ordered to hold a ford with a detachment of 50 men, but despite having 
passed all his exams and commanding good men from a good regiment, he finds it a difficult task. He 
remarks that he was well-prepared to refight Waterloo, Bull Run or Sedan, but that his current duty was 
something he ‘had never really considered… However, in light of my habitual dealings with army corps, it 
would, no doubt, be child’s-play after a little thought.’35 Eventually, after a series of dreams, each of 
which teaches him several key tactical lessons, he succeeds at his task, but his previous lack of basic 
tactical training, and the irrelevance of being taught ‘how to tie an overhand knot and the time needed to 
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cut down an apple tree six inches thick,’ are made abundantly clear.36 In contrast to the Elgin 
Commission’s findings, this is a very direct commentary on military education, but the conclusion is much 
the same. A young officer, whose good mind and willingness to learn were not harmed at Sandhurst, 
overcame faults in his education, but those faults were serious and the need for reform was clear.  
 
The Royal Military College, Sandhurst 
 The results of the investigations into Army education prompted by the Boer War meant that staff 
at Sandhurst faced a long list of suggested reforms. A great many changes were made and the quality of 
military education significantly improved by 1914. The Commandants ensured that the staff were chosen 
carefully from among well-qualified soldiers, and by the middle of the period Sandhurst met the Akers-
Douglas Committee’s recommendation that all senior staff should be men who had passed Staff College, 
denoted by the letters psc after their name on the Army List. The syllabus was overhauled to place 
tactical instruction at the centre of the course, alongside the allied subjects of military engineering and 
topography. The tactical instruction emphasised the centrality of firepower on the battlefield and the 
need for initiative, dispersion, and concealment, and prepared cadets well for modern battle. The cadets 
themselves took their studies seriously and worked hard, drawing motivation, in part, from the change in 
selection method for entry to the Indian Army, which came to be determined by marks on the final exam 
rather than the entry exam. It should be noted that not every recommendation was acted upon; certain 
of the proposed alterations were disregarded. These were minor, sometimes little more than cosmetic; 
the titles of ‘Professor’ and ‘Instructor’ were retained, for example, and Non-Commissioned Officers 
(NCOs) continued to handle some instruction, particularly of drill.37 The College and the War Office did 
not adopt the findings of the Report wholesale, but focused on the most substantial reforms and allowed 
some criticisms of insignificant points to fall by the wayside.  
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 The organization of the staff at Sandhurst did not change markedly in this period. The senior staff 
consisted of a Commandant, an assistant Commandant, and an Adjutant. The teaching and discipline 
were handled largely (but not exclusively) by officers, who taught all the subjects bar languages, and who 
were also attached to one of the Cadet Companies. German and French were taught by civilians, all 
native speakers, although Hindustani was taught throughout the period by Major Chapman of the 
Reserve of Officers.38 The cadets were formed into six Companies of 60 men, each commanded by an 
officer (typically a Major), who was usually assisted by four other officers (typically Captains).39 The 
number of cadets at RMC did not change significantly in the early years, save for the fluctuations brought 
about by changes in course length, but increased with the formation of G, H, and K Companies in 
September 1912, January 1913 and September 1913 respectively, which brought the total number of 
Gentlemen Cadets to nearly 600.40 Most cadets between 1902 and 1914 spent either a year or 18 months 
at Sandhurst before passing out, depending on the instructions passed down from the War Office. In 
1904, as part of the reforms discussed below, the course was extended to two years’ duration, but in 
1905 was cut to a year. It was then extended to eighteen months in 1906, before being shortened and 
then extended again in 1908 and 1912, respectively.41 When the courses were a year long, the newly 
arrived cadets were classed as the Junior Division, and those returning for a second term the Senior 
Division. This became the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions when the College was operating on a three-term 
system.  
 
The Staff of Sandhurst 
 The Commandant was the College’s senior officer. There were three Commandants between 
1902 and 1914, all Colonels. Colonel G. C. Kitson, CMG, psc, took up his post on 17 September 1902, and 
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was succeeded by Colonel W. B. Capper, psc, on 15 January 1907. He in turn was succeeded by Colonel L. 
A. M. Stopford, psc, on 15 January 1911, who held the post until after the outbreak of war.42 It is worth 
noting that all three men had passed Staff College. The requirement for all senior staff to be psc was not 
introduced immediately after the Boer War, but by March 1907, the War Office was writing to Capper 
about the appointment of officers to vacancies, noting that while Major Norris RFA ‘is no doubt an 
excellent officer in all respects’ he was not a Staff College graduate and thus ineligible under the 
regulations to hold the position of Company Commander.43 Because there was a steady turnover of staff 
at Sandhurst rather than arrivals and departures en masse, it is difficult to pin down exactly when the 
transition to a senior staff composed entirely of psc men was complete. It seems that most Company 
Commanders were already Staff College graduates by 1907; the process was certainly complete by 1912, 
when the Commandant, the Second-in-Command, and all seven Company Commanders were psc.44 This 
achieved one of the recommendations of the Akers-Douglas Report, and meant that a significant portion 
of the teaching staff were drawn from the most highly educated and professionally ambitious men in the 
Army. Oddly, the only senior officer in 1912 who was not psc was the Adjutant, Major Crispin. He had, 
however, come to the College in 1910 after holding several Staff appointments, and his duties were 
administrative and organizational rather than instructional.45 
 Major Crispin’s career prior to his arrival at Sandhurst is instructive. He was commissioned in 
1892, served in the Nile Expedition and was present at the Battle of Khartoum. He commanded a unit of 
mounted infantry in the Boer War, was twice severely wounded, was mentioned in dispatches, and was 
promoted to Brevet-Major, back-dated to November 1900.46 His career before Sandhurst involved a good 
deal of active service and other professional attainments, and he offers a model of the kind of officer that 
the RMC sought to attract and retain. To give another example, Captain Beadon, Army Service Corps 
(ASC), was appointed officer of a Company of Cadets in 1910. He was commissioned in 1896 and saw 
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active service in West Africa 1897-8 and Sierra Leone 1898-9, for which he was awarded the Africa Medal 
with two clasps. He served in Jamaica, where he was promoted Captain in 1900, and then Gibraltar, 
before returning to the UK in 1905. He spent three years as an Adjutant immediately prior to his posting 
to RMC, and had passed Schools of Instruction in Military Topography, Musketry, Riding, Signalling, 
Supply, and Transport.47 Appointed to the same role at the same time, Captain Wood had seen no active 
service, but had served in the UK, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Singapore, and East India since commissioning in 
1893. He passed Schools of Instruction in Gymnastics, Musketry, and Range Finding, and commanded a 
unit of mounted infantry during a course of instruction at Poona in 1901. He had also spent nearly three 
years as Adjutant of his battalion before taking up his position at RMC.48 That both these men were 
Adjutants prior to their appointments indicates the care that was taken to ensure that able and 
professionally capable men made up the staff of the College.  
 Attracting such men was one thing, but the College was not always able to keep them. Shortly 
after arriving, Kitson received a request from Captain Knox, one of the Tactics teaching staff, that he 
might retain his position. The War Office had ordered that no man whose appointment was up could 
remain beyond the Christmas of 1902. Captain Knox put forward his case with ‘the greatest diffidence’, 
having been encouraged by Kitson’s ‘great appreciation of my efforts here.’ Knox had passed Staff 
College, and when war broke out in 1899, more than once asked if he might leave RMC to join his 
battalion and fight. He had good reason to believe he would be battalion Adjutant, but his requests were 
denied. Knox turned down requests to be Aide-de-Camp (ADC) to first the Governor of Jamaica and then 
the Governor of Bermuda, again because he could not be spared from teaching. He justifiably felt that he 
had ‘lost the chance of a life time in not being allowed to go on service’, and that being able to stay in his 
current job would be some compensation. Kitson forwarded Knox’s request to the Commander in Chief, 
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adding that Sandhurst owed ‘a great deal to Captain Knox’ and that ‘[I] should be glad to retain him.’49 A 
reply from the War Office denied Knox’s request.50  
Other requests were more successful. Capper wished to keep Major Ravenshaw as Adjutant 
beyond 25 July 1907, as the cadets were at their summer training camp until the 22nd, and a great deal of 
work remained to be done after that date. The War Office allowed him to remain until 6 September, 
which was a more sensible transition point, especially as his scheduled departure on the 25th was itself an 
extension from 27 March, which was in the middle of the spring term.51 The Commandants did not 
confine their efforts to the commissioned instructors. A volume of correspondence relates to the 
selection, appointment and retention of NCOs. In May 1907 Capper wrote to the Inspector of Gymnasia 
to protest against orders for the temporary removal of the College’s gymnastics instructors, which would 
have left the cadets under strange instructors for the final three weeks before their exams. Capper noted 
that the instructors could attend the planned two month course on the new system of physical training of 
recruits during the College’s summer holiday, between 2 July and 12 September. This request was 
granted.52   
Sometimes the Commandant faced budgetary difficulties when it came to instructors. Captain 
Chapman took up the role of Hindustani Instructor in September 1901, alongside his duties as ‘Attached 
Officer’ with the Intelligence Division. He was doing two jobs but his work at RMC was entirely unpaid, 
and he wrote to the Commandant requesting that his teaching be paid equally to the French and German 
instructors, namely £350 a year. He taught two classes of 35 cadets each and was amply qualified, having 
served in India on the Educational Staff of the Bombay Army. He had supervised the language instruction 
of Indian Army native troops, and had passed Higher Proficiency Tests in Hindustani, Persian, Goojerati, 
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Marathi, Sindi, and Beloochi. He had also passed Interpreter in Russian.53 The War Office noted that his 
appointment was temporary and would remain so until the Akers-Douglas Committee issued its report 
and a decision was taken on whether language teaching at Sandhurst would continue. Until such time, he 
would be paid only £200 annually, with a housing allowance of £50. The War Office warned that any 
other recompense he might currently be receiving was to cease at once.54 How Captain Chapman felt 
about this might be imagined. But his pay was eventually put on a proper footing and he was still at RMC 
in 1914.55  
  The care that the Commandants took over the staff of the College is evident from the 
correspondence, and they made an effort to improve the future career prospects of departing staff. 
Whether RMC instructors arrived with the intention of using a successful teaching appointment as a 
career stepping-stone, or whether the Commandants sought to make a place at Staff College—and all the 
possibilities of advancement that it offered—one of the possible rewards for good teaching, is unclear. 
There is no explicit link made in the correspondence between an appointment at RMC and improved 
career prospects. However, the number of Company Officers who were recommended for a place at 
Camberley, or who sought to apply there, indicates that teaching at Sandhurst was probably coming to be 
seen as a good career move, and a good step for an aspiring and thoughtful officer. Some of this was due 
to the careful selection of promising and capable officers; in July 1913 Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, 
commanding 1st battalion The Buffs, wrote to Stopford that Captain Trueman, a new Company Officer, 
had been placed on the selection list for Staff College before he left his battalion.56 That a man in 
Trueman’s position would seek to go to Staff College after his teaching appointment is hardly surprising, 
and he would not have needed a special recommendation to do so, although of course an adverse report 
from the Commandant would have been a very serious obstacle.  
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 Equally, the Commandants were willing to send capable men to Staff College if they proved to be 
successful instructors. Capper recommended Major Bell-Smyth for a place at Staff College because he had 
‘proved a tactful whole-hearted successful instructor of Gentlemen Cadets’ and because he was 
confident that the Major would prove a ‘very valuable staff officer.’ Capper also noted that the Major 
‘would be only too glad’ to attend Camberley.57 Similarly, Kitson recommended Captain Harrington for 
the Staff College, mentioning his exceptional organizational abilities, his ‘absolutely dependable and 
reliable’ character, and his ‘many years’ as Adjutant with his regiment.58 Such recommendations were not 
the typical reward—not everyone would have been ‘my right hand man at the Royal Military College’, as 
Kitson described Harrington—but it does indicate that the staff were sufficiently capable and 
professionally committed that many were deemed suitable for the upper echelons of the officer corps. 
Indeed, it would have been foolish for the Commandant to recommend for the Staff College any officer 
who was not entirely suitable; army regulations stated that ‘if an officer, while at the Staff College, proves 
himself clearly unfitted for staff employment, this fact will be noted by the Army Council as showing a 
want of judgment and capacity in the officers who recommended him.’59 It is important to note that Staff 
College was not the only way for Commandants to reward good service.  Stopford wrote to the War 
Office to urge accelerated promotion for Captain Duff, the Quartermaster of RMC, in light of the 
increased burden which the opening of the New College had thrown upon ‘this most deserving officer,’ 
whose ‘excellent arrangements… [meant] that the work has progressed without a hitch.’60 
 What the Commandants dispensed with one hand they were perfectly willing to take away with 
the other, if an officer failed to do his duty. On 18 November 1907, Captain Wilson was not present on 
parade with his company. This was the second time it had happened, and Capper had to ‘seriously 
consider whether I can countenance his remaining on the staff of this college, as examples of this nature 
are not such as I can allow to be set to Gentlemen Cadets.’ Capper requested his Second-in-Command to 
warn Captain Wilson that ‘his future rests entirely in his own hands,’ and that action would be taken if 
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any further dereliction took place.61 It seems this warning proved effective, as the file contains an internal 
memorandum noting that Captain Wilson was warned, and his written report offering an explanation, but 
no further paperwork beyond that. Officers who performed adequately but failed a promotion exam 
were also liable to removal; the Director of Staff Duties notified Kitson that Major MacFarlan had failed to 
pass his Tactical Fitness for Command exam, and that if MacFarlan failed his next promotion exam, ‘it 
may become necessary to consider whether he shall be retained in his appointment at the Royal Military 
College.’62 Failing a promotion exam was not something that necessarily impacted his teaching or any of 
his other work at Sandhurst, but it indicates the importance the Commandant and the War Office placed 
on ensuring that the staff were professionally able, and on removing them if they proved otherwise. 
While sometimes the relationship between the Commandant and the War Office could seem almost 
adversarial if adequate funding for teaching or remuneration of staff was a matter of debate, on other 
matters they were much closer together, and the quality of teaching staff was one such area.  
The Director of Military Training wrote to Stopford in June 1913 about Major Hare, a Company 
Commander, who had been almost constantly on medical leave since February. The question was 
whether the Major was likely to be fit for duty in the near future, and what impact his illness had had on 
his Company and its efficiency. Stopford replied that the instruction of A Company ‘has inevitably 
suffered.’ Prior to Easter, Major Hare’s Military History course was taught by three of his Company 
Officers, each of whom took a campaign ‘in addition to their other work.’ After Easter, Captain Stewart 
arrived for temporary duty. Stopford recognised that the ‘constant change of instruction is a most 
important subject.’ The Director of Military Training replied that, if Major Hare fell ill again, or was unable 
to resume his duties by September, he would be asked to resign.63 This was perhaps a bit unfair on Major 
Hare, but it does show that the Commandant and the War Office were both willing and able to deal with 
officers who were, for whatever reason, failing to meet the necessary standards.  
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 The teaching staff of Sandhurst would likely have met with the approval of the Akers-Douglas 
Committee in 1914. The Committee’s desire that all senior staff be graduates of the Staff College had 
been met, and the Commandants attempted to ensure that the College attracted and retained able and 
professional soldiers. Among the instructors of this period, there was no shortage of active service 
experience. Many also had experience as regimental Adjutants, and with postings to most of the far 
corners of the Empire and a variety of training courses, there was a wealth of experience available for 
cadets to draw upon. There was clearly an effort to promote the careers and professional advancement 
of men who performed well, and, equally, the Commandant was not shy about threatening to remove an 
officer who did not. Not every recommendation from the Akers-Douglas Report was taken up; NCOs 
continued to play an important role in teaching riding and drill, but most of the Committee’s concerns, 
and all of the significant ones, had been addressed. 
 
The Sandhurst Syllabus 
 Some of the most severe criticism of Sandhurst related to what the cadets were, or were not, 
taught. The list of faults was a long one, but the primary failings concerned Tactics. Cadets spent too little 
time on the subject, learned too much theory, had too little practice, and sat exams which repeated these 
flaws. Tactical lessons were isolated from the rest of the curriculum, with no links drawn between tactics 
and its natural companions topography and fortification. The flaws in tactical teaching were replicated 
elsewhere, in lessons that were too theoretical, too often indoors, and focused on details rather than 
general principles.  
 In October 1903, Kitson was ordered to submit a revised syllabus to the War Office.64 What he 
proposed for Tactics began with basic definitions and information then moved on to the ‘effect of ground 
on Tactics’ and discussions on each of the three arms separately and together in combination. Orders, 
night operations, colonial campaigning, and the attack and defence of various terrain features were part 
of the classroom component. The practical work included outposts, placing sentries and pickets, the use 
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of blank ammunition, reconnaissance, scouting, and patrols, and the ‘attack and defence of small 
positions both by means of Plans and actual Practice.’65 The proposed textbook was DeGruyther’s Tactics 
for Beginners, which is discussed below.  
The proposals for Military Topography were on the same pattern, with the use of maps and 
instruments taught in the classroom, and outdoor practice applying these skills to actual ground, 
including marches through woodland in daytime and across country at night, and creating new maps or 
sketches of ground.66 Military Engineering was similar. Cadets were to be taught about explosives, certain 
technical details of artillery pieces and ammunition, and the penetrating power of rifle bullets against 
various materials. Geometrical drawing, building field fortifications, and clearing fields of fire were all 
included, as were the construction and maintenance of roads, railways, and telegraphs. Cadets would 
learn about various bridge types, how to construct improvised bridges, and camping arrangements like 
field kitchens, latrines, and water supply. Demolitions of various structures, both with and without 
explosives, were also included. Outdoor work included inspecting machine guns and artillery, 
experiments firing rifles at various materials to discover bullet penetration, the preparation of field 
works, and various skills necessary in making camp.67  
The syllabus thus included a large amount of outdoor instruction, parts of which apparently 
involved cadets in a good deal of physical exertion. The College employed thirteen full-time labourers, 
and three more part-time workers, during term-time to dismantle bridges and fill in trenches after cadets 
were finished making them. The labourers also had to prepare outdoor sites for classes by providing the 
necessary stores, constructing sample earthworks, and making stockades. The cadets got hands-on 
experience with more than just digging and building during their outdoor work; a man in the Fortification 
Office was tasked with issuing ‘diagrams, schemes, models and explosives to classes.’ 68  Whether the 
cadets regarded a bit of demolition as an exciting change from digging earthworks is not recorded. The 
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outdoor work did not cease when term ended, but continued for a fortnight at the summer camp on 
Salisbury Plain. The cadets had a fair bit of work before arriving at camp, however, as it was a three day 
march between Sandhurst and Tidworth Pennings Camp.69 Kitson requested that particular camp because 
it was ‘very convenient owing to the close proximity of the Rifle Range.’70  
Kitson set exercises for the cadets’ march between Sandhurst and Salisbury. The General Idea 
was that ‘an army covered by a screen of dismounted troops, is marching from LONDON in order to 
attack an invading army which has disembarked at WEYMOUTH.’ The Special Idea dispatched officers to 
reconnoitre suitable routes near Sandhurst for an advanced guard of all arms, and to find places for that 
force to camp. The second day’s work concerned outpost positions to cover the selected camping 
grounds. The third day’s exercise involved reconnaissance of an enemy position along a given line, and 
cadets had to sketch the position without getting any nearer than 500 yards. The two best Junior and 
Senior reports from each Cadet Company were submitted for the Commandant’s inspection.71  
Tactics, Military Engineering, and Military Topography were seen as the key to producing officers 
with appropriate tactical awareness and abilities, and the proposed syllabus contained a great deal of 
practical instruction likely to be useful to a subaltern. The courses on Military Law and Military 
Administration were less likely to prove directly relevant on a battlefield, but were essential for producing 
officers who could function within the army and administer their units—after all, as Gary Sheffield noted, 
even during a war, officers and their men spent more time off the battlefield than on it.72 The Military 
History and Geography course was to be centred on the Fredericksburg Campaign, and the elements of 
strategy were to be taught prior to, and in conjunction with, the rest of the course.73 
 The tactical textbook was DeGruyther’s Tactics for Beginners. It was first published in 1899, with 
a 1902 edition updated in light of South African experiences. The third edition made brief mention of the 
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Russo-Japanese War, although the author noted the need for a fourth edition with more information 
drawn from ‘more reliable and unbiased accounts.’74 DeGruyther was a Major and a graduate of the Staff 
College who had formerly taught at Sandhurst. As with the syllabus, the book began by setting out basic 
information on unit sizes and roles, and the impact of time and space on the battlefield. Outposts, 
marches, advanced and rear guards, reports, and reconnaissance were each covered in a separate 
chapter, which laid out principles and rules of thumb, quoting periodically from published army manuals, 
but which explicitly avoided laying down firm rules. DeGruyther noted that ‘outpost duties must be 
carried out on accepted principles rather than by any precise rules, as the conditions under which the 
work has to be performed vary considerably,’ and similar statements can be found regularly throughout 
the text.75 
 ‘The Evolution of Tactics since 1866’ is a detailed chapter full of historical examples. The lessons 
of the Franco-Prussian War were that ‘shock tactics [were] no longer possible’, that swarms of 
skirmishers were the only possible attack formation, and that it was absolutely vital for artillery to 
support their infantry, even if at considerable risk to themselves. The failings of the French cavalry, and 
the lack of firepower of both French and Prussian cavalry, were condemned, as were the failures of both 
sides to use entrenchments after the US Civil War ‘had clearly established their value.’76 The Russo-
Turkish war provided further lessons, including the need to cover advancing troops with rifle fire as well 
as artillery fire, and the inability of carbine-armed cavalry to engage infantry on equal terms.77 The 
discussion of the impact of smokeless powder and the lessons of the Boer War was astute. DeGruyther 
noted that extended formations with fifteen or twenty paces between each man were ‘not at all 
uncommon’ and that attacking was now much harder; small rushes covered by fire were the only way to 
get forward, and ‘crawling must be resorted to in the later stages of attack.’78 The utility of machine guns 
was emphasized, delegation described as ‘absolutely essential,’ and the value of concealment and cover 
for men and guns had again increased. Cavalry should rely primarily on dismounted action as firepower 
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was predominant on the battlefield.79 The discussion of Manchuria was necessarily tentative, but 
observations supported the lessons already emphasized, especially those of the Boer War.80 That the 
chosen textbook stressed firepower in this way, and made practical and relevant observations about the 
nature of the modern battlefield, rather undercuts some of the more negative assessments of the army’s 
understanding of firepower and its impact on tactics.81  
 The battlefield impact of firepower in recent wars was then explained for each arm. Cavalry 
needed long and thorough training and an understanding of how best to apply firepower on the 
battlefield.82 Artillery had to gain fire superiority, either concentrating or dispersing itself as required, and 
should conceal itself by making full use of ground.83 Infantry needed to use firepower to win battles, and 
for that fire control and proper ranging were key.84 Officers had to be able to use their tactical knowledge 
to formulate plans suitable for their circumstances because ‘Infantry Training [i.e. the Army training 
manual] very rightly does not lay down any normal system of attack.’85 The book then offers chapters on 
the combination of all three arms in both attack and defence, night marches, and the peculiar tactical 
features of villages, woods, rivers and defiles, before offering a chapter on what it calls ‘Savage Warfare.’ 
DeGruyther noted that almost every British campaign of the preceding forty years had been undertaken 
against non-European opponents, and because officers must be ready at any time for imperial 
campaigning, they must study such tactics. ‘The subject is a large one… Cadets have not much time for 
reading anything outside the prescribed course in Tactics, but they are recommended to study the works 
mentioned in the foot-note, at the very first opportunity they get.’ The works in the footnote were 
Callwell’s Small Wars, Peach’s Tactics of Savage Warfare, Younghusband’s Indian Frontier Warfare, and 
Hutchinson’s The Campaign in Tirah.86 The chapter on imperial campaigning again emphasized that giving 
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set rules was impossible, although certain general principles were highlighted.87 The book ends with a 
significant statement; ‘in conclusion, the reader is reminded that the subject of Tactics is practically 
inexhaustible, and it is only by studying past campaigns that a thorough knowledge of the subject can be 
acquired. This book is simply intended to act as a groundwork for future study.’88  
 This textbook was a thoroughly up-to-date publication that provided cadets with a solid 
grounding in essential facts and taught valid tactical principles through an analysis of recent campaigns. It 
emphasized that firepower was paramount on the modern battlefield and so concealment and cover for 
troops were extremely important. It laid stress on the need for a comprehensive study of tactics and set 
out general principles rather than rules, repeatedly promoting independent thought and the use of 
initiative in solving tactical problems. It also encouraged cadets to pursue further study, not just at 
Sandhurst but throughout their careers. It was a textbook which, together with the proposed tactical 
syllabus, went a long way towards answering the criticisms of the Akers-Douglas Committee and the 
young subaltern hero of Duffer’s Drift. 
 The syllabus which Kitson proposed to the War Office was the subject of several letters back and 
forth, and although the War Office requested some minor changes, like the inclusion of ‘Elementary 
Strategy’ and the listing of the portions of the textbooks that cadets would study in each term, the War 
Office was satisfied.89 The new syllabus came into use in January 1904.90 But ensuring that cadets were 
given detailed and modern instruction, and that more of it was taught outdoors with a strong practical 
focus, addressed only one facet of the criticisms of Sandhurst. There remained the inadequate focus on 
tactical instruction and the examinations that cadets faced. These problems were also resolved. 
The allocation of marks in the final examinations remained similar for most subjects, but changed 
dramatically in the case of Tactics, especially in the final exams before cadets passed out. The marks for 
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Military Topography and Military Engineering were also altered, although the overall proportion of marks 
available for Tactics, Topography, and Engineering, as a group, remained similar, as shown in Figure 1. 
Full details of the marks for each subject in 1900-1901, and subsequent to the reform in 1904, are given 
in Appendix One. The most significant change outside of these three subjects was the inclusion in the 
reformed curriculum of an exam in musketry worth 300 marks. 
 
Figure 1. Selected Subject Marks in Sandhurst Final Exams 91 
 1900-1901 1904 
Tactics  450 950 
Military Engineering 900 450 
Military Topography 800 750 
Total for all subjects 3800 4450 
 
 The new mark scheme redressed the imbalance evident in the earlier exams. Tactics became the 
single most important subject in the curriculum, and rather than being worth only eleven percent overall, 
and thus only marginally more important than Law, Administration, or a Language, it now encompassed 
more than 20 percent of the total marks. Taken together, the three subjects most important in preparing 
a subaltern for the battlefield—Tactics, Engineering, and Topography—made up nearly half of the total 
marks.  There was no escaping their significance, and the absolutely central importance of Tactics, even 
among the more numerous new subjects, and this was not lost on the cadets. Gentleman Cadet Burnell 
wrote to his parents that ‘We did a paper on “Tactics” the other day. It is, of course, the most important 
of our subjects.’92 Perhaps equally significant was the way that the marks within each subject were 
awarded. The plans for the new final examinations, the marks for which are given in Appendix Two, show 
that a modest number of marks were awarded in key subjects by Company Officers or by the Instructor, 
perhaps for practical coursework (although, sadly, the surviving documents are silent on this point), and 
that practical sections on the final exams were worth 1,200 of the 4,450 total marks.93 The exams also 
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underlined the very close relationship amongst Tactics, Military Topography, and Military Engineering, to 
the extent that the three subjects came to be assessed together in a Combined Exam.94 
 Not many exam papers from Sandhurst survive, but those that do are instructive. The tactics 
exams, for example, indicate a progressive curriculum, with cadets in their first term asked to define 
concepts like ‘strategy,’ ‘enfilade,’ and ‘key of the position,’ to explain ‘the effects of smokeless powder 
and magazine rifles upon minor tactics’, and to ‘discuss the development of tactics’ with reference to 
campaigns they had studied, as well as explaining the principles of employment of the three arms.95 
Similarly, the same exam the next year required cadets to define ‘tactical unit,’ ‘frontage,’ and ‘active 
defence,’ to create an advanced guard for a mixed column in open country, and to know the duties of an 
outpost commander. Quoting Combined Training, the exam noted that an essential prerequisite for 
gaining superiority of fire is ‘an intelligent use of the ground. What do you understand by this?’96 After a 
term of study, cadets were expected to have a firm grasp of concepts and an ability to apply them to 
practical problems, as well as an awareness of how recent technological developments had changed the 
battlefield.  
 Senior cadets faced more involved exam questions with a stronger focus on solving practical 
battlefield problems.  They were asked how best to conduct reconnaissance before an assault, and which 
information would be most valuable in that situation, and to list the principles governing how to 
distribute the three arms for an attack. They had to explain why cooperation of all three arms was a 
necessity, and why officers should all be ‘thoroughly acquainted with the principles governing the action 
of arms other than their own.’97 They were also asked to decide whether it was ‘ever permissible for an 
officer to act contrary to orders he has received from his senior officer in the field’, and if so, when. 
Cadets were given the scenario of commanding a picket posted to protect a division at the end of its day’s 
march. Having halted their men at the location selected for the picket, cadets had to ‘describe what you 
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will do in the next 2 hours.’98 Scenarios like this were sometimes extended, to the point that some exams 
look almost like papers for manoeuvres or a staff ride; cadets were provided with a map and a General 
Idea, then presented with a specific situation and asked to list their plan of action, write orders to put it 
into effect, and ‘explain in detail how you would use your machine gun.’ Older cadets were also required 
to know the principles which should guide an officer in interpreting his orders.99  
All cadets were expected to weigh what they knew, make a decision, and then communicate it 
clearly. It was an exam for Juniors which raised the issue of whether smokeless powder and improved 
weaponry benefited attackers or defenders more, and asked: ‘Which side do you take? Give your reasons 
for doing so.’ Cadets were warned that marks would be given for ‘clearness and conciseness. Long 
rambling statements are of very little value.’100 This suggests that the tactical teaching, like the text-book, 
was non-prescriptive and demanded that cadets think clearly—and write clearly—rather than merely 
absorb and parrot information. Even more explicit were the preface notes to the Senior exam, which 
advised any candidate that if ‘he requires more information regarding the military situation than is given 
by the Examiner, he may make any reasonable assumptions’, taking care to highlight these in his answer, 
and then stated that ‘The Examiner allows for very great difference of opinion with regard to the solution 
of a tactical problem.’101  
These exams indicate that tactical teaching was centred on an understanding of principles, and 
aimed to prepare cadets for the kinds of tasks they were likely to face as a subaltern by asking them to 
apply those principles to various scenarios. It is clear that cadets were expected to understand the place 
of initiative and independent thought in battle. While the examinations also had a purely practical 
component, even the written portions were largely practical, eschewing theory and the regurgitation of 
memorised facts and figures. They were a far cry from the overly-theoretical and prescriptive exams that 
had tended to reduce cadets’ revision to ‘crammed’ facts and figures, which the Akers-Douglas Report 
had so roundly condemned. 
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 The exams in other subjects show an equal focus on practical questions which sought an 
awareness of principles rather than details.102 Topographical exams, for example, required cadets to 
demonstrate map-reading and the ability to use magnetic compasses, including how to set them for a 
night march, and to know key material like the map symbols for militarily significant terrain features. 103 
The practical Topography exam presented cadets with a summary of a military situation and the 
commanding officer’s intentions, tasked them with reconnoitring and mapping a piece of ground, and 
then reporting on the tactical features of the ground and the most likely positions for the deployment of 
all three arms.104 Topography, like tactics, required that essential principles be applied to scenarios cadets 
were likely to face upon commissioning. Moreover, the link between terrain and tactics was highlighted, 
and cadets had to be able to identify the tactical value of a piece of ground. The same pattern is repeated 
in the Military Engineering exams.105 All three subjects had a strong practical focus in both the 
coursework and the examinations, and the links amongst the three subjects were a focus of exam 
questions. Here, too, the criticisms of the Akers-Douglas Report had been acted upon to good effect.  
Other exams also demonstrate that the problems apparent in 1902 had been rectified. Indeed, 
some Military Law exams allowed cadets to make use of The Manual of Military Law and the King’s 
Regulations in forming their answers—the clearest possible proof that the examinations were no longer 
forcing cadets to ‘cram’, and had adopted a much more practical approach.106 Any officer faced with a 
question of procedure during a Court Martial, or asked to prepare the charge sheet for a soldier found 
drunk on guard, would in real life consult the relevant texts closely, and so the exam mirrored this. The 
exam for Sanitation was very practical, asking about the risks of malaria and precautions against it, and 
how to protect the water supply and keep the ground sanitary for the next occupants of a company’s 
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campsite—another scenario that was likely to face a young officer in real life.107 Even the German exams 
had a notably practical focus; all the passages for translation had a strongly military flavour, featuring 
accounts of battles or of the terrain over which a campaign took place.108 The standard of German 
required would have been perfectly adequate to travel around Germany, or to converse, but it was 
clearly aimed at fitting cadets to read military works in German. The French exams do not survive but 
there is nothing to suggest they were any different.  
The syllabus that came into use at Sandhurst in 1904 does not tell the whole story of what cadets 
were taught over the following decade. A course of instruction in Sanitation was introduced as part of the 
medical reforms following the Boer War, and cadets were taught much the same things that men already 
commissioned were expected to acquaint themselves with through the Manual of Elementary Military 
Hygiene 1912.109 An essay competition for the Senior Division was begun in 1913, with the intention of 
improving the standard of written English, with 90 minutes allowed to write an essay on one of the 
following: ‘discipline, Si vis pacem para bellum [if you wish for peace, prepare for war], Field Sports and 
Games as a Preparation for War’.110 There were also visiting lecturers on a fairly regular basis. The 
autumn term of 1912 saw three such visits; Major-General Wilson, Director of Military Operations, spoke 
on “An Island Empire,” Colonel Wolley-Dod, 2nd-in-Command RMC, addressed “Athletics and Games and 
the part they play in Training for War,” and Major Yate of the General Staff lectured on “Port Arthur and 
the Russo-Japanese War.”111 In November of 1913 the cadets were lectured by Mr Arthur Diósy, ‘a 
recognized authority on Japan,’ who spoke on ‘Japan and the Japanese, especially the Japanese Soldier.’ 
He also gave the library a copy of his new book The New Far East.112 A week later, Wilson returned and 
lectured on “Frontiers of Europe” and greatly impressed the cadets, according to the R.M.C. Record:  
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No officer or cadet who has had the privilege of listening to one of General Wilson’s lectures can 
fail to think deeply on the serious nature of his profession. The wide range of subjects which 
General Wilson touched upon during this lecture makes an almost irresistible appeal to the least 
ambitious amongst us to endeavour strenuously to keep himself abreast of all recent 
developments in the Military History of Modern Europe.113 
 
Some cadets even sought out their own extra military education. Gentleman Cadet H. Davies requested 
that the Commandant forward to the Secretary of State for War an application for permission to take the 
Royal Aero Club’s Flying Certificate while he was still at Sandhurst. He clearly intended to join the Royal 
Flying Corps, as he asked whether he could claim back his expenses on the certificate at once, or whether 
he had to wait until two years’ service with a battalion made him eligible to enter the Military Wing of the 
Royal Flying Corps. Davies was told he was welcome to seek the certificate, provided he did so over the 
summer and thus did not interrupt his term-time work.114 Although flying lessons were a fairly unusual 
extracurricular activity, it is evident that the education of the cadets was by no means confined to the 
syllabus, and that there were various other aspects to their training, both individually-chosen and 
officially sanctioned.  
 The contents of the courses and the methods of examination at Sandhurst were reformed in line 
with the recommendations of the Akers-Douglas Report, and cadets who passed out successfully were 
well-prepared for the multiple facets of their profession by a methodical and practical syllabus. Each 
subject’s course of instruction was designed to make cadets thoroughly familiar with the key facts and 
overarching principles of the discipline, and then to accustom cadets to apply their knowledge to practical 
scenarios, of the sort they would face once they were commissioned. Moreover, it was emphasised at 
various points that Sandhurst was not the end of their professional preparation, and that continuing 
study was a necessary professional activity.  
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The Sandhurst Cadets 
The staff and the syllabus of Sandhurst had a significant impact on the men who passed out at 
the end of their time and took up His Majesty’s commission. The Gentlemen Cadets who attended 
Sandhurst in the twelve years between the Boer War and the Great War were an important part of the 
College. Accurately describing several thousand young men is not possible in the space available, but it is 
important to highlight certain points regarding their own thoughts and attitudes about their education, 
and the extent to which cadets had any form of prior military experience before passing in to Sandhurst.  
Before and during the Boer War, a cadet’s chance at an Indian Army commission was determined 
by his entry exam, and thereafter he would be secure in a desirable post provided he did nothing severely 
wrong at Sandhurst. This was how Claude Auchinleck secured his place in the Indian Army.115 The Akers-
Douglas Committee felt that this provided little incentive to hard work, and it was soon changed so that a 
cadet’s chances of entering the Indian Army were dependent upon the results of his final exam. That this 
provided an incentive to hard work is clear not only from accounts of cadets—Montgomery was ‘bitterly 
disappointed’ to find he had narrowly missed the necessary marks for the Indian Army, as he had worked 
hard towards that goal—but from the volume of correspondence that the Commandant handled on the 
subject.116 If a cadet fell ill and thus had to ‘drop’ a term, it was important to determine whether or not 
he would lose his chance of competing for the Indian Army. To offer just one example, Gentleman Cadet 
Bourchier had been ill since Easter when Capper wrote to the War Office on 14 May 1907 asking that 
Bourchier be allowed to drop a term rather than likely fail his exams after having missed so much work. 
On the same day, Capper wrote to the cadet’s father to explain that failed exams ‘would entail perhaps 
serious consequences in the future… under these circumstances you will understand that it is a benefit 
rather than otherwise for your son to be allowed to drop.’ The father thanked Capper for his kind advice, 
and stated that his son would have ‘special tuition in the subjects that he will study at Sandhurst on his 
returning.’ Capper emphasised to the War Office in a letter of the 27th May that Bourchier ‘is in every way 
                                                          
115
 Warner, Philip, Auchinleck: The Lonely Soldier (London: Buchan and Enright, 1981). p. 13. 
116
 Montgomery, Bernard Law, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G. (London: 
Collins, 1958). p. 26.  
 47 
 
to be allowed to compete for the Indian Army’ because he was an able, hard-working cadet and was 
dropping due to ‘ordinary misfortune’ and not through any fault of his own.117  
 That Capper corresponded with a parent in this instance was nothing unusual, and it was typical 
for letters to travel both between Sandhurst and the War Office, and Sandhurst and the cadet’s home, in 
such circumstances. That parents were naturally anxious for their sons’ prospects was only part of the 
issue; in some cases there was a considerable financial outlay involved. The cost of a cadet’s attendance 
was determined by his father’s position. While the son of a deceased officer whose death had left his 
family ‘in pecuniary distress’ faced fees of £20 a year, the son of a private gentleman would pay £150 a 
year.118 Whether parental concerns about if their sons were making good use of this investment had any 
influence on cadets’ behaviour is unclear, but the accounts of cadets suggest that they were well-
motivated and worked hard. As one company commander wrote, ‘the cadets were of a high standard and 
I never had the slightest difficulty with them. They worked hard and the life was no child’s play.’119 
 In his half-yearly report to the War Office in December 1907, Capper noted that ‘competition for 
the Indian Army still continues to be keen. Of the 3rd Division now going out, many returned to try again 
for the Indian Army & the number wishing to join it (viz. 44) is in excess of that possible to admit.’120 
Besides the carrot of Indian Army commissions, there was also the stick of dropping a term after failed 
exams, which seems to have held an equally strong grasp on cadets’ minds. In October 1912, Arthur 
Burnell wrote to his parents that ‘the worst of it [the examinations] is that if we don’t get 30% in every 
subject and 60% altogether we “drop” to the next term, which quite a lot do. We all live in holy terror of 
doing so.’121 The preface to the second issue of the R.M.C. Record was written by a cadet determined ‘to 
write… till I dropped. (The ugly word slipped out uninvited. I hope my readers will forgive it.)’122 In a 
similar vein, a cartoon in the next issue shows a cadet reading an exam paper with his hair standing 
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straight up on end. The caption reads ‘Why buy hair tonic when your Examination papers will raise your 
hair just as well?’123 Although the references to examinations in the Sandhurst magazine are light-
hearted, the attitude of cadets towards academic matters, and their fear of the consequences of failure, 
still come across clearly.  
Equally, cadets were pleased by success, and appear to have taken an interest, either friendly or 
competitive, in classmates’ results. Gentleman Cadet Kenneth Garrett wrote in his diary in January 1913 
about his exams after his first term; he was ‘naturally rather bucked [pleased]’ to have placed 29th, as he 
had passed into RMC 140th. That same day, he ‘dispatched p.c.’s [postcards] to various Sandhurst men to 
find out where they had come out’ and he recorded his friends’ results in his diary as he received replies 
from them.124 Reinforcing their personal motivations, cadets were encouraged to work hard by the staff 
and by senior officers making inspections. Reading his report during a half-yearly inspection in December 
1912, Stopford announced that the cadets’ behavior had been ‘exemplary. They had shown throughout 
an appreciation of discipline, together with a desire to fit themselves for their future profession, which 
was most creditable to all.’125 After his inspection in December 1913, General Sir Charles Douglas 
congratulated the cadets for their proficiency and soldier-like bearing, before reminding them that ‘the 
Army of the present day is not an indolent and pleasure-seeking profession. Those who joined it must be 
prepared, like their brother officers, to devote themselves to the study of their profession if they wished 
to become proficient in it.’ He also encouraged cadets to keep the Staff College in mind ‘if they wished to 
rise in their profession.’126 
The College’s inducements to hard work were not limited to inspiring speeches, and there was a 
conscious effort made to encourage friendly rivalry between cadets and between cadet companies. Some 
of this was done via sporting contests, but much of the military work of the cadets was handled in a 
competitive fashion as well. There were inter-company contests in drill, musketry, riding, signalling, and 
physical training, as well as in revolver shooting, association football, and rugby. A company also 
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benefited if one of its members was on the Sandhurst rifle, revolver, rugby or hockey teams which 
competed outside the College, sometimes against Woolwich. The company which accumulated the most 
points from all these activities was named ‘Champion Company at Arms’ for the term.127 There were 
numerous prizes for individual cadets as well. Cadets who performed best in the exams for riding, 
signalling, musketry, physical training, and drill, were named in the R.M.C. Record, and were also awarded 
prizes by the College. J H Elliot, who won the riding prize in December 1912, was given an engraved 
saddle, while cadets who won prizes in drill or musketry were given swords or revolvers.128 The prizes for 
academic subjects were books; the prize for Military History in December 1912 consisted of Clausewitz’s 
On War, Maurice’s War 1877-78, and Pratt’s War 1870-71, while the prize for German was a copy of 
Moltke’s Gesammelte Schriften.129 The prizes provided a further impetus towards studious application, 
and brought cadets recognition not only from staff and cadets at the College, but also a chance at 
recognition further afield, as the names of prize-winners were published in the RMC Magazine, which was 
sent to ‘many messes’ as well as to many of the public schools that sent young men to Sandhurst.130 
Cadets had a variety of encouragements towards hard work while at Sandhurst. Their own 
personal desire to do well was supported by the exhortations of the staff and by the significant 
professional prize of an Indian Army commission if they succeeded in passing out high enough after their 
final exams. The limited number of Indian Army positions available contributed to a competitive 
atmosphere, which was reinforced by the prizes available to cadets and to companies for outstanding 
achievement in the various facets of College life.  
Many of the cadets were not entirely new to military life when they arrived at Sandhurst. Some 
of the cadets had family ties to the armed forces, and others had been part of their school’s Cadet Corps, 
and some cadets fell into both categories. Harold Alexander’s grandfather and father had been military 
men, and Alexander participated in the Rifle Corps during his time at Harrow, eventually being promoted 
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to the top rank in the Corps, one of only five officers among about 300 cadets.131 Claude Auchinleck 
attended Wellington, where he was made Lance Corporal, and then Corporal, in the school’s Rifle 
Volunteer Corps, and his father had served in India with the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA).132 It seems that 
cadets with this kind of experience found it beneficial at Sandhurst; Arthur Burnell had been in 
Winchester College’s cadet unit, and frequently mentioned it in his letters home, including his 
experiences during field days with the cadet corps of Eton, Wellington, Marlborough, and Bradfield.133 
While at Sandhurst, he wrote home in February 1913 about how glad he was to have some prior 
experience; ‘On Tuesday we had our first turn at signalling. Goodness only knows what the unfortunates 
who have never done any before think of it, as they rush along like anything. What I should have done I 
shudder to think, but as it is I have a very good start indeed.’134  
While many cadets arrived at Sandhurst having already had some kind of initiation into military 
life, there were a very few cadets who had quite a bit of military experience. In 1909, Capper received a 
forwarded letter from the War Office, and a request for him to confirm whether the information in the 
letter was correct. Gentleman Cadet C. P. Trevor’s father had written to the War Office to protest that his 
son had served in South Africa as a ‘Mounted Orderly to Brig. Gen. J. F. Burn-Murock, CB, commanding at 
Newcastle, Natal’ and although his son had been put on the medal roll for the Queen’s South Africa 
Medal, he had never received it. Trevor had arrived at Sandhurst to find that another cadet called 
Graham did have the medal, which prompted his father, a retired Major, to seek to have his son’s medal 
awarded, because as his son was going to be ‘a professional Soldier… it would of course be of value to 
him now.’ Capper replied to the War Office that Gentleman Cadet L. S. T. Graham did indeed have the 
medal, earned for his service in a Base Depot Company of the Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa, 
between November 1900 and May 1901, during which time Graham turned eleven.135 While arriving at 
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Sandhurst as a decorated veteran was extremely unusual, it does serve to illustrate that cadets’ prior 
military experience could be more than the usual family ties or school cadet corps, and that their 
previous experiences often proved valuable to them. It also indicates that Trevor’s father was keen for his 
son to have the best possible start in his military career, which meant not falling behind another cadet, 
even if they had both been at Sandhurst for only a few days.  
The Gentlemen Cadets of this period took their studies seriously and worked hard. The intense 
competition for a coveted commission in the Indian Army was not the only spur to devoted professional 
preparation. The exhortations of the College’s staff and of senior figures in the Army, and the competitive 
element which was introduced into almost every aspect of a cadet’s coursework, also helped to foster 
hard work. A fair number of cadets arrived at Sandhurst with some kind of military background, either 
through their family or through participation in a cadet unit at school, and were thus slightly better 
prepared than classmates without these advantages, and were also probably more certain and thus more 
determined in pursuit of their chosen profession. 
Sandhurst in the period between the Boer War and the First World War made a number of 
serious reforms. The syllabus was thoroughly overhauled, to give a greater focus to tactical matters and 
to emphasise links between subjects. In particular, Tactics, Military Engineering, and Military Topography 
were closely aligned in the reformed syllabus, to the point where all three subjects were examined jointly 
in a single paper at the end of a cadet’s course. There was a greater focus on hands-on and practical 
work, and on teaching the central principles of a subject and then asking cadets to think through the 
solutions to problems. This was apparent not only in the central three military subjects, but throughout 
the curriculum. The teaching staff were selected with care, with an effort made to attract men of 
particular professional competence and ability, and to reward men who discharged their teaching duties 
successfully with accelerated promotion or a berth at Staff College, as appropriate. Equally, officers who 
did not perform their duties to the required standard faced the Commandant’s displeasure and the real 
prospect of losing their position and being sent back to their regiment in disgrace. The staff and the 
syllabus were important, but so too were the students themselves, and the cadets made good use of 
their time at Sandhurst. They worked hard and aimed to give themselves a good start in their chosen 
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career. By 1914, Sandhurst had come a long way from 1902 and was turning out young officers who had 
been grounded in a variety of essential military disciplines, and given up-to-date training in the tactical 
skills necessary for the modern battlefield.  
 
The Royal Military Academy, Woolwich 
 Woolwich had been censured for certain failings after the Boer War, but in comparison with 
Sandhurst it had done well, and the Akers-Douglas Committee had found a lot about the Academy 
deserving of praise. The criticisms of Woolwich’s instruction focused on a need for more practical 
teaching, particularly making mathematics and scientific subjects more militarily relevant. There was a 
need for a greater emphasis on Tactics and much closer links between tactical teaching and the study of 
Fortification and Topography. As with Sandhurst, the staff of the Academy did not simply accept and 
adopt wholesale the recommendations of the Report. Significant and far-reaching changes were made to 
Tactical instruction, in particular, although Military Engineering and Military Topography were also 
reformed. There were other, smaller, changes in the syllabus, but the scientific and mathematical 
instruction retained a good deal of theoretical content. The Committee had concluded that the cadets at 
Woolwich were generally well-motivated, and that competition for entry to the Royal Engineers was an 
adequate drive to achievement. This chapter argues that the cadets continued to be motivated and to 
work hard to fit themselves for their chosen profession.  
 The Governor and Commandant at the start of this period was Major-General R. H. Jelf, who held 
his post from 1901 to 1904. His successors, who were titled simply Commandant, were Colonel H. V. 
Cowan (1904-1908), Colonel A. G. Thomson (1908-1912) and Brigadier-General A. E. A. Holland (1912-
1914).136 The Commandant had the assistance of an ‘Adjutant and Quartermaster’, and until a 
reorganisation in 1904, he was supported by an ‘Assistant Commandant and Secretary’ as well.137 The 
teaching staff were split into departments headed by Professors, most of whom had a few Instructors to 
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assist them. In 1904, the War Office ordered that Professors be renamed Chief Instructors, and in the 
autumn term of that year, the cadets were arranged into three companies, each commanded by a Chief 
Instructor, rather than the former three divisions.138 These companies were, for much of the period, 
single term units, in that a company would contain all the cadets who passed in at the same time. It was 
only in 1912 and 1913 that this was altered so that each Cadet Company contained a mix of cadets from 
each cohort.139 For most of the period, cadets spent four terms at Woolwich, although from 1909 to 
1911, they spent three.140 After the spring term in 1909, the 3rd and 4th classes were commissioned 
together, ‘owing to the shortage of officers in the Mounted Branch of the Royal Artillery.’141 The 
shortening of the course was a temporary measure and was rescinded once the shortage of officers had 
been made good. Similarly, the attendance of an Infantry Company, orphaned from Sandhurst until the 
increased accommodation available in the New College there was finished, was also temporary, although 
they stayed a little longer than initially planned. The first Infantry cadets, 60 strong, arrived in September 
1905. They did the Sandhurst course but were otherwise Woolwich cadets.142 The Infantry Company 
returned to RMC at the end of the autumn term in 1910.143 
The great majority of the teaching staff were officers, but some, notably the language and the 
mathematics staff, were civilians. This was not, however, a particular short-coming, as the civilians were 
amply qualified. In 1900, the five civilian instructors of Mathematics and Mechanics had three MAs and 
two BAs, and the Professor of German was Dr. Weiss, MA.144 The Chief Instructor in French, Monsieur 
Barrère, a decorated veteran of the Franco-Prussian War, was sufficiently accomplished as a teacher that 
in 1907 his students won a vase presented by the President of the French Republic as the prize for a 
competition among schools in Britain. It was, moreover, not the first time his students had gained this 
honour.145 Unsurprisingly, most of the officers were artillerymen or engineers, but there were some from 
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other branches of the army. For example, in 1900, the Professor of Military Topography, Major J. F. 
Daniell, belonged to the Royal Marine Light Infantry, and two of his Instructors were from the Royal 
Marine Artillery and the Liverpool Regiment, and the staff in 1905 included two officers from The Buffs, 
and one each from the Worcester Regiment, the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and the West Kent Regiment.146  
The Professors, later the Chief Instructors, were almost invariably Majors, and the Instructors were 
typically Captains, although there were a number of Lieutenants among them.  
 
The Woolwich Syllabus 
 The course of instruction at the Royal Military Academy was overhauled at the same time as the 
new syllabus at Sandhurst was introduced, namely, the spring term of 1904. The new syllabus introduced 
an annual course with examinations held at the end of each year, rather than at the end of each term, 
and the marking was split equally between the instructors and the outside examiners. Jelf noted in his 
December 1903 report that ‘a further feature was the recognition of the principle that the cadets must be 
trained for their future role as drill masters and instructors. This principle now formed the keynote of 
military training at the academy, and a certain proportion of marks for all outdoor drills and exercises, 
including riding, would be given for capacity to drill.’147 While the new syllabus would thus focus more on 
the skills cadets would need once they were commissioned, the existing syllabus did not entirely lack 
practical training. The cadets already attended an annual camp for several weeks in the summer, which in 
1903 lasted from 16 June to 9 July and featured practical work in several subjects. Cadets made sketches 
and enlarged maps, and built bridges over a local pond, making both trestle and suspension bridges.148 
They took part in tactical exercises, against each other and against imagined opponents, involving 
assaults on a hill, contact with an outpost line, and rear-guard actions, and were asked to produce 
schemes to defend a given location if allowed a certain time and number of men to prepare. They fired 
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musketry practice and took part in a night march culminating in a surprise night assault on an enemy 
bivouac.  
The cadets also participated in an exercise of several days’ duration with troops from the Rifle 
Brigade. Their hard work was perhaps enlivened by their instructors’ demonstrations of the use of 
explosives; Captain Singer blew up a fougasse [a type of improvised landmine] and Captain Pilcher blew 
up a tree.149 This summer camp was an annual fixture, although it stopped after 1908, which Maurice-
Jones attributes to financial cuts imposed by the costs of reorganising the army during Haldane’s 
reforms.150 Oddly, the cadets did not all participate in the summer camp as artillerymen or engineers. In 
1906, the Senior Class attended camp as a mounted infantry company, and the 1st, 2nd, and Sandhurst (No 
4) Companies attended as infantry, while only the 3rd class were organised as a field battery for the 
camp.151 Perhaps this was simply a matter of military balance, as any tactical scheme for the employment 
of four batteries would likely require the imagined or flagged presence of a brigade of infantry or a mixed 
force several thousand strong, but the presence of the mounted infantry hints at a hangover from the 
Boer War, when many artillerymen were redeployed in that role.   
The shortage of specifically artillery experience at the summer camp did not, however, mean that 
cadets lacked practice with the weapons of their chosen arm, as the two senior classes also travelled for 
gunnery practice each year. In 1903, the 4th class went to Shoeburyness between 9 and 16 May, and the 
3rd class between 16 and 23 May.152 In May 1907, they both went together for a week at Golden Hill on 
the Isle of Wight, during which they fired 5-inch guns, visited a battery of 9.2 inch coastal guns, and fired 
12-pounder guns and Maxim guns. Like the annual summer camp, this was a practical piece of hands-on 
learning for the cadets, but it, too, ceased after 1908. This was described at the time as a temporary 
measure, like the shortening of the course, but the annual camp and the week-long gunnery practices did 
not resume when the course reverted to a full two years.153 The loss of the summer camp and the 
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practice camps was not a forward step, and, in the absence of any definite evidence as to why their 
‘temporary’ cancellation became permanent, it would be unwise to speculate beyond noting that 
Maurice-Jones’s suggestion of financial constraints is a plausible one. 
The rest of the syllabus, however, was reformed to meet the needs identified in the Akers-
Douglas Report. Military History, taught alongside Tactics, was rapidly introduced. Major E. M. Percival, 
DSO, RA took up his post as Professor of Military History and Tactics on 15 January 1903, and the cadets 
faced examinations in Military History and Tactics starting that July.154 As at Sandhurst, Sanitation was 
introduced as a subject in the middle of this period, and Woolwich cadets faced their first exam in the 
subject in June 1908.155 The teaching of tactics was markedly altered. The Tactics examination from July 
1901 gives some idea of the shortcomings of tactical teaching at the beginning of the period. Far from 
asking cadets to solve tactical problems of a type that might confront them after being commissioned, or 
even asking cadets to demonstrate a sound knowledge of tactical principles or the realities of firepower 
on the modern battlefield, cadets were asked for the ages at which men and boys could enlist, and for 
what periods. They were asked how long it would take various units of infantry and cavalry to march past 
a given point. The last question of the exam (worth 120 marks out of 450 total marks) asked cadets to 
consider an advanced guard of ‘1 squadron, 2 field guns, ½ field company Royal Engineers, 2 battalions, 
and 1 company Mounted Infantry’ in ordinary country, and to roughly sketch the bodies into which this 
force would be subdivided and the distances between them.156 While this last question was at least of 
some tactical relevance, handling the dispositions of more than two battalions would not confront a 
newly-commissioned officer, and indeed was unlikely to require his consideration until he had climbed at 
least as high as Lieutenant-Colonel. The complaint in Duffer’s Drift, that a young subaltern might feel 
more comfortable moving army corps than handling a practical problem in minor tactics, seems to have 
been well-founded. An examination paper like that might be understandable if it were set at the end of 
the first term, but it was set at the end of the third term, which paints a poor picture of a year and a half 
of tactical teaching.  
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The reform of tactical teaching was rapid, and the new syllabus, introduced in January 1904, 
appears to have resulted in a significant improvement. The third class Tactics paper from December 1904 
opens with the question ‘How has the introduction of smokeless powder affected (a) the attack, (b) the 
defence of a position? (Not more than one page to be written).’ The exam also contains a tactical 
scenario involving one squadron, one battalion, and two guns. Cadets were given a map, a summary of 
the information available about nearby hostile forces, and the objective of the force. The cadets were 
asked to select a place for the two guns when the O.C. opts to attack the enemy, and to identify where 
the infantry companies would be at a given point in the operation.157 This exam indicates that the tactical 
syllabus was at that point considerably more practical. It involved discussion of modern firepower and 
asked cadets to apply their knowledge to military problems they were likely to face upon commissioning. 
The command of two guns was a very likely responsibility for a Royal Artillery (RA) subaltern, and to 
support infantry properly he would need to know how they would operate and where they would likely 
be at any given point in an operation. The Third Class Tactical exam of December 1911 provides further 
examples of material in the syllabus. Cadets had to discuss the statement ‘the object of artillery fire is to 
assist the infantry advance,’ and ‘explain the relation between fire and movement in the attack.’ Cadets 
were also asked about the impact that a wood ending 1,200 yards from the enemy position would have 
on the further advance of a battalion passing through the wood, and the steps that should be taken to 
ensure the battalion’s continued advance from that point. Cadets were questioned about night marches, 
night attacks, and the defensive measures necessary against an ‘uncivilised’ opponent in a mountainous 
country. The final question of the exam, however, is perhaps the most significant: 
During the course of an operation a subordinate commander receives an order which, in his 
judgement, is unsuited to the circumstances in which he finds himself. The officer who issued the 
order is at a distance, and there is not time to refer to him for a reconsideration of the order. 
What action should the subordinate take? Give the reasons for your answer.158 
 
This indicates that the tactical curriculum demanded that cadets be aware of the need to think for 
themselves on the battlefield and be prepared to exercise their initiative. For this, of course, they needed 
a thorough grounding in tactical principles, and practice in applying those principles to solve tactical 
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problems. The examinations confronted cadets with a variety of tactical problems, and demanded that 
they apply their knowledge of the conditions on a modern battlefield to generate solutions. As at 
Sandhurst, the tactical syllabus was wide-ranging and thorough, but it resisted stereotyped responses. 
Instead, cadets were encouraged to think. 
 The examinations in Military Engineering and Map Reading were also made more practical and 
more applicable to battlefield situations, although it should be noted that the pre-reform syllabus for 
these subjects was considerably better than for Tactics. The First Class Military Engineering exam in July 
1901 required cadets to ‘distinguish between the uses of provisional and field fortification’ and to identify 
the objects against which shrapnel shells should be used. Cadets had to be able to arrange a line of 
shelter trenches suitable for the terrain, and explain how to make loopholes in walls.159 These were not 
particularly complex engineering problems, but at the end of their first term, cadets were already being 
asked to make at least rudimentary connections between their military engineering work and likely 
battlefield applications. Similarly, the Military Topography paper in the same set of examinations asked 
cadets to demonstrate basic knowledge of the subject, like defining ‘forward bearing,’ ‘resection,’ and 
‘plotting,’ but it also included questions with a practical application, asking cadets to draw a map in yards, 
and then to correct it on the basis that the work was done from a French field book and is therefore 
actually in metres.160  
By 1909, exams in Map Reading, Field Sketching, and Reconnaissance still asked cadets to be able 
to define essential terms and handle comparative scales on maps, but cadets also had to be able to find 
true north in the northern and southern hemispheres by using the stars or an ordinary watch. They were 
also required to be able to draw a map of a given stretch of country, including militarily significant 
features like a village which contained a telegraph office and a church with a steeple, as well as roads and 
railways, and any bridges, tunnels or cuttings associated with them.161 Third Class exams in Military 
Topography were distinctly practical, being very similar to a task that a subaltern officer might be given, 
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and contained links to tactical considerations. In December 1909, cadets were asked to reconnoitre the 
road from Eynsford Bridge to Kevinton, and sketch a half-mile wide stretch of country with the road in 
the middle, taking care to note ‘general nature of the country, fences, &c.’, ‘halting places,’ and ‘any 
points where a column might be checked, owing to gradients, &c.’162 Halting places and gradients were 
not intimately connected with tactical considerations, although the speed at which a column arrived on 
the battlefield and whether it could leave the road clear during rests on the march were relevant. The 
general nature of the country, and the position of fences, were more directly relevant to tactical 
concerns, as dense forest or thick hedgerows and fences along the road could prevent a column from 
reacting to artillery bombardment or the appearance of enemy troops. The syllabi of the two subjects 
most closely related to tactics, namely engineering and topography, do appear, on the basis of 
examination questions, to have given increasing emphasis to links with tactical questions over the decade 
after the Akers-Douglas Report. This move towards closer links culminated in unified exams which 
included all of these subjects.  
 The examinations in 1912 included the first combined paper in Tactics, Map Reading, Field 
Sketching and Reconnaissance, and Military Engineering. This exam included a General Idea and a Special 
Idea, as cadets might see in an exercise once they were commissioned. Redland and Blueland were at 
war, with Blueland forces in Redland territory; a map was attached to the exam. The cadet was placed in 
command of a troop of cavalry, a section of quick-firing 18-pounder field guns, two companies of 
infantry, and a machine-gun section, and ordered to delay an enemy convoy escorted by roughly 500 
men until sufficient reinforcement arrived to allow the convoy to be captured. Cadets were required to 
indicate and justify their proposed order of march, the defensive measures they would take for their 
overnight camp, and how they would deploy their troops to prevent the enemy convoy advancing beyond 
a given point. They were then asked to indicate the point at which they would order their troops to open 
fire, as well as the likely fields of view of scouts from given positions on the map. Cadets had to place 
infantry entrenchments in the best available positions, justify their choice of that position, and draw the 
entrenchments they would expect their men to dig in 30 minutes. Finally, cadets were asked to explain 
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the difficulty of totally concealing their guns while still being able to fire on a given stretch of road, and 
whether the British Army had ‘any field artillery which would present no difficulty in this respect.’163 This 
exam presented cadets with a tactical scenario and asked them to apply a variety of tactical, 
topographical and engineering skills to solve the given problems. It made clear the close connections 
between the subjects, and constituted a thorough and very practical assessment of a cadet’s tactical 
abilities. It fully addressed the concerns of the Akers-Douglas Committee about the state of tactical 
instruction and the lack of practically-oriented and integrated teaching.  
 The combined exams were the culmination of inter-related instruction which took place 
throughout a cadet’s time at Woolwich. In other words, cadets were not taught various subjects in 
isolation for a year or a year and a half and then asked to combine them in their final term. Rather, the 
close links between the most central military subjects were emphasised throughout the course. The Field 
Engineering paper for the Second Class in 1913 is a good example. Questions included: ‘Explain, fully, how 
field fortification might be applied in an offensive action’ and ‘What are the main points to be borne in 
mind in examining a locality which it is required to strengthen?’ Cadets had to know how to construct 
earthworks on steep convex forward slopes and along sunken roads, and be able to list the factors 
determining the best positions for obstacles, and what made a good obstacle, all of which were of tactical 
relevance on a modern battlefield, and were problems of the type that subalterns were likely to have to 
solve.  
The Tactics, Military Engineering, and Topography exams, and then their Combined successors, 
were not the only practical work in the syllabus. The Sanitation exams also asked cadets practical 
questions, on mosquito-borne illnesses, enteric fever and tuberculosis, and the precautions against their 
spread. Cadets had to be able to keep a stream supplying a camp with water free of contamination, and 
to ensure that latrines were properly sited in a small camp.164 These were key issues, ones that a 
subaltern or a captain would likely have to address on active service. The language exams, too, indicate a 
practical military focus in the syllabus. The French and German exams both asked cadets to translate 
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passages with military themes. If the language required was not necessarily technical, it was still a 
particularly military vocabulary that was taught. While it was the tactical instruction which was most 
improved by the reform, and the interdependence of the three core military subjects which was most 
heavily emphasised, the other subjects also focused on practical matters and were part of the overall 
preparation of capable and competent officers.  
Not every subject, however, was made more practical. The examinations in mathematical and 
scientific subjects do not show much change over the period. Comparing, for example, a Calculus paper 
from 1913 with a Differential and Integral Calculus paper from 1901, reveals almost no difference, which 
suggests that the teaching of calculus had not been made any more militarily relevant in the meantime.165 
The questions remain abstract, and while the 1913 paper does mention pressures in a gun barrel, the gun 
is merely incidental to the requirement that cadets find the differential equation that handles the given 
variables, and list the assumptions necessary to integrate that equation. The exams in Electricity and Light 
were more practical, but still contained a large portion of theory. The July 1913 paper contained practical 
questions on electrical batteries commonly used by the Army, as well as the advantages of telescopic gun 
sights over plain gun sights. Cadets had to be able to ‘draw a diagram of the speaking circuit of a 
telephone’ and explain how each part worked. All of this was readily applicable to service after 
commissioning, but questions on the relative advantages of astronomical telescopes and Galilean 
telescopes, or being able to sketch the magnetic lines of force created by a solenoid, were very much 
theoretical.166 It is difficult to discern any great effort to meet the suggestion of the Akers-Douglas Report 
that the mathematical and scientific teaching be made more militarily applicable.  
However, that is not to say that the recommendation was either ignored or rejected out of hand. 
Shortly after the reformed syllabus was introduced, Jelf noted in his semi-annual report that there were 
significant elements of theory in the Electricity syllabus, but that in that subject in particular, an ability to 
do practical work was necessarily grounded in a strong understanding of theory.167 There was also an 
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awareness that science was making rapid advances, so if cadets were well-versed in theory it would be 
easier to pick up new practical knowledge at a later date. Even before the revised syllabus was 
introduced, the ‘Shop’ magazine noted that ‘one thing is absolutely certain, that the twentieth century 
soldier can no more afford to stand still than the civilian. Both must progress or be hopelessly left behind 
in the international race.’168 The Committee itself had recognised the increasingly important role that 
science played in the professional life of an officer, and praised experimental science, militarily relevant 
or not, as good for mental discipline.169 This is not to suggest that militarily relevant teaching in such 
subjects was not worth pursuing, but rather that there was little point in confining teaching in scientific 
subjects to only those matters which were currently of military value, as change was liable to be rapid. 
So, while the teaching of some subjects at Woolwich was not greatly altered by the general move 
towards practicality and military utility, this was not necessarily a failing, and it should not detract from 
the significant improvements made in those subjects—tactics, topography, and engineering—which were 
very much practical and of the most vital military utility.  
The cadets of the Royal Military Academy received a sound, practical, and modern military 
education once the reformed syllabus was introduced in 1904. Tactical teaching, in particular, was 
drastically revised and made both significantly more practical and noticeably more modern, particularly in 
its coverage of firepower and movement on the modern battlefield. The increasing emphasis on the links 
between the key military subjects culminated in a single unified exam, and many of the other subjects 
were also made more practical and of immediate relevance to a new subaltern. Both Military History and 
Sanitation were introduced to the curriculum for the first time, and for half of the period in question, 
cadets attended seven weeks of camp a year, engaging in practical engineering and topographical work 
and taking part in tactical exercises, as well as practice and live firing with a variety of artillery pieces. 
Although not every subject was made more practical, there were sound reasons for this, and it did not 
detract from the solid military education that Woolwich provided to cadets.  
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The Woolwich Cadets 
 The cadets of Woolwich were the ones who worked through the instruction provided, and who 
gained or lost depending on the standard of teaching and utility of the syllabus. The Gentleman Cadets 
were overwhelmingly from public schools. Indeed, between 1900 and the spring term of 1904, 515 cadets 
came to RMA from only thirteen schools [please see Appendix Three], and Cheltenham alone provided 
108—given that the number of Cadets attending in this period peaked at 306 in autumn 1901, when a 
condensed course saw them commissioned after twelve or fifteen months, the influence of a small 
number of public schools was very great.170 This appears to have remained the case throughout the 
Edwardian period. Between 1905 and 1908, fifteen public schools sent a total of 250 cadets to Woolwich, 
while only 99 cadets came from all other schools and tutors. Within this intake of 349, the pupils from 
Cheltenham numbered 55 and those from Wellington 41.171 When L. A. Hawes joined in 1910, he found 
that he ‘was the only one from a school which was not a major public school. There were contingents 
from Marlborough, Cheltenham, Eton and Harrow and the rest. I was the odd man out.’172 The R.M.A. 
Magazine, nicknamed ‘The Shop’ after Woolwich itself, was first published in 1900 and ran throughout 
the period, providing a rich source of information not only on the institution, but on the cadets 
themselves. The Magazine was not a purely cadet-run enterprise, but cadets typically made up a third or 
a half of the contributors, and the Committee which ran the publication was headed by two officers as 
Editor and Treasurer, but the rest of the members were Gentlemen Cadets.173 
 The magazine offered prizes for essays from cadets on various subjects, and it usually printed 
both the winning entry and the second-place entry. Initially, a winning essay won two guineas (£2 2s) and 
the runner-up won a guinea (£1 1s), but by 1906 a second prize essay won only 10 shillings.174 There were 
also prizes offered for cadets who submitted verses or articles for publication. The topics of the essay 
competitions included: ‘Lessons of the War in South Africa’, ‘The Crimean War’, ‘Diary of the Camp on 
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Salisbury Plain’, ‘Probable developments in the use of self-propelled vehicles for military purposes’, ‘The 
Strategic Position in the event of war between Japan and Russia’, and ‘The Necessity for Close 
Cooperation Between the Land and Sea Forces of the Empire’. Cadets also wrote on aspects of 
Napoleonic campaigns, the issue of National Service, and whether war correspondents should join armies 
in the field. All of this was done outside the curriculum and in their spare time. There does not seem to 
have been any shortage of professional interest in military issues or current affairs. The magazine carried 
regular articles on the war in South Africa and on the Russo-Japanese war, and such was the interest in 
the Boer War that a ‘War Map Committee’ was created to put up, and then update, maps of South Africa 
and charts listing the composition of columns, and ‘a diary of the war for reference.’175 
 It is hardly surprising that cadets took a keen interest in the major wars of the era, particularly 
the Boer War, but there is clear evidence of professional interest throughout the period. The Magazine 
printed a series of articles on wireless, for example, and covered ‘The Thousand Miles Reliability Trials of 
the Automobile Club’ in a lengthy article which also discussed the possible military uses of cars.176 There 
were articles on aspects of military life in other countries, like ‘A Day in the Life of a French Infantry 
Officer’ and ‘A Spanish Military Academy’, as well as matters of direct practical import for Woolwich 
cadets, like the republication of an RUSI article entitled ‘Military Hygiene on Active Service’ or a report on 
Okehampton Practice Camp.’177 There were also regular lists of new books added to the Woolwich library 
and reviews of the more significant works. It is interesting to note that The Defence of Duffer’s Drift was 
acquired for the library in 1905, with a further six copies provided in the spring of 1908.178 Several 
hundred volumes were acquired over the period. The non-fiction works were largely military in nature, 
although works on naval matters and on the history, geography, and culture of countries and regions 
were also common, particularly concerning areas of the Empire where the Army might expect to 
campaign, or where, like Manchuria, there was an active campaign in progress. Given the incentives, it is 
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not surprising that cadets took a close interest in their work. One cadet recalled that most of his 
compatriots worked ‘pretty hard, those at the top to get Sappers, those at the bottom not to fail.’179 
 This might create the impression that the cadets had no time for anything beyond their studies 
and professional matters, and sometimes the Magazine does suggest this. An early appeal for jokes, 
cartoons, or any other kind of humour apparently resulted in no submissions whatsoever, leaving the 
editor to salvage the situation by publishing ‘Our Joke Page’—entirely blank except for a note requesting 
that the Magazine be made a formal part of the syllabus.180 But the cadets were not without a sense of 
humour, and later publications contain sketches, caricatures, and joke exam papers. These displayed a 
dark sense of humour about exams, similar to items in the contemporary Sandhurst magazine. A 
supposed fortification exam asked: ‘If, in piercing a loophole through a wall 14 feet high and 2 feet thick, 
you thrust your crowbar with unexpected force through the wall and into the eye of an adversary who is 
waiting on the other side to look through, what will he say?’181 Another question asked cadets to ‘Discuss 
the relative capabilities of the chief transport officers of Napoleon in the march to Moscow and 
Alexander on the way to India. (a) assuming both had rail-less transport, (b) assuming both were addicted 
to plunder.’182 The humour was perhaps esoteric, but the strong focus of life at Woolwich on study and 
exams, and a concern over the challenges posed by the Academy, comes through, as it does in cartoons 
of cadets being badly bounced around on horses during riding, or being deluged with rain while out 
drawing sketches for Topography.  
 There is, as has been noted above, rather less information on Woolwich cadets of this era than 
there is on Sandhurst cadets. However, The R.M.A. Magazine does allow the construction of at least a 
partial picture. What emerges is positive, and suggests that the cadets took an active interest in 
contemporary wars and other aspects of military life, as well as a range of related technical and scientific 
subjects. That this was their attitude towards their coursework as well seems likely. There is little direct 
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evidence of the levels of motivation and hard work exhibited by the cadets, but given that the Akers-
Douglas Report deemed the competition for a commission into the Royal Engineers a perfectly adequate 
spur to hard work, this incentive likely continued to exert that same influence over the next decade. 
While this conclusion must necessarily be tentative, from the evidence it seems fair to suggest that the 
cadets were motivated, worked hard, and took their profession and their future careers seriously.  
 The Royal Military Academy made several important changes after the Boer War. The syllabus 
was altered, in some subjects quite radically, to ensure that tactics and related subjects were taught 
properly and with due attention to the links between them. This eventually resulted in these subjects 
being jointly examined in a single paper. Practical work and the intelligent application of principles to 
solve problems were emphasised, and in the subjects where there was little move towards practicality, 
there were reasons for the continuing attention to theory. The cadets of the era were likely to benefit 
from the sound and modern syllabus, given their interest in professional topics and the incentives 
provided for hard work and academic success. Woolwich had become, by 1914, a successful institution 
which provided cadets with the skills necessary for modern military careers.  
 
Conclusion  
 The Army’s two institutions for the training of new Regular Officers, Sandhurst and Woolwich, 
were both found in need of reform in the wake of the Boer War. The key recommendations concerned 
tactical teaching, which had to be more practical and far more closely linked with the teaching of 
engineering and topography. There was, however, a recognised need for both institutions to make all of 
their teaching more practical and more relevant to military life. Sandhurst and Woolwich both introduced 
reformed syllabi at the start of 1904, and made further improvements as necessary, as with the addition 
of Sanitation to the curriculum. The new courses were considerably more practical, and the cadets 
attended summer camps and did more outdoor work, although financial stringency ended the Woolwich 
camps after 1908. The tactical courses, in particular, were designed to teach cadets sound general 
principles that they could then use to solve a variety of tactical problems on active service. Firepower and 
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the conditions of the modern battlefield were emphasised. Care was taken to select competent and 
capable officers for the teaching staff, and to reward them for good service or censure them for 
inadequate performance. The cadets were well-motivated and worked hard, showing an earnest desire to 
begin their chosen career on a sound footing and develop their professional skills. The College and the 
Academy successfully completed their reforms and provided the Army with a generation of well-trained 
young men prepared for the reality of the modern battlefield. While the Army could regard with some 
satisfaction the training given to new officers by Sandhurst and Woolwich, these institutions were not the 
only source of supply, and a proportion of the regular officer corps entered the army after first serving in 
the auxiliary forces.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ENTRY VIA THE AUXILIARIES: THE MILITIA, THE SPECIAL RESERVE, AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 A proportion of the British army’s officer corps in 1914 had never passed through either 
Sandhurst or Woolwich, but had instead entered the army through the auxiliary forces. This introduced a 
heterogeneous element to the officer corps, at least in terms of the military instruction that men had 
received prior to being commissioned. Entry from the auxiliaries, especially the Militia, is often referred 
to as the ‘back door’ into the army, with an implication that men who entered by that route were poorly 
prepared, or less able and less competent, in comparison to men who had attended RMC or RMA.1 
Indeed, Travers suggests that most of the officers who entered through the auxiliaries did so because 
they had failed to get into Sandhurst.2 This chapter explores the notion of a ‘back door’ into the army, 
and divides the discussion into five sections. Firstly, it establishes the number of men among the junior 
officers of 1914 who had entered the regulars from the auxiliaries. Secondly, it examines the auxiliary 
forces and their value as military organizations, particularly their level of training and capability. Thirdly, it 
assesses the value and ability of regular officers who were drawn from the auxiliary forces. Fourthly, it 
considers the processes by which men who had not passed through RMC or RMA could gain a regular 
commission. Fifthly, it considers the value of the reformed auxiliaries that Haldane brought into being 
and discusses the impact of the regular army’s efforts to forge closer links with the auxiliaries in the wake 
of this change. This chapter demonstrates that while the auxiliary forces may be described as a ‘back 
door’ into the regular army, any derogatory implication in such a description is not justified.  
 
Prevalence of Entry via the ‘Back Door’ 
 The existing literature provides various statistics about the modes of entry of the members of the 
late Victorian and Edwardian officer corps. Travers notes that between 1873 and 1914, Sandhurst trained 
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only 55 percent of new officers, with the bulk of the remainder gaining commissions via the Militia.3 
Bowman and Connelly suggest that the Edwardian commissioning system followed the Victorian pattern 
fairly closely. From 1896 to 1900, 682 officers were commissioned from Woolwich and 1,548 from 
Sandhurst, while the Militia provided 1,124 and the universities 192.4 Simpson notes that from 1876-
1914, only 55 percent of the officers for the infantry, cavalry, Indian Army, and Army Service Corps 
passed through Sandhurst, while never less than 75 percent of the officers for the Royal Artillery and the 
Royal Engineers passed through Woolwich.5 Spiers gives a similar figure, noting that from 1885-1906, 
RMC and RMA provided 9,021 officers of the 16,472 commissioned, or roughly 55 percent of the total 
intake.6 Taken together, the existing literature suggests that the officer corps contained little more than a 
bare preponderance of men commissioned from the service academies. However, while this may have 
been the case across the entire officer corps at the beginning of the century, it was certainly not the case 
among junior officers in 1914.  
 An examination of the Army List shows that, of the junior officers at the start of 1914, a 
considerable majority had been commissioned from Sandhurst or Woolwich, and that the proportion of 
men drawn from other sources was declining. The number of Captains and subalterns who had been 
commissioned from one of the service academies, or who had become officers by other means, is shown 
in Figure 2; the reality of the situation for junior officers on the eve of the World War was rather different 
from what the existing literature suggests.  While 55 percent of Captains had passed through either RMC 
or RMA, nearly 75 percent and 85 percent, respectively, of Lieutenants and Second-Lieutenants had done 
so.7 It is important to note that those who are listed as ‘commissioned from other sources’ in Figure 2 
includes several alternative routes of entry, such as men promoted from the ranks, although the majority 
had entered from the auxiliaries, particularly the Militia. The detailed break-down of the men who did 
not pass out of Sandhurst or Woolwich is in Appendix Four.  
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Figure 2. Sources of Regular Junior Officers in 1914 8  
 
 
  
Captains Lieutenants 
Second-
Lieutenants Totals 
Total number of officers: 4,426 3,777 1,434 9,637 
Commissioned from RMC or RMA: 2,434 2,813 1,193 6,440 
Commissioned from other sources: 1,992 964 241 3,197 
Percentage from other sources: 45% 25.5% 16.8% 33.2% 
 
For junior officers as a group, just over 66 percent of them had passed through one of the service 
academies—significantly above the 55 percent which the existing literature suggests. Moreover, not only 
was the number of auxiliary entrants lower than is commonly supposed, but it was declining. This is not 
entirely surprising, given that, as discussed in the last chapter, Sandhurst had expanded to allow for a 
greater number of Gentlemen Cadets, and Woolwich had similarly accepted larger intakes in the latter 
part of the period.9 The comparatively high number of Captains drawn from the auxiliaries is due to the 
Boer War. As Figure 3 shows, two thirds of the Captains who entered from the Militia in the two decades 
between 1889 and 1908 did so in the four years 1899-1902. That this massive spike occurs during the war 
is not a coincidence, as can be seen from a comparison of Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 4, the four years with 
the largest intake from the Militia—1891 to 1894—account for only half of the total intake. 
It is possible to suggest, on the basis of this comparison, that the Boer War pulled some 550-600 
men into the regulars from the Militia who might not otherwise have entered. Indeed, estimates at the 
time put the number even higher; Major-General Sir Alfred Turner, Inspector-General of the Auxiliary 
Forces, told the Norfolk Commission that some 1,982 auxiliary officers joined the Regulars during the 
three years of the war, when the average annual intake was just 277. This suggests that the war pulled in 
as many as 1,151 men.10 However, even with this increased draw from the auxiliaries into the regulars, 
the proportion of junior officers who had entered via the ‘back door’ is lower than is commonly 
supposed. This suggests that concerns over the impact of such means of entry may be overblown. It is, 
however, also necessary to consider the auxiliary forces which men were drawn from and the standards 
of training they received there before entering the regular army.  
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Figure 3.11 
 
 
Figure 4.12 
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The Auxiliary Forces 
 The Militia, the oldest auxiliary force, was obsolescent by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
with an annual 28 day training period which was not suitable for urban and industrial life and a 
geographical distribution of units which no longer matched the national distribution of population. The 
Militia, however, retained significant political support for its continued existence.13 It had an authorised 
strength of 124,000 men in the decade before the Boer War, but was, on average, 20,000 men 
understrength. Despite this, it was a not-inconsiderable source of manpower to the regular army, both of 
officers and other ranks, and from 1889 to 1898 some 14,000 militiamen passed into the regulars 
annually.14 When the Boer War began, this drain of men became severe, as regular units sought to fill up 
with the necessary officers and men before embarking—the average regular battalion was 36 percent 
under strength in 1899.15 As part of Haldane’s reforms, the Militia was converted into the Special Reserve 
in 1908. From that point, it effectively ceased to exist, although the government retained the nominal 
power to call the Militia until 1953.16  
The Volunteers were an auxiliary force dating back to the Napoleonic Wars. After falling into 
abeyance shortly after Waterloo, they were revived in 1859 in response to a series of invasion scares.17 
After the Boer War, the Volunteers nominally mustered 264,000 men, but they were understrength and 
lacking in equipment, and the numbers in the force were declining further. Indeed, by March 1903, the 
force was short by more than 98,000 men.18 The Imperial Yeomanry, a renamed and repurposed 
continuation of the yeomanry, were the mounted arm of the auxiliary forces, and after the Militia and 
Yeomanry Act of 1902, were liable to be called up during emergencies in much the same way as the 
Militia. Formerly seen as auxiliary cavalry, after the Boer War the Imperial Yeomanry were intended to 
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fulfil the role of mounted infantry, as such units had done in South Africa.19 After 1902 the force 
numbered some 35,000 men, who enlisted for three years. The annual training was of eighteen days 
duration, fourteen of which were mandatory.20 Together, the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Imperial 
Yeomanry made up the British auxiliary forces at the end of the Boer War.  
These forces all made a contribution to the war, and as with the regular army, investigations and 
efforts at reforming the auxiliaries followed in the wake of the conflict. The Elgin Commission gave 
passing consideration to the auxiliaries, but declined to make more thorough enquiries to avoid 
trespassing on the remit of the Norfolk Commission, which Brodrick, Secretary of State for War, had 
created. The Norfolk Commission began work in May 1903 and examined the size, terms of service, and 
organisation of the Militia and the Volunteers—the yeomanry were not considered. It also proposed 
measures to maintain these forces at an adequate strength and suitable level of military efficiency.21 One 
recommendation was that conscription should be adopted to ensure an adequately large home defence 
force in the British Isles. This created a significant political stir, which was of a piece with the political 
wrangling caused by each attempt at reforming and adapting the auxiliaries until the Liberals took power 
in 1906. The National Service League had formed in 1902 to push for Britain to adopt conscription, but 
none of the major political parties was willing to adopt that policy into the party platform.22 The issue 
remained a live one until, driven by wartime necessity, the government adopted conscription in 1916. 
Lord Roberts was a prominent member of, and advocate for, the League, and Adams suggests that the 
majority of serving officers were sympathetic to the League’s arguments and supported its goals.23 
Regardless of the sympathies of serving officers, there was enough interest within the army that the 
usual restrictions on discussing anything that smacked of politics were somewhat loosened. Serving 
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officers dutifully carried out the policies decided upon by the civilian government, but discussion of the 
potential impact of national service did take place.24 
The efforts at reform began even while the Boer War was still being waged; Brodrick planned for 
an army of six corps, in which the Volunteers, Yeomanry, and Militia would all serve alongside the 
Regulars.25 Brodrick’s demands for greater efficiency from the Volunteers, and his methods, caused an 
outcry, particularly among the Volunteers and their political proponents who felt the War Office was 
trying to destroy the force.26 Brodrick’s scheme was delayed and then cancelled upon his replacement by 
Arnold-Forster.27 Brodrick achieved little lasting change beyond upsetting the auxiliaries and creating the 
Norfolk Commission. Arnold-Forster decided to await the Commission’s report before undertaking his 
intended reforms, but when the report was issued, he rejected its findings out of hand, announcing that 
considering conscription was entirely outside the Commission’s remit.28 Conscription was sufficiently 
contentious that the government felt it politic to deny any intention of acting on the recommendations of 
the Commission, and to continue issuing denials whenever the subject arose thereafter. 
Arnold-Forster took nothing from the Norfolk Report apart from the fact that reform was 
necessary; a view he had, in any case, held before taking office. He intended to create a short-service and 
a long-service army, and to similarly divide both the Militia and the Volunteers into two classes. This was 
so unpopular that Arnold-Forster was obliged to tell the House of Commons that his scheme was just a 
personal view.29 His next efforts were also strongly opposed, and by the time he left office, Arnold-
Forster had managed to make only the most minor changes to the auxiliary forces, and even those were 
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ended when Haldane replaced him.30 This political wrangling and the accompanying open debate about 
their military value had done little to improve the lot of the auxiliary forces, but rather a lot to sour their 
attitude, as will be discussed below.  
 The Haldane Reforms have been the focus of considerable academic study, and it is necessary to 
cover only the salient points here.31 Haldane took a considered and rational approach to reform, and 
undertook a thorough and far-reaching restructuring of British auxiliary forces.32 After consulting and 
gaining the confidence of military opinion and taking careful stock of what was politically and fiscally 
possible to ensure the minimum of political resistance, Haldane created the Territorial Force, the Special 
Reserve, and the Officers Training Corps. The Territorial Force was intended to be a home defence army 
to allow an Expeditionary Force of six regular divisions to be dispatched abroad in wartime without 
courting invasion. It was also intended to provide reinforcement to, and expansion of, the regular army in 
a way hitherto impossible. The Force had an authorized strength of 314,000 men, formed into divisions 
and equipped as such, including ancillary services and artillery—albeit 15-pounders rather than the 18-
pounders that the regular army was reequipping with. Some units of the Imperial Yeomanry were 
incorporated into the Territorials as the mounted arm, providing a cavalry brigade to each of the fourteen 
divisions of the Force. The rest of the Yeomanry was disbanded.33  
Both the Volunteers and the Militia disappeared, although much of the manpower of the 
Volunteers went into the ranks of the new force—Beckett notes that the first Territorial unit in France in 
1914 was the 14th The County of London Battalion, which had been the 15th Middlesex (London Scottish) 
Rifle Volunteer Corps—and, as noted above, many Militia battalions were converted into Special Reserve 
battalions.34 The Special Reserve was Haldane’s mechanism for keeping the regular army supplied with 
trained men to replace casualties and sustain the strength of the Expeditionary Force. Each of the 74 
battalions of the regular army was linked to a battalion of the Special Reserve. Thus, the Special Reserve 
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inherited much of the manpower of the Militia, and one of the primary wartime functions of the Militia as 
well. The Officers Training Corps (OTC) brought together under one organization the cadets corps at 
public schools and similar units at the Universities. The fact that the Territorial Force, the Special Reserve, 
and the OTC were all under War Office control meant greater uniformity in the content and quality of 
training across the auxiliary forces, as will be shown below. 
There were thus five auxiliary forces in Britain in the twelve years between the Boer War and the 
Great War which supplied officers to the regular army. As is clear from the table in Appendix Four, men 
were not limited to the Militia, the Volunteers, the Imperial Yeomanry, the Territorial Force or the Special 
Reserve if they wished to seek a regular commission. More men, for example, were promoted from the 
ranks than were commissioned from the Volunteers or the Imperial Yeomanry, and men who had served 
in dominion or colonial military units outnumbered those from the Volunteers and the Yeomanry as well, 
although neither provided all that many men in absolute terms. The number of men entering from the 
Territorial Force was small, and was likely to remain so; regulations prohibited any Territorial officer who 
joined the Force after 31 May 1910 from seeking a regular commission, save in the case of Territorial 
Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) officers.35 A number of men entered the Regulars direct from a 
University, but the number of men who did so was modest, even among those who gained commissions 
by routes other than RMA and RMC.36 The regulars would likely have continued to draw the majority of 
their auxiliary entrants from the Special Reserve, just as had been the case with the Militia. However, in 
1914 these changes were apparent only among the Second-Lieutenants, and the bulk of auxiliary entries 
across the period were from the Militia. The discussion of the value of the training that men received 
before entering the army ‘via the back door’ will therefore focus primarily on the Militia, although other 
auxiliary units, particularly the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force, will also be briefly considered.  
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The Value of the Auxiliary Forces 
The evidence as to the value of officers who entered the army via the Militia is mixed. The Akers-
Douglas Committee had, as noted in the last chapter, asked 87 regular commanding officers whether 
they found subalterns from Sandhurst preferable to those from the Militia, and 50 showed ‘a strong 
preference for the cadet, and only 17 for the Militia officer,’ with the remainder feeling there was not a 
great deal to choose between the two.37 The reform in teaching at Sandhurst may well have altered that 
proportion further in favour of Sandhurst men. Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove told the Committee 
that between 1 January 1900 and midsummer 1901, when he had been responsible for providing officers 
to the regular army, he had to find more than 3,000 officers in excess of the normal requirements over 
that time. He hoped that the army would form a sizable reserve of officers to avoid such a situation in 
future.38 During the war, he had ‘turned in many directions and obtained them [officers] from many 
directions; but of course the very first direction in which I turned was that of the Militia and the 
Volunteers.’39 The drain of officers that this imposed on the Militia—the lost men often being among the 
best in each unit—was a serious problem, and he felt that far from the regulars drawing officers in from 
the Militia, the reverse should be the case. Sir Coleridge thought it would be far better if a few regulars 
could provide an example of ‘the way that things ought to be done’ and to help the Militia bring 
themselves up to full efficiency. After six months of embodiment, a Militia battalion ‘can, more or less, 
take care of itself,’ but needed support before then.40 Lord Roberts mistrusted the Militia, and initially 
took care to confine them to duties on the lines of communication. He found the ‘greatest difference’ 
between them and regular troops, referring to the auxiliaries as ‘partially trained.’ Both he and Field-
Marshal Lord Wolseley felt that the Militia ‘failed in the matter of an adequate number of well-trained 
officers.’41 Very similar concerns were voiced during the enquiries of the Norfolk Commission. 
Roberts and Wolseley were right to complain about inadequate numbers of officers. The 1,691 
officers and 43,875 men the Militia sent to South Africa constituted the bulk of the 68 Militia battalions 
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which left the UK during the war. Those 68 units were, collectively, 303 officers below establishment at 
the time they were warned for embarkation. Three battalions were short of seventeen, sixteen, and 
fourteen officers respectively, while another two each lacked thirteen officers. The War Office solved this 
by appointing a number of entirely untrained young men to bring the units up to a notional full 
strength.42 This, naturally, did nothing to improve the average military capabilities of Militia officers, at 
least initially. Being understrength was a perennial problem, and Major-General Sir Alfred Turner, 
Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, told the Norfolk Commission that the Militia had been 624 officers 
below complement at the outbreak of war in 1899. A year later, this had shrunk to a shortfall of only 23. 
But the situation worsened again after the war; by the summer of 1903 the Militia lacked roughly 740 
officers from a total authorised strength of 3,400, and Turner feared the situation was going from bad to 
worse.43  
The Norfolk Commission questioned 134 witnesses, sent written questions to every Militia and 
Volunteer unit, and also considered ‘numerous memoranda and suggestions… submitted to us by officers 
of the two Forces and by other gentlemen acquainted with their conditions’ and many War Office 
reports.44 They did, however, operate under a peculiar handicap, in that although their mandate was to 
find measures to keep the Militia and Volunteers at full strength, the War Office refused to tell them 
what that full strength was meant to be.45 The Committee thus lacked ‘the means of reaching in any 
scientific manner an independent conclusion as to the adequate strength to be provided.’46 This, 
however, did little to obstruct enquiry into levels of training and efficiency, and the conclusions that the 
Commission reached were often critical, and some little short of damning.  
The Report addressed both the capabilities and strength of the auxiliaries overall, and the 
abilities and numbers of their respective officer corps. The training of Militia rank and file was deemed 
inadequate, which made it all the more important for the officers to be well-prepared, but ‘the training of 
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the Militia officer is inadequate to enable him properly to lead troops, and especially incompletely 
trained troops. Moreover, those Militia officers whose purpose in joining this force is to obtain 
commissions in the Regular army, leave the force just as they are acquiring experience.’47 The Report 
noted that, besides being generally understrength, the units of the force varied wildly in size, with the 
largest and smallest battalions mustering 1,307 and 207 men respectively. Unsurprisingly, the 
Commission found the Militia ‘unfit to take the field for the defence of this country. We think, however, 
that its defects arise from causes beyond the control of its officers and men.’48  
The Volunteers came in for equal criticism. The qualifications of Volunteer officers were crucial, 
and the Commission accordingly gave it ‘our special consideration.’49 In marked contrast to training in 
regular forces, Volunteer officers had no mandatory obligations beyond the attendance at drill required 
of all Volunteers, and while most officers exceeded these standards, ‘no provision is made for the careful 
progressive military education before and after receiving a commission which is conspicuous in all armies, 
although a small number of Volunteer officers attempt to acquire it for themselves.’50 The Committee 
concluded that while a minority of officers would be valuable after educating themselves in military 
matters, the majority ‘have neither the theoretical knowledge nor the practical skill in the handling of 
troops which would make them competent instructors in peace or leaders in war’, and considered the 
Volunteers unfit to take the field against a regular opponent.51 While these conclusions were severe, it 
was the Committee’s opinion on possible improvement which was most damning: 
If the purpose is to produce a force which without substantial help from the regular Army can be 
relied upon to defeat an invader, then improvements in the Militia and Volunteer Forces will not 
be sufficient. We cannot assert that, even if the measures recommended in the preceding section 
were fully carried out, these forces would be equal to the task of defeating a modern Continental 
army in the United Kingdom.52 
 
The conclusions of the Norfolk Commission paint a bleak picture of the state of the Volunteers and the 
Militia after the Boer War. The minutes of the testimony do little to brighten this portrayal of the 
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auxiliaries, but a consideration of some of the finer points of evidence, alongside information from other 
sources, does develop a more nuanced picture of the auxiliary officers of the period, and particularly of 
those who entered the regular army from those forces.  
 The Commission and the witnesses were well aware that the Militia was a route of entry into the 
regular army, and there was an effort to determine exactly how common this was. Field-Marshal HRH The 
Duke of Connaught and Strathearn was asked whether the Militia could be divided into three classes: the 
commanding officer ‘and those immediately expectant on succeeding him; the captains and senior 
subalterns, whom we may also call permanent Militia officers, and the junior officers, who, as a rule, are 
Army candidates?’ The Duke replied simply, ‘Yes.’53 Lieutenant-General Sir John French was less 
sweeping, and when asked whether ‘the great majority’ of young Militia officers sought to enter the 
army, he replied ‘that is often the case.’ Pressed on whether it was practically always the case, he replied, 
‘It used to be, I know.’54 Satisfied on the truth of that point, the Commission considered how more such 
men might be retained in the Militia if they failed their exams for the regular army, or if more aspiring 
regulars could be attracted into the Militia by offering a greater number of regular commissions. Major-
General Hallam Parr felt such a course would indeed mean a more plentiful supply of officers, as ‘we 
know that the proportions that compete are something like one to four, or one to five’.55 In other words, 
allowing 100 more Militia officers to enter the regular army each year would likely draw a further 300 or 
400 men into the Militia annually. Whether they would then stay, however, remained an open question, 
and the Committee heard various suggestions on how to retain men who had unsuccessfully competed 
for a regular commission. That men who sought to enter the army were a considerable proportion of the 
total Militia officer corps is clear from the evidence that Militia commanding officers provided in their 
replies to the Committee’s questionnaires. Of the 479 officers in the Royal Garrison Artillery (Militia), 33.5 
percent were Army candidates, and among the 2,287 officers of the infantry, 24.1 percent were Army 
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candidates.56 Men seeking to gain a regular commission via the Royal Engineers (Militia) were rather less 
common, making up just 5.5 percent of the 108 officers in that corps.57 Overall, however, a quarter of the 
officers in the Militia were men seeking to use it as a stepping stone.  
As has been noted above, the common supposition is that men using the Militia as a ‘back door’ 
into the Army did so as an alternative to gaining a place at RMA or RMC. Edward Spears fell into this 
category; he joined the Kildare Militia in 1903 before joining the 8th Hussars in 1906, although he would 
have been eligible to compete for a place at one of the service academies.58 Some men perhaps fell into 
the same category as Henry Wilson had done in the Victorian era; he had failed on each of five attempts 
to enter either RMC or RMA, but eventually gained his commission after a stint in the Militia.59 But not all 
the men making use of the ‘back door’ were similarly placed. Richard Meinertzhagen was working in his 
father’s bank and serving as a Yeomanry officer when he met, and impressed, John French during 
manoeuvres. French told him he must not continue as a stockbroker, exclaiming, ‘“Good God! What a 
waste. You should come into the Army; it’s a grand profession.”’ Meinertzhagen wrote to a friend in the 
War Office for advice, and resigned his Yeomanry commission before joining the 3rd (Militia) Battalion of 
the West Yorkshire Regiment.60 He took this route not because he had failed to gain admission to either 
of the service academies, but simply because he was by then too old to be allowed to sit the exams. For 
him, the Militia was the only available route into his chosen profession. Frank Crozier had a similar 
experience, albeit for different reasons. When he left school he intended to take the Sandhurst entry 
exam, but found out he was half an inch shorter than the minimum required height. He persisted in his 
aim and gained a commission in the 4th Middlesex Rifle Volunteer Corps, and later gained a regular 
commission in the Manchesters during the Boer War.61 In the case of Edward Spears, while he was 
                                                          
56
 Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. (London: 
HMSO, 1904). pp. 197, 208. [hereafter referred to as Norfolk Appendices] 
57
 Ibid. p. 203. 
58
 Egremont, Max, ‘Spears , Sir Edward Louis, baronet (1886–1974)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31706, accessed 23 Feb 
2015]. 
59
 Jeffery, Keith, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). pp. 11-12. 
60
 Meinertzhagen, Richard, Army Diary 1899-1926 (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1960). pp. 6-7. 
61
 Messenger, Charles, Broken Sword: The Tumultuous Life of General Frank Crozier 1879-1937 (Barnsley: The 
Pretorian Press, 2013). pp. 5, 16. 
 82 
 
eligible to sit the exams for Sandhurst or Woolwich, he may have been unable to do so owing to lack of 
support from his father, who disapproved of Spears’s desire to join the army. When Spears joined the 
Militia father and son became completely estranged.62  
 It is not possible to establish whether Meinertzhagen’s, Crozier’s, and Spears’s reasons for 
entering the army through the auxiliaries were typical or unusual. However, just as not all men who 
entered via the Militia did so after failures in examinations, there were some men in the Militia who 
chose to seek a regular commission by entering Sandhurst or Woolwich. William Birdwood was 
commissioned into the 4th battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1883, and while his parent’s wishes were that 
he enter the army via the Militia, after two years he sat the entrance exam for Sandhurst.63 He passed 
and thus while he entered the Army from the Militia, it was most certainly not by a ‘back door’. Those 
Militia officers who had failed to gain entry to the army by the more usual channels were not, necessarily, 
inferior to men who had passed out of RMC or RMA, at least in terms of their motivation and the energy 
they brought to their soldiering. Colonel C. Healey, commander of the 3rd Battalion, South Wales 
Borderers, explained to the Norfolk Commission that he wanted his officers to have every chance to do as 
much training as they wished, and to be afforded every encouragement 
to become a real professional soldier so far as time and opportunities allowed. He has missed his 
chance, very often by only a few examination marks, of becoming a regular officer. He has been 
disappointed for life, and yet is just as keen to be a soldier. I have officers who will never do 
anything else.64 
 
That such men then sought to gain entry to the army by another route is not surprising, and while their 
exam failures undoubtedly compare badly with the men who passed those same exams, this was not, 
perhaps, such a severe drawback as has sometimes been argued.  
 However, in terms of military knowledge, the experience men gained from the 28 days annual 
training with the Militia would not have been equal to that given by Sandhurst and Woolwich, especially 
after the 1904 reforms at those institutions. Even within the Militia, 28 days annual training was widely 
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agreed to be insufficient for the most basic training. Of 124 infantry commanding officers who replied to 
the Norfolk Commission, only seventeen felt that their battalion’s annual training gave adequate time for 
musketry, and only nineteen felt there was adequate time for company training. A few COs felt that such 
training could be squeezed in if it was done hurriedly, but 100 felt that there was not enough time for 
musketry, and 101 felt the same about company training.65 Similarly, officers both within and without the 
Militia felt that not enough men received military education outside of the annual camp. Colonel H. Fryer, 
who commanded the 4th Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment, encouraged his junior officers to attend 
schools of instruction, and set a good example by personally attending as many as he could. But few of 
his officers actually went, as they could not afford to take that much time away from their jobs. Fryer did 
note, however, that his battalion had ‘several men with Hythe certificates [i.e. from the School of 
Musketry at Hythe] which are very useful.’ His battalion had never played a war game, as they simply 
could not find the time. As for military knowledge gained in the other eleven months of the year, he felt 
that his officers knew a certain amount of military history, and that most of them could speak French, but 
that he ‘could not say they were highly educated as regards military history, tactics, and these matters.’ 
He argued that Militia officers should face a promotion exam before being promoted to Captain, but that 
this might necessitate attending a crammer, as his officers ‘might get a certain amount of lectures on 
tactics, and we do at present a certain amount in that way. As to the part laid down in the drill book we 
do a good deal, but not enough to enable them to pass a sufficient test. The ordinary tactics we do study 
as far as time allows.’66 Colonel Fryer’s testimony was echoed by other Militia officers, and by regular 
officers as well. Major-General Ardagh felt that ‘the opportunities afforded to him [the Militia officer] for 
learning the military profession are insufficient.’67 The average Militia officer does not appear, on this 
evidence, to have been in any way equal to a subaltern fresh from Sandhurst.  
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The Value of the Men Entering from the Auxiliary Forces 
 Despite the somewhat parlous nature of training in the auxiliary forces at the end of the Boer 
War, it seems that many Army candidates did more than the average in terms of military study. Hallam 
Parr felt that it would be worth ‘a considerable effort’ to retain for the Militia the services of Army 
candidates for a short period of time.68 There would be little point in making such an effort, especially 
involving an anticipated outlay of £25 or £30 per man, unless such men were better than the average. 
Some indication of the reason for this is contained in the replies to the Norfolk Commission 
questionnaires. Commanding officers reported that among the infantry battalions, most Militia officers 
were able to attend the annual training. Those who found it difficult to attend either felt unable to leave 
their business behind for the requisite length of time, or were army candidates who were unable to leave 
their studies.69 ‘Studies’ in this instance meant time spent at a crammer. Hallam Parr was asked whether, 
‘having worked with their crammer and having learnt the four great subjects of military knowledge it 
would be a great gain to the Militia to retain them for a few years?’ He replied in the affirmative. The 
Committee asked whether ‘the State would get something for it at all events; they would be men who 
had worked hard at the military knowledge up to competition standard, and they would have had the 
advantage of their Militia training for two or maybe three years as well?’ Hallam Parr agreed.70 The 
officers who entered the army from the Militia were not, therefore, quite as badly prepared as might be 
supposed, given the generally parlous state of the force.  
 It is worth examining in more detail the experiences of those men who passed into the regulars 
from the Militia during the Boer War, because they make up such a large proportion of the whole cohort 
(see Figure 3). Of the men who gained a regular commission between 1899 and 1903, many of them had 
more military experience to draw upon than peacetime training and crammers. As Figure 5 shows, of the 
1,523 regular Captains in December 1913 who had entered from the Militia, nearly 40 percent of them 
had served in an embodied Militia battalion, been attached to a regular unit, or done both.  
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Figure 5. Military Experience of Captains who entered from the Militia 71  
 
Embodied 
Militia 
Attached to 
Regulars 
Embodied and 
attached 
Overall 
 
Number of officers 468 24 109 601 
Average number of days before 
Regular commission 252.6 313.8 504.0 300.6 
Proportion of all 'via Militia' officers 30.7% 1.6% 7.2% 39.5% 
 
Not all prior military experience is listed in the table; a small minority of men had served in other auxiliary units, 
typically the Imperial Yeomanry, before entering the Militia. 
 
The number of days that a man might spend attached to the regulars, or serving in an embodied Militia 
unit, varied greatly. Three men served in embodied units for only a single day before transferring to the 
regular army, while one man gained his regular commission after 930 days of embodiment. Attachments 
to regular units were also of considerably varied length, although the span was less extreme; the shortest 
period of attachment was 72 days, and the longest 816 days. While allowances must be made for the 
considerable disparity of individual experiences in this group, these men collectively gained a good deal 
of military experience before gaining their regular commissions. Sir Coleridge Grove’s testimony to the 
Elgin Commission gives some indication of the value of embodiment. He told the Commission that a 
Militia battalion on embodiment needed support from regular officers, but that after six months, a Militia 
battalion ‘can, more or less, take care of itself.’72 
The opportunity for prolonged training was likely an important part of this increase in capability. 
In its normal round of annual training, Colonel Fryer’s battalion was able to do only a little training with 
cavalry or field artillery, but once his unit was embodied, ‘we did it constantly’.73 The time pressure of 
shoehorning musketry and company training into 28 days was eliminated. Moreover, many of the officers 
who were attached to the regulars, or who served with embodied units, would have had the chance of 
seeing action. Sixty eight Militia battalions left the UK during the Boer War, and while eight relieved the 
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regular garrisons of Malta, Egypt, and St Helena, 60 went to South Africa.74 As will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Four, active service was greatly sought after in the Edwardian army. It was, in some 
ways, considered the ‘gold standard’ of officer experience, and active service was regarded as being likely 
to produce much more efficient Militia officers. Questioned on the advisability of allowing already-rare 
Militia officers to enter the Imperial forces in Nigeria and Uganda, Hallam Parr insisted that such men 
‘would probably come back to their Militia units, and they come back of much greater value, having seen 
service.’75 Thus, despite the criticisms the Norfolk Commission made of Militia officers, it is vital to 
recognize that nearly half of the Captains of 1914 who had entered from the Militia had spent, on 
average, nine months in an embodied unit, or ten months attached to a regular unit, or sixteen months 
doing both, and that this represents a considerable accretion of practical military experience. It is 
simplistic and inaccurate to suppose that every man who passed through that force into the regular army 
achieved no more than the average level of military knowledge and experience.  
The number of Captains who had attended Staff College is also indicative of the capabilities of 
Militia entrants to the regulars. Of the 4,255 Captains on the Army List in December 1913, 216 had 
passed Staff College and gained the coveted letters psc after their name. Unsurprisingly, regular officers 
make up the great majority of trained staff officers, outnumbering staff officers who had begun their 
military careers in the Militia by about five to one. However, of all the men who had been commissioned 
from Sandhurst and Woolwich, 4.2 percent had gained the letters psc, compared to 2.2 percent of those 
who had entered via the Militia (see Figure 6). This is not a small gap—men from the service academies 
were nearly twice as likely to gain entry to Camberley—but it serves to illustrate that men from 
Sandhurst and Woolwich did not hold a monopoly on rising to be the brains of the army. Moreover, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Five, there was an age limit beyond which no officer could compete for the 
Staff College—a factor which was likely to impose a greater limitation on former auxiliaries, who might 
have joined the army at a more advanced age than men from Sandhurst or Woolwich.  
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Figure 6. Routes of entry of psc men 76  
  
Number of Percentage of psc men in each 
Route of entry to the army: psc officers all psc officers route of entry 
 
RMC or RMA 176 81.5% 4.2% 
 
   via Militia 34 15.7% 2.2% 
 
Total 216 100% 
 Six psc men who rose from the ranks, or entered from local Imperial forces, the Imperial Yeomanry, or the 
Volunteers, are not shown.  
 
As discussed, a significant proportion of the men who came into the regular officer corps from the 
auxiliaries did so during or immediately after the Boer War. However, the movement of personnel did not 
stop in 1903, and it is worth examining in detail the process by which men entered the regulars during 
peace-time.  
 
The Process of Entry to the Regular Army 
The rules under which men might gain entry to the regular army were revised at roughly the 
same time that the curricula at Sandhurst and Woolwich were overhauled, and new regulations were 
issued in 1904. The impact of the new regulations will be discussed below, but the existing procedure for 
Militia officers seeking a regular commission included an examination, albeit on non-military subjects. In 
1904, of the 51 Militia and Imperial Yeomanry officers who sat the exam for entry to the Regular army, 
two men passed with high enough scores in Mathematics to enter the Royal Artillery as well as the 
infantry, cavalry, or Foot Guards. One other man, having previously qualified but without meeting the 
higher mathematical standard, retook that portion of the exam and qualified to enter the Royal Artillery. 
Six men gained the marks necessary to enter the infantry, cavalry, or Foot Guards, but failed to meet the 
standard required for the Royal Artillery. The other 42 candidates failed, which equates to a pass rate of 
just under 18 percent.77 The exam of April 1905 had a somewhat better pass rate. Of 127 men who sat 
the exam, two did so to improve on their previous pass mark and gain entry to the Royal Artillery. One 
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succeeded. Eleven men passed with high enough marks in Mathematics to qualify for the Royal Artillery, 
and a further 42 men gained the necessary score to enter the infantry, cavalry, or Foot Guards. Seventy 
three men failed.78 Although rather better than the previous year, this was still a failure rate of nearly 60 
percent. Examinations with failure rates of 60-80 percent make the ‘back door’ look no easier than the 
front. These examinations were, as their title suggests, not military in nature. The obligatory subjects 
included Mathematics I, Latin, English Composition, Geometrical Drawing, Freehand Drawing, Geography, 
and a choice between French and German. The optional subjects, of which candidates had to choose two, 
included Mathematics II and III, Greek, English History, Chemistry and Heat, Physics, Physiography and 
Geology, and the choice of sitting the other of the two foreign languages available. Beginning in 1905, 
however, the process changed. 
Under the new regulations, Militia and Imperial Yeomanry officers were required to sit a 
competitive examination if they wished to enter the regulars, and had to meet a series of conditions 
before they were eligible for the exam. Candidates had to possess either a ‘qualifying’ or ‘leaving’ 
certificate, which will be discussed below.79 Men were obliged to serve at least two annual trainings with 
their auxiliary unit and spend four months on attachment to a regular unit.80 The attachment included a 
regular musketry course, at the end of which the candidate had to be a first-class shot. A course of 
signaling within the regiment was also obligatory.81 At the conclusion of the attachment, men who had 
performed satisfactorily were examined by a board of officers in ‘Practical Military Topography’, ‘Practical 
Military Engineering’ and ‘Practical Tactics’. The last of these included everything in Parts I-V and VII of 
Combined Training ‘and their practical application in the field.’82 If a man successfully cleared these 
hurdles, the President of the Board issued him a certificate that he had ‘acquired a good knowledge of, 
and is competent to give instruction in, those subjects’.83 This reference to both knowledge and ability to 
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instruct is significant, and will be discussed further in Chapter Three. Only at this point was a man aspiring 
to a regular commission allowed to sit the actual competitive examination.  
These were held in March and September, and covered military subjects very similar to those 
taught at Sandhurst. The marks in the examination, again similar to the revised syllabus at Sandhurst, 
indicate that tactics was of central importance. Indeed, taken together, tactics and the allied subjects of 
engineering and topography were worth rather more than half of the entire examination. The subjects 
and marks are given in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Examination Marks for Militiamen and Yeomanry to gain Regular Commissions 84 
Military History and Strategy   1000 
Tactics      1500  
Military Engineering    500 
Military Topography    250 
Military Law     250 
Military Administration and Organization  250   
 
The examination was competitive and the number of commissions available depended on the needs of 
the service. Besides placing highly enough in the order of merit, a candidate had to gain a minimum 
qualifying score of at least 40 percent in each subject, and 60 percent of the marks in the aggregate.85 A 
man could thus come first in the order of merit but fail in one subject, or score highly in every subject but 
be bested by other candidates, and in either way fail to gain a regular commission. Those who passed the 
exam but were beaten by others in the order of merit had no future claim to a commission, and instead 
had to compete again on the same footing as all other candidates if they wished to make another 
attempt.86 This, then, was a lengthy and involved process with multiple tests of a man’s military 
proficiency, and one which offered no guarantees to those pursuing a regular commission by such a 
route. It is very difficult to reconcile the reality of this route of entry into the regular officer corps with the 
way that the ‘back door’ is often presented.  
 The requirement for candidates to possess a ‘qualifying’ or ‘leaving’ certificate imposed a further 
hurdle which aspiring regulars had to clear. The army’s purpose was to ensure that men had a sufficiently 
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high standard of general education. Schools could award a ‘leaving’ certificate to pupils of at least 
seventeen years of age who had attended three years’ continuous teaching and conducted themselves 
satisfactorily. Men without a leaving certificate could also sit an examination offered by the Civil Service 
Commissioners in order to gain a ‘qualifying’ certificate. This exam included compulsory papers in English, 
English history and geography, and elementary mathematics, and a requirement to choose two subjects 
of a further three: Science, French or German, and Latin or Greek. A further paper in mathematics was 
also available for men who wished to qualify themselves for the Royal Artillery.87 Not everyone was 
obliged to obtain one certificate or the other—men could be exempted if, for example, they had qualified 
in the exam for entry to Sandhurst or Woolwich, or if they possessed an M.A., B.A., or B.Sc. from a British 
university.88 These exemptions were not easily gained, in other words, and this is indicative of the level of 
difficulty of the qualifying examination itself. The qualifying exams will be discussed in more detail below, 
but it is important to note that they were a demanding test of a candidate’s general education, and 
failure rates were in the region of 45-60 percent. It is not difficult to see why men often spent time at a 
crammer while preparing for them.  
The Militia ‘back door’ into the regular officer corps was, then, rather different to how it has been 
portrayed. Fewer of the junior officers of 1914 had entered by this route than is normally stated, and 
while the Boer War did bring a large number of auxiliary officers into the army, the proportion of men 
who entered the army from the auxiliaries after 1902 was comparatively small and was, moreover, falling 
steadily in the period up to 1914. The average standard of training in the Militia was not high, but the 
Army candidates studied and worked to a higher level than most in pursuit of a regular commission. Not 
every man who entered via the Militia had failed to gain entry through the service academies—at least 
some found that their age made the Militia their only option. While the Boer War had produced a spike in 
the number of regulars drawn in from the auxiliaries, it also produced a crop of auxiliaries in which a 
significant proportion of men had seen active service, and had spent months in an embodied unit or 
attached to a regular unit, with all of the possibilities for training and benefits of first-hand experience 
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that this brought. Upon gaining their regular commissions, these men had much more than a few annual 
camps of 28 days under their belts. Candidates for the regular officer corps faced a demanding, albeit 
non-military, exam immediately after the Boer War, and subsequently faced more than one military 
examination and an attachment to a regular unit. This does not necessarily mean that men from the 
auxiliary forces were as well prepared as cadets passing out from Sandhurst or Woolwich, particularly 
after the reformed curriculums had been instituted in 1904, but the broad picture which emerges is not 
of a ‘back door’ but rather of a different route of entry—one without the suggestion that men making use 
of it were shirking the rigours of the front door. 
The men who entered from the Militia were, as Appendix Four shows, the majority of all auxiliary 
entrants between 1902-1914, despite the fact that the Militia effectively ceased to exist half-way through 
the period. The second most significant auxiliary source from which the army drew officers was the 
Special Reserve. As those Militia units which were not disbanded were moved into the newly-created 
Special Reserve, there was, at least initially, some continuity from one force to the other. Unfortunately, 
as noted in the literature review, there are very few primary sources which deal with training in the 
Special Reserve, or indeed with the force more generally, and it is, as a result of this, almost entirely 
absent from the historiography—Mitchinson’s Defending Albion is virtually the only published work which 
addresses the inner workings of the Special Reserve at any length.89 Owing to the paucity of records 
available compared to the material on the Territorials, or indeed the auxiliary forces prior to Haldane’s 
reforms, it is possible only to sketch the outlines of Special Reserve training and offer some tentative 
conclusions as to its probable value. 
 
The Special Reserve and the Auxiliaries after Haldane 
Upon appointment to the Special Reserve, an officer was on probation and was required to 
undergo continuous training, typically with a regular unit, and whenever possible with the regular unit 
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that his Special Reserve battalion was affiliated with.90 The commanding officer of the regular unit was 
obliged to ensure the attached officer was instructed in field duties, court martial duty, and interior 
economy. At the end of the probation, initially set at a year but later lowered to six months, the regular 
CO issued the probationer with a certificate if he was found ‘in all respects competent.’91 Conversely, the 
probationary period could be ended early if the CO reported the officer in question was unlikely to 
become proficient.92 Shortened probationary periods were available for men with Certificates A and B 
from the Officers Training Corps, although their attachment to a regular unit had to be during the ‘drill 
season’ between 1 March and 31 October.93 Special Reserve officers who successfully completed 
probation joined their battalion, where both the Colonel and the adjutant were likely to be regular 
officers.  
The responsibility for the new officer’s military education now fell, as it did in the regular army, 
upon his CO, with General Staff Officers in the command district exercising ‘general supervision’ over 
Special Reserve training.94 Special Reserve men who sought promotion to Captain had first to pass a 
school of musketry and also had to pass the (c) exam—covering map reading, reconnaissance, military 
engineering, and tactics—just as the regulars did. Provision was made for men to sit other promotion 
exams voluntarily, and for this to be recognized in the Army List.95 More senior officers were obliged, just 
like regular officers, to pass a Tactical Fitness Examination before they could be promoted.96 The overall 
pattern of training appears to have been similar to that of regular units (which will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapter), but on a more limited scale. Infantry training was meant to include fire control, 
attack and defence, use of cover, ‘mutual support of units by fire to cover advances’, entrenchment, and 
night operations. Field artillery training was intended to work batteries as a unit in action and in 
manoeuvre. The selection and occupation of positions, concealment, ranging, observation of fire, and the 
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construction of concealment and cover were some of the main objectives of the training.97 This syllabus, 
although it focused on suitable battlefield skills, was not likely to be equal to the training of a regular 
officer. It was, however, probably a distinct improvement on training levels in the Militia, particularly with 
the closer involvement of regular officers in Special Reserve training. There was also an effort by the army 
to encourage regulars to take an interest in the Special Reserve and to recognize the importance of 
proper training for its officers and men. 
The Militia had tended to feel that it was looked down on not only by the regular army, but by 
the other auxiliaries as well. One commanding officer complained in his written evidence to the Norfolk 
Commission that ‘at present very few officers join the Militia from a sense of national duty, as they quite 
realize how little the force is taken seriously.’98 Other officers complained that the regulars were ‘inclined 
to send useless or inefficient men, and the latter think it is to be a lazy time for ever, after once coming to 
a Militia Battalion.’ This feeling appears to have been common, as another officer wrote that ‘I feel 
convinced that the auxiliary forces are looked upon by Commanding Officers of Regulars as a useful 
dumping ground for their less desirable N.C.O.s.’99  
Many Militiamen also saw their force as the poor relation of the Imperial Yeomanry and the 
Volunteers, and felt that the War Office showered the other auxiliaries in ‘lavish encouragement’ while 
offering the Militia only ‘studied neglect and snubs.’ The situation was such that one commanding officer 
bemoaned that some of his junior officers were ‘going about apologising for belonging to it [the 
Militia].’100 The Volunteers did not think of themselves as receiving lavish encouragement—far from it—
but did agree about the Imperial Yeomanry; they felt they lost many good men to the Yeomanry, as the 
commanding officers of those regiments were often able to offer pay, which was simply not possible in 
the Volunteers.101 While it isn’t clear that the attitudes of either the regulars or the auxiliaries had much 
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changed in this regard by 1914, the army did make an effort to improve relations and forge closer ties 
with the auxiliary forces.  
In 1909, the Army issued a memorandum on the Special Reserve of Officers, to explain the impact 
of the 1908 reorganisation and the relationship required between the new body and the regular army to 
make the system effective:  
it is obvious that the interest of Regular Officers, especially of those commanding regular units, in 
the efficiency of the Special Reserve officers and men who are to serve with them in war is no 
less than that which they have in the efficiency of their own units. The recognition of this fact by 
regular officers cannot fail to produce a corresponding eagerness on the part of officers and men 
of the Special Reserve to qualify themselves for duty in war with the regular units to which they 
are affiliated. 
 
Officers were reminded of the long-term manpower shortage that the Militia had faced, and told that the 
better conditions and responsibilities of the new force should be broadcast, so that all current or 
potential Special Reserve officers will know ‘that they will be welcomed by the Regular officers.’102 At 
least some regulars took this view to heart; in an article in The Cavalry Journal, a Major of the 14th 
Hussars wrote that ‘the importance of such a reserve needs no demonstration’ and that assisting the 
training of Special Reserve officers ‘should commend itself to every officer who has the interest of his 
regiment at heart’.103  
There are indications that links and attachments between the regulars and auxiliaries were more 
common after 1908. L. A. Hawes, for example, had a Second-Lieutenant of the Special Reserve attached 
to his battery during its time at Lydd practice camp in 1913, during which they participated in 
experiments on the direction of artillery fire by aircraft.104 Charles Kernahan, serving in the Territorial 
Force, felt anxious on his arrival at barracks in Chichester for an attachment to the regulars, lest he be 
regarded as an imposition. He received a warm welcome, however, and wrote that regulars were ‘more 
than ready to welcome and to do all in their power to instruct and to assist the Volunteer.’ The only 
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sneers he heard about Territorials came from civilians, and not from professional soldiers.105 On a larger 
scale, the plan for divisional training and army manoeuvres at Aldershot in the summer and autumn of 
1914 included a significant number of auxiliary units. The Welsh Border Mounted Brigade and the 
Worcestershire Yeomanry were both made available, with the latter designated to form part of the 
Brown Force during the manoeuvres, and instructions were issued designating the regular units which 
would host attached officers from particular Territorial units.106  
After Haldane’s reform, auxiliary units also benefited from being trained on a more regular plan. 
Infantry Training 1911 states that the training of Special Reserve, Territorial Force infantry, and the 
Forces of Overseas Dominions were to be carried out in the same ‘systematic and progressive’ fashion as 
that of the regular infantry. While time constraints would not allow auxiliary units to complete the entire 
course, the regulations noted that ‘the spirit of the instructions should be observed.’107 Men and boys 
serving in OTC units were also provided with a definite syllabus of instruction. Camps for the Junior OTC 
were not intended to produce efficient fighting units, but rather to give cadets more advanced instruction 
in field work, and in camp duties, than would be possible elsewhere, as well as helping officers to instruct 
their respective contingents. Stress was laid on the fact that the OTC was intended to fit cadets to 
become officers, so every cadet was to be afforded the chance to lead a small group of men. The 
programme of instruction that cadets were to complete before attending camp was nothing like as 
extensive as that of a regular officer, but discipline and leadership were emphasised, and commandants 
of training camps were instructed that ‘stress should be laid on, and continual practice given in, fire 
direction, fire control, and fire discipline, and it should be remembered that fire and manoeuvre must be 
taught together.’108 The training for the Junior OTC was thus fairly basic, but built on sound principles. 
‘Specially selected’ regular officers participated at Junior OTC camps, giving short lectures, with suggested 
topics including the purpose of the OTC, ‘the art of command’, ‘discipline, loyalty and example’, and 
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national duty.109 Regular officers also took part in exercises; Arthur Burnell, recently commissioned after 
passing out of Sandhurst, assisted at an OTC camp held at Tidworth Pennings on Salisbury Plain. He wrote 
to his parents about how much he enjoyed the first field day, at which cadets were issued blank 
ammunition and took part in mock fighting as well as establishing outposts overnight.110 Regular officers 
could not be so intimately involved with the Junior OTC year-round, but to help ensure that the cadets 
were properly instructed, school OTCs were linked to local depots, which sent officers to visit schools and 
advise on training matters. The army also set aside money and time to prepare schoolmasters for their 
role instructing cadets. In the winter of 1909-10, more than 100 masters devoted most of their holiday to 
schools of instruction and regimental tours. In the 1910 Easter holiday, some 120 masters were attached 
to regular units during company training, with regular officers ‘specially detailed to superintend the 
training.’ The army found that this had a ‘marked’ impact on the cadets, and the program was continued 
in future years.111  
The Senior OTCs, comprised of university students, benefited from more intimate and sustained 
interaction with the regular army. Each contingent, or group of contingents, had a carefully selected 
regular officer as adjutant. This man was attached to the General Staff to keep him in the closest possible 
contact with the War Office. Men in the contingents were instructed by regular NCOs, and beyond that, 
significant numbers of regulars were attached for short periods twice annually to assist men with training 
and with preparing for the examinations for Certificates A and B.112 By 1911, almost every University had 
an OTC contingent. Studies of the Cambridge and Manchester and Salford Corps present a positive 
picture of their training and of the regular officers selected to lead and train them.113 The number of 
Universities with Senior OTC contingents grew from nine in 1908 to twenty in 1911, with the number of 
cadets growing from 2,234 to 6,184, although some 10 percent of them were likely to miss their annual 
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summer camp in a typical year.114 The training of University candidates, then, was improved in the wake 
of Haldane’s reforms, just as the training of the other auxiliary forces was also improved and brought 
consciously more into alignment with the training given to regular units. The quality and suitability of the 
annual round of training in the army will be examined in Chapter Three, but it is sufficient to note here 
that this development was an improvement for the auxiliaries.  
Officers in the Special Reserve were able to enter the regulars on much the same terms as had 
been in force for Militia entrants. They had to possess either a ‘leaving’ or ‘qualifying’ certificate, and if 
they did not possess this, had to sit a ‘qualifying’ exam.115 This was the same examination taken by men 
from the Territorial Force, and from the Bermuda, Malta, and Channel Island Militias, and included 
papers on English, English History and Geography, Elementary Mathematics, Science, Intermediate 
Mathematics, and a choice between French and German. A quarter of the marks for the foreign 
languages were awarded in an oral test, and 20 percent and 30 percent respectively of the marks in 
Mathematics and Chemistry and Physics were given for the Laboratory Tests. In terms of the level of 
competition, these exams were not much changed from the literary exams that Militia officers had to sit 
prior to 1905. In the exam of November 1912, for example, 115 men competed. One man passed highly 
enough to enable him to enter the artillery as well as the infantry or cavalry, while 42 were able to enter 
the infantry or cavalry only. One man sat and passed only the Intermediate Mathematics paper, and the 
remaining 68 men failed—a pass rate of just 41 percent.116 The results for the exam of June 1914 are 
better, with a comparatively low failure rate of 45 percent among the 92 men who competed.117 As with 
the Militia, this was just part of the necessary preliminaries if a Special Reserve officer wished to obtain a 
regular commission. He also had to sit a competitive examination. This was very similar to the 
competitive examination introduced for Militia officers in 1905; it included a section on map reading, 
field sketching, and reconnaissance worth 1,000 marks, but otherwise contained all of the same subjects 
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worth the same marks.118 Men from the Universities also faced this exam; it was a difficult test. In March 
1911 26 percent of men sitting the exam failed it, and in October of that year 66 men competed for 50 
offered commissions and 37 were successful—a failure rate of 44 percent.119 In March 1912, 61 eligible 
men competed for 50 commissions, and fourteen of them failed—a failure rate of 23 percent.120 Again, it 
is difficult to reconcile a demanding competitive examination on military subjects with the idea that 
entering the regulars from the auxiliaries was a ‘back door.’ While the exams were slightly different, entry 
from the Special Reserve or from Universities, just like entry from the Militia, was not an easy matter.  
 The Territorial Forces contributed a few officers to the regular army before the outbreak of war, 
making only a very small contribution to the number of Lieutenants in 1914, although a rather more 
substantial number of Second-Lieutenants were drawn from the Force. As noted above, the training of 
the Territorials was conducted along the same lines as that of the regulars. Men in the force were aware 
of this. H. Williams proudly differentiated between the Territorial Force ‘which was properly organised in 
Brigades and Divisions’ and its predecessor the Volunteers, which was ‘organised on rather loose lines 
and was more or less a law unto itself, each unit… with its own ideas regarding discipline, training, 
uniform, etc.’121 The training was rather more involved than it had been for the Volunteers, with a 
fortnight’s camp in the summer, at least one drill or lecture on a workday evening each week, as well as 
musketry training over Easter, which in the case of Williams’s unit, the London Rifle Brigade, was 
conducted at either Bisley or Hythe.122 Other Territorials, not based in the south-east, would not have 
been able to use those facilities and would have undertaken musketry wherever was available locally.  
The tactics employed on manoeuvres were sometimes entirely suitable to the modern battlefield, 
with advances that made use of dead ground and cover, and then progressed by short rushes in 
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dispersed formations, covered by the rifle fire of another section. Sometimes the practice was less 
appropriate, with enemy positions approached via night marches which were sufficiently loud as to leave 
the Umpires and the entire defending force in no doubt that they faced an imminent attack. Despite this, 
such exercises invariably ended ‘with the usual enthusiastic “charge”, although, as was always confirmed 
by the Umpires, the whole attacking force would have been well and truly wiped out!’123 That such 
exercises were not of the same standard as those conducted by the regular forces will be shown in the 
next chapter, but the training of the Territorials was still an improvement on that of the Volunteers, who 
could expect the average trained man to attend only 19 drills a year, apart from the annual camp.124 The 
Territorials were not equipped to the same standard as the regulars, being armed with the long Lee 
Enfield and with obsolescent artillery. One gunner, writing about his battery’s live firing exercise in 1913, 
noted that the target ‘was still intact when we had finished firing. This is hardly surprising with the old 5” 
B.L. Howitzer.’125 Such issues had a detrimental impact on training, but the effects seem to have been 
slight rather than severe, and on the whole, the Territorial Force was an improvement on the Volunteers, 
despite the problems it faced. 
 
Conclusion 
 The auxiliary forces of the Edwardian army were chronically undermanned, subjected to several 
attempted reorganisations and then a wholesale reform, and their various standards of training all left 
something to be desired. Despite this, the army’s need to draw at least a certain proportion of its officer 
corps from such sources was not as great a handicap as it is often argued to be. The proportion of men 
who entered the army from the auxiliaries, most often from the Militia, was smaller than typically 
portrayed and was shrinking over the period between 1902 and 1914. While the Boer War had drawn a 
great many such men into the regulars, a significant minority of them had the benefit of a lengthy 
apprenticeship, either in an embodied Militia battalion or attached to a regular unit, before they gained 
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their regular commissions. If this did not make them equally well-equipped as subalterns fresh from 
Sandhurst or Woolwich, it nevertheless left them with more military experience than they are typically 
credited with, and a respectable, if small, proportion of them subsequently successfully entered and 
passed Staff College. While some such men had undoubtedly failed in their attempts to enter the army by 
the more usual routes, others found that the Militia was their only option if they wished to pursue a 
military career. It was not, regardless of the reasons, an easy route into the regular army, and the 
examinations were capable of producing an imposing number of failures among the candidates. The bulk 
of the auxiliary officers who entered the regular army throughout this period were drawn from the 
Militia. Although the Special Reserve incorporated much of the strength of the Militia, and with it the 
lion’s share of auxiliary entrants into the army, the new Territorial Force made a small but important 
contribution to the makeup of the junior officer corps. The quantity and standard of training in both the 
Territorials and the Special Reserve was, arguably, insufficient. Although it was arranged on the same 
lines as the training of the regular forces, the standards attained were lower; however, this still 
represented an improvement on the training of the Militia and the Volunteers before Haldane’s 
reorganisation, and the men seeking to gain regular commissions worked harder than most. The auxiliary 
forces represented not so much a ‘back door’ as a different means of entry, and one free of any 
implication that men taking that route were shirking the rigours of the more usual route of entry through 
one of the service academies.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING AFTER COMMISSIONING 
 The instruction of officers did not end when they received their commissions. Successfully 
passing out of RMC or RMA, or serving in the auxiliaries and then succeeding in the necessary 
examinations, was just the beginning of an officer’s military education. This chapter will examine the 
training and education, both formal and informal, that officers undertook once they had gained their 
commissions. Firstly, it will examine the format, nature, and objectives of the army’s training, and the 
syllabus and purpose of some of the army’s Schools of Instruction. Common themes and objectives of 
training programs will be highlighted, and some types of training will be explored in greater depth. 
Secondly, this chapter will discuss active service experience among junior officers in 1914. Campaigns 
were usually on a small scale and involved only a minority of officers in this period, but for those who saw 
active service, it was an important professional milestone. Thirdly, the professional military literature of 
the time will be examined, with a focus on the type and quantity of material available, how widely it was 
read among officers, and the extent to which junior officers actively engaged by contributing articles to 
periodicals. Lastly, it will discuss the system of promotion and the examinations which officers had to 
pass before they were eligible for a higher rank. They had to demonstrate the required level of 
professional knowledge and ability before they could hope for advancement. Taken together, this will 
develop a picture of the ongoing training and education of officers and their professionalism once they 
had successfully embarked on a military career. This chapter argues that year-round training and a variety 
of military literature helped officers to develop the professional military skills that were expected of 
them, and which they were required to demonstrate before they could aspire to promotion. 
 
The Annual Training Schedule and Schools of Instruction 
 The British Army of the Edwardian period trained year-round, beginning with individual skills and 
fitness, then progressing through company and battalion training, and working up in scale until the 
culmination of the annual manoeuvres which involved a corps on each side. Officers took part in this 
 102 
 
process with their units, sometimes teaching their men, and sometimes participating with them in a 
larger-scale exercise, but they also took part in their own, officer-specific, training and exercises and 
developed their own military skills. Company training took place in March and April, battalion training 
and musketry in May and June. Similarly, battery, squadron, and regimental training also took place in 
those four months. Brigade and divisional training occurred in July.1 This was broadly similar across the 
army, although there were some local differences; the Aldershot Command formed double-companies 
for company training, while the Southern Command used single companies, and conducted battalion, 
brigade and divisional training slightly later.2  
For officers, the winter was devoted largely to indoor work, and almost entirely to exercises 
undertaken without troops. It was also the time of year, at least for units based in the UK, when officers 
were most likely to go on leave. Officers away from their units were not training, but their absence did 
not prevent units from continuing to train. A cavalry subaltern wrote to The Cavalry Journal to complain 
about what he feared was a common view among civilians, namely that officers did not work very hard 
for their pay. To rebut this idea, he sent in a week from his diary in February 1912, noting that it was 
during the leave season and thus not as busy as it might otherwise have been. Between Monday and 
Saturday his diary recorded that he made nine visits to stables, gave his troop instruction in 
swordsmanship, riding, composing and passing messages, and dismounted action. He delivered lectures 
to his men on topics including fire discipline, dismounted action, horsemastership, march discipline, and 
movement of patrols. He did practical reconnaissance work on the ground with his NCOs as well as 
spending part of a morning working through a ‘short scheme’ with them. He devoted two evenings to 
preparing for a promotion exam, but confessed that, perhaps understandably, on one of those evenings 
he fell asleep in his chair.3 This week’s activity, while it was volunteered by an officer keen to 
demonstrate that he worked hard, suggests that training did not greatly suffer during the ‘leave season.’ 
There are other indications that officers’ amusements were not allowed to interfere with military work. A 
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test mobilization of the Malta Garrison took place in the spring of 1914, ‘unexpectedly one afternoon 
while a race meeting was in progress.’ This was not popular, but nevertheless, an officer serving there at 
the time recorded that ‘the test was a very sound one.’4 Senior officers do not appear to have worried 
about whether leave might have a deleterious impact on training or preparedness for war. Smith-Dorrien 
recorded that at Aldershot ‘an immense amount of instruction went on incessantly throughout the year’, 
presumably without undue interruption from leave.5 
 The Army divided the training of officers into theoretical and practical work. Theoretical training 
included staff rides, war games, writing essays, and attending lectures and courses. The practical side 
involved field training, tactical exercises, and manoeuvres.6  Tactical issues were important but many 
exercises also included some logistical work and required officers to use various other military skills, as 
training covered as many of the various activities that an army would undertake in wartime as possible, 
for both the combat and non-combat arms. Training was progressive, starting with individual skills for 
both officers and men, and then moving from company training up to divisional and then Army 
manoeuvres over the course of the spring and summer. Common threads ran through all practical 
training exercises of whatever scale or style, and were also evident in the theoretical work. Above all else, 
the overriding and explicit objective was to prepare officers and men for war. This entailed making 
exercises as realistic as possible, although sometimes there were limits, in terms of availability of 
manoeuvre grounds, the size of training budgets, and the constrictions of peace-time soldiering, to how 
far realism could be taken. The pursuit of realistic training manifested itself in various ways, ranging from 
conducting entire exercises based on likely scenarios for future wars, to ensuring that tactics and 
formations were appropriate for the modern fire-swept battlefield. Officers were meant to learn from 
their training, and as a result, exercises didn’t end when the fighting or manoeuvring finished, but 
featured a concluding conference which all participating officers attended to discuss the lessons of the 
exercise. Such was the importance of this that some extended exercises also held conferences at the end 
of each day’s work.  
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 The Army took the annual round of training seriously. Combined Training described peace-time 
training like this:  
The object of all training is the preparation of the individual officer and man for the duties he will 
have to carry out in war… Success in war depends mainly on the nature of an army’s discipline. 
True discipline cannot exist unless all feel absolute confidence in the fitness of their superiors to 
instruct in peace and to lead in war. The mental and physical efficiency of every officer and non-
commissioned officer is, therefore, a matter of supreme importance.7   
 
Training and Manoeuvre Regulations was more succinct, stating that ‘the sole object of military training is 
to prepare our forces for war, success in battle being constantly held in view as the ultimate aim.’8 Similar 
statements emphasizing the central importance of readiness for war appeared repeatedly in official 
publications.9 Officers’ duties included the instruction of their subordinates, and being able to impart this 
training properly was important. Recognition of this was not limited to official manuals; Haig’s orders to 
the Aldershot Command, for example, emphasized that commanding officers should give ‘special 
attention’ to training their subordinates ‘as leaders and as instructors’.10 For similar reasons, the 
Southern Command held week-long ‘war courses… primarily to teach the senior officers the best method 
of imparting instruction to the junior officers’.11 The brigade and battalion COs of an infantry brigade, and 
the brigadier of their affiliated artillery, along with a few majors each from the infantry and artillery, 
attended a short lecture and discussion each morning, and spent the afternoon solving problems on the 
ground under the supervision of the Major-General. Issues that came up were discussed both during the 
day and at a conference held each evening, and this provided officers with ‘a great deal of instruction.’12  
There was an emphasis in much of the Army’s training work not only on officers being competent 
in their own work, but on being effective instructors of subordinate officers and men. This focus was 
especially clear in the work of the various training Schools which the Army operated. It was also 
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expressed in official publications. As noted above, Combined Training stressed the need for officers who 
were able ‘to instruct in peace and to lead in war.’13 The Army’s desire was also reflected in unofficial 
publications, one of which described in detail the subjects taught at the Musketry Course at Hythe and 
noted that ‘the one chief object is now to turn out each student as an Instructor and not a Talking 
Machine [emphasis in original]’.14 For officers, training meant preparing their men for war just as much as 
it meant preparing themselves.  
 The School of Musketry at Hythe was one of a number of instructional schools the army 
operated, which provided a variety of courses for officers and NCOs. The courses trained officers in best 
practice and the teaching methods to pass that best practice on to their units. There were Schools of 
Musketry, of Military Engineering, of Gunnery, and a Central Flying School as well as an Ordnance 
College, a Cavalry School, and a Camel Corps School.15 There was also a School of Signalling and a 
Mounted Infantry School.16 The army’s non-combatant corps benefitted from a Veterinary School, an 
Army Service Corps School of Instruction, and a Medical School which became the Royal Army Medical 
College in 1907.17 This discussion will focus on the courses and curriculum available to regular officers, 
but most of these institutions also offered courses to officers of the auxiliaries as well.18 Unfortunately, in 
some cases, very little evidence survives on curriculum or attendance, and for some of the Schools it is 
possible to say little beyond the fact that the Schools existed. However, good sources on the School of 
Musketry at Hythe and the Cavalry School at Netheravon survive. The evidence suggests that what these 
schools were intended to achieve, and how they aimed to achieve it, was typical.  
Courses at Hythe taught officers both the technical details of rifles and Maxims, and everything 
necessary to use their fire to best effect in battle, including estimation of range, identifying and 
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describing service targets, fire control and discipline, and the use of ground and cover. Training methods 
for units were also part of the course, with instruction on range practices and elementary firing 
instruction and the preparation of collective field practices.19 Courses for regular officers lasted four 
weeks, with a possible further three weeks for those officers expected to become musketry instructors in 
their units.20 Officers had to do well in the initial course to win the right to stay for the second portion, 
and if they successfully completed the extended course, which included instruction in the Maxim gun, 
then they were eligible for the appointment of assistant-adjutant.21 The exact number of men who 
passed through such courses is unclear; unlike for courses at other schools, Army Orders relating to the 
School of Musketry did not specify a class size for the various courses. Instead, the Commandant wrote to 
General Officers to inform them of the number of officers to send. However, over the Edwardian period 
the intake of regular officers must have been substantial, as after 1 January 1902 all infantry and cavalry 
officers were required to qualify at a school of musketry before they could be promoted to Captain.22 If 
this was not enough to turn every officer of those branches into a musketry expert, it did ensure that 
there were such officers within every battalion and regiment.  
Hythe also offered brief five day courses for senior officers as well as three week courses, with a 
chance of a further fortnight, for officers of the auxiliaries. Hythe was somewhat unusual in that it had an 
‘Experimental officer’ on the strength. He undertook research on infantry weapons and fire effect, with 
one of the lessons being that a great volume of fire, even from indifferent marksmen, was more 
important than a few shots from expert marksmen.23 This informed the decision to define rapid rifle fire 
as twelve to fifteen rounds a minute when other armies expected, at most, eight rounds a minute.24 
There is no evidence that research of this kind was carried out at other places. Otherwise, Hythe was 
fairly typical in terms of the courses it offered and the objectives of the instruction. It aimed to instruct 
officers in current best practice and how to teach it, and thus propagate that best practice around the 
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army. When officers returned to their units from Hythe, besides incorporating the teaching into on-going 
training, they would also help to spread it more widely.25 The ultimate aim was to improve battlefield 
performance. Musketry by itself was not the answer, but it was a necessary skill and, as Spencer Jones 
has argued, an important part of the British Army’s tactical reforms after the Boer War.26 Officers at the 
time certainly felt that musketry was important, and their experiences in the World War did not change 
their opinions. Smith-Dorrien, for example, wrote that Charles Monro deserved praise for his work as the 
Commandant at Hythe in this regard, and this sentiment was echoed by Monro’s biographer, George 
Barrow.27 
The Cavalry School was similar in its objectives and methods. In 1909, it offered courses of nine 
months for cavalry subalterns, six weeks for cavalry captains, two months for subalterns of the RHA, 
seven months for cavalry NCOs, and two weeks for senior officers of the Yeomanry. These courses 
reached a large portion of the army’s cavalry officers. In 1905, Army Order 114 stipulated that every 
cavalry regiment at home or abroad would send a ‘thoroughly efficient’ subaltern of at least three years’ 
service to undertake a six month course at Netheravon.28 The school’s course for regulars in 1906 catered 
for 30 officers.29 As the School was only recently established and not yet occupying all of its permanent 
buildings, the number of officers on future courses may have increased. The cavalry subalterns studied 
equitation, horse management and basic veterinary care, strategy and tactics, military engineering as it 
related to cavalry, and sanitation. Strategic and tactical study included an examination of how foreign 
armies employed cavalry and a study of history to ‘facilitate the deduction of lessons for our guidance.’ 
The course included practical work in the field on using machine guns and the Royal Horse Artillery in 
support of cavalry, as well as the cooperation of cavalry with other arms. Officers were also trained in 
‘the rapid appreciation of situations such as are likely to confront a Cavalry officer in war, and the writing 
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of (or issue of verbal) orders suitable to the case.’30 The director of the Cavalry School, Colonel J. Lindley, 
wrote that the School existed to train officers in equitation ‘with a view to teaching it’.31 Every officer 
attending was also given practice ‘in lecturing on the various duties that may fall to the cavalry soldier in 
the field.’32 Just as Hythe did, the Cavalry School focused on turning out well-trained and knowledgeable 
instructors who would be able to impart their knowledge to their men, improving both the professional 
knowledge of the officers in question and helping to spread best practice throughout the army. The 
school’s intake was sufficiently large to ensure that best practice was indeed widely spread. This pattern 
appears to have been typical of the Schools which the Army operated, as evidence from the Mounted 
Infantry School at Longmoor indicates that it operated in a very similar fashion.33 It is clear that the 
courses offered by these schools, just like much of the Army’s other instruction, were of practical use to 
officers, in that they focused on improved battlefield performance through improved military skills. 
These Schools were unusual in one sense, because although they were officially classified as 
theoretical training, they operated, and took in students, year-round, when other theoretical training 
occurred predominantly in the winter. The advantage of theoretical work was that it took place without 
troops, and this allowed officers’ training to carry on virtually year-round. Lectures were most frequent 
during the winter, when the weather militated against outdoor work. Some lectures focused on officers’ 
day-to-day duties or on preparations for promotion exams, others addressed subjects useful for unit 
training later in the year, and some aimed to broaden officers’ general military educations. Napoleon’s 
1805 campaign was the one selected for special study by officers in the winter of 1912-13; Aldershot 
Command orders provided a suggested reading list for officers, and instructed divisional commanders to 
select officers to deliver lectures on topics likely to be useful for men studying the chosen campaign.34 
The same orders required every company, squadron, and battery in the command to attend at least three 
lectures on the first field dressing. The Deputy Director of Medical Services arranged courses of lectures 
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on sanitation and officers who wished to attend could put their names forward in answer to periodic 
requests in Command Orders. Beyond these specified subjects, divisional commanders were instructed to 
arrange other lectures on suitable topics, particularly from men recently returned from courses at 
Hythe.35  
In earlier orders, Haig had urged battalions to take advantage of any officer with ‘special 
qualifications, such as a skilled lecturer in Military History’, as well as calling on any officer returning from 
instructional courses to pass on the latest information to the whole unit.36 Lecture programs, and lectures 
from men with particular experience, were not confined to Aldershot or to units under Haig’s command. 
Arthur Burnell wrote to his parents from Delhi in March 1914 to tell them that one of the big events of 
the previous week was ‘a splendid lecture by Colonel Benyan (O.C. Gurkhas here) on “N.W. Frontier 
fighting” for our special benefit.’37 In 1907, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 3rd Division arranged a 
course to prepare officers for ‘examination, or rather for war, the examination being of quite secondary 
consideration.’ Some 40 officers had a fortnight’s course with three lectures each morning and work to 
solve military problems each afternoon. The GOC himself delivered some lectures, the rest being given by 
the Brigade Majors of the Infantry and Artillery, all based around the subjects of the (d) promotion exam, 
which will be discussed below.38 In December 1911, the 3rd Division held a five day conference for officers 
which included a war game, rapid solution of tactical problems, discussions among officers of points of 
interest, and lectures on cavalry, transport, tactical study of a battle, fire action, the battle of Liaoyang, 
and ‘The Franco-Prussian Problem.’39 Some of these lectures were of very immediate practical relevance, 
but some were also on topics of wider professional interest—the situation in Europe or the most recent 
large-scale conventional war. By such means, the Army drew upon the expertise of officers, either taught 
or gained through experience, and sought to create opportunities for that expertise to be shared among 
those officers’ peers.  
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Some winter instruction was explicitly intended as preparation for future training. In 1912 Haig 
ordered COs to assist their subordinates by ‘giving advice as to how and what to teach; for this purpose 
winter conferences should be held.’40 A Black Watch regimental staff ride, which dealt with the 
protection of supply convoys, was preceded by a lecture on modern methods of protecting lines of 
communication.41 This was part of the provision made by senior officers for the training of their 
subordinates. There was a tension, however, between overseeing the training conducted by junior 
officers and interfering in it, and the Army was aware of this. Haig’s instructions to hold winter 
conferences were accompanied by the warning that ‘interference by commanding officers is to be 
deprecated, but supervision is necessary.’42 Similar warnings of the need to supervise without meddling 
were issued regularly, in an effort to balance the twin requirements of encouraging independent junior 
officers with initiative and ensuring a cohesive and tactically appropriate training programme in all units.  
War games were conducted indoors and represented the manoeuvre of bodies of troops by the 
use of markers on a map. They could be played by as few as three officers, but a larger number of 
participants would allow for assistant umpires, an officer to record operations, orders sent, and casualties 
deemed to be inflicted, and for a chain of command under each of the opposing commanders. This was 
particularly important to replicate the reality of any detachments, as well as any unit which was not 
immediately under the eye of the commander.43 The published rules for war games exhorted participants 
to include non-combatants like medical and transport units in their orders, as ‘the framing of orders is 
perhaps the most valuable training to be derived from war games.’44 Each side was issued with a shared 
General Idea, setting out the scenario, and individual Special Ideas indicating the forces available to that 
side and their locations, any intelligence on the enemy, and the objective.45 Players issued orders as they 
would in the field, and umpires moved the pieces on the map accordingly, introducing ‘enemy’ pieces 
onto each player’s map as and when they would discover them in real life. Time in the game would move 
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more rapidly than in real life, but at varying speeds; at the beginning, one turn might allow troops to 
march for an hour or more, but as the two forces reached close quarters turn-length might shrink to a 
span of a few minutes. The purpose of the game was not to create and then resolve a tactical situation, 
but rather to practice issuing orders and manoeuvring a force—games often ended when the bulk of the 
forces were engaged with each other, rather than attempting to adjudicate the outcome of the combat.46 
Training and Manoeuvre Regulations explained that war games should not be used for instruction in 
minor tactics, because ‘such instruction can only be adequately given on the ground.’47 War games could 
be played for their own sake, but could also be used as a vehicle for creating the starting positions of a 
staff ride. The orders which Rawlinson issued to the 3rd Division in early 1911 indicate the kind of 
instruction which war games were intended to impart: 
The object of this War Game is firstly to afford Officers an opportunity of studying the strategical 
aspect of the Belgium problem, and secondly, to familiarize them with the establishments and 
organization of the German and Belgian Armies. Tactics must always be a matter of subsidiary 
importance at all War Games but there is much to be learned regarding the strategic geography 
of the theatre under consideration which may one day be of vital interest to the British Army.48 
 
His orders also indicate that the Army was aware of the enemies and the theatres of campaign it was 
most likely to see in the future, and accordingly included this in exercises. This was a common feature of 
large-scale exercises and staff rides, as will be seen below, and of the teaching at the Staff College, which 
will be explored in Chapter Five. Schemes set in Belgium or northern France, or on the North West 
Frontier of India, were part of the Army’s effort to make its training as akin to actual warfare as possible. 
 The Army stressed the need for realism in training, although it was recognized that this could be 
taken only so far in peace. Field Service Regulations emphasized that manoeuvres and field training would 
be of the greatest value provided that ‘war conditions and the exertions inevitable in war are, as far as 
peace exigencies allow, constantly kept in view.’49 Haig’s orders to the Aldershot Command noted that, 
although only blanks were fired during exercises, officers ought to act as if they were actually under fire 
in order to set a good example; ‘It must be remembered that many of the younger officers, non-
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commissioned officers, and men at present serving have had no experience of war; it is more than ever 
necessary, therefore, that our peace training should be made as realistic as possible.’50 Official manuals 
noted that the greatest difficulty in making peace-time training realistic was the lack of live shell-fire and 
rifle-fire, and thus a key role of umpires during exercises and manoeuvres was to ‘convey to the troops… 
the effect produced by the enemy’s fire.’51 Commanding officers drove home the same message. Ivor 
Maxse, commanding the Guards Brigade, was remembered by one of his subordinates chiefly for his 
‘favourite comment when watching training: “Gentlemen, you are training for war! War! Gentlemen! 
War! You will not long survive if you do not learn to conceal your movements.”’52  
Sometimes during training the realities of a situation became clear to officers without any 
intervention from an umpire or a superior. Arthur Burnell’s half company, on a training exercise outside 
Delhi, captured a ‘Brigand Chief’ (played by a fellow officer) in a dawn attack and fought a rear-guard 
action to protect a convoy against the remaining brigands. Burnell then took his men out of their camp at 
3.30 in the morning and sought out the brigand pickets to surprise them. He succeeded, recording that 
‘[we] gave them a proper fright!’ but the experience had evidently impressed on him that ‘wandering 
around at night, without knowing where we were, would be a horrid job if there were any real bullets 
about!!’53 The realities of night marches were, perhaps, more readily apparent than those of imagined 
enemy fire. While training exercises were not, and never would be, exactly like war, the army certainly 
strove to make them as close as possible so that officers might gain the maximum benefit from them.  
Despite the army’s best efforts, not every exercise was realistic in its simulation of the modern 
battlefield, nor was every unit proficient in all of the necessary military skills. However, failures in this 
regard did not escape comment and censure. Upon arriving at Aldershot, Horace Smith-Dorrien was 
displeased to find that the cavalry units there gave insufficient attention to musketry and rarely 
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dismounted during manoeuvres, preferring instead to deliver ‘perfectly carried out, though impossible, 
knee to knee charges against infantry in action.’ He summoned all of his cavalry officers and ‘gave them 
my views pretty clearly, with the result that dismounted work was taken up seriously and the 
improvement in musketry was so marked that the cavalry went nearly to the head of the lists in the 
Annual Musketry.’54 This marked a change from the arme blanche tactics which Sir John French, Smith-
Dorrien’s immediate predecessor, had favoured, and the critique of his methods implied by the change 
was one of the reasons for the deteriorating relationship between the two men.55 Such criticisms were 
not the sole preserve of senior officers, and unrealistic tactics, or a lack of efficiency, invited comment 
and criticism from any officers observing or umpiring at manoeuvres. Richard Meinertzhagen was 
unimpressed by an artillery practice camp he attended. He condemned the batteries taking part for slow 
and inaccurate fire, noting that they appeared to have focused on caring for the horses and presenting a 
clean ‘spit and polish’ appearance to the detriment of their training. Meinertzhagen recorded with 
satisfaction that at the end of the day General Pilcher addressed the artillery officers in withering terms, 
describing them as ‘a disgrace to the Royal Artillery’ and ordering that all of their leave be stopped for six 
months.56  
Official criticisms of the actions taken, or not taken, during training were included in the written 
reports of exercises and manoeuvres. The report on the 1913 Army Manoeuvres, for instance, included 
criticism of specific aspects of each day’s events as well as broader issues observed throughout the 
exercise. It covered tactical matters, staff work, intercommunication between units, supply and transport, 
and march discipline, among other things.57 It laid emphasis on the need to train for war, and to approach 
wartime conditions as nearly as possible; criticism of the operations on 25 September included the 
remark that the 3rd Division’s attack ‘progressed with a rapidity which would almost certainly have been 
impossible in war’ and also noted that a concentration of guns at a given point ‘might have proved more 
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difficult in actual war than it appeared in peace operations.’58 The report on the 1912 Army Manoeuvres 
included similar commentary, covering topics like the handling of brigades and divisions, concentration by 
rail, cyclists, staff duties, and mechanical transport.59 Remarks on aspects of the manoeuvres, and the 
lessons to be learned, were offered by the Director, as well as by the commanders of both sides. 
Famously, aircraft were involved and played an important role in the 1912 manoeuvres, and this was also 
discussed in the report.60 Comments on aspects of exercises sometimes appeared in military periodicals. 
An infantry officer who umpired at the cavalry manoeuvres in 1907 wrote an article for The Cavalry 
Journal offering both praise for work he considered well done and criticism for work he considered poor. 
He had seen units make mounted attacks on entrenched opposition, which he condemned as 
‘impossible’.61 If training did not always look and feel like war, it was not for want of effort, and instances 
of implausible tactics, movements, or dispositions were recognized as such and criticized on that basis.  
The written reports on exercises and manoeuvres were a formal record of the lessons of large-
scale training, but they were only a part of the process by which those lessons were discussed and 
promulgated. Training schemes concluded with a conference at which all participating officers discussed 
the progress of the exercise, the appropriateness of decisions taken and deployments made, and 
opportunities for improvement. These conferences are evident in exercises involving every level of the 
officer corps. A staff ride held by General Lyttelton in October 1907, for example, gave the officers of 
‘Eastland’ a force of six infantry divisions, four cavalry brigades, and two mounted brigades—this, 
incidentally, being very similar to the size of the anticipated Expeditionary Force which Britain might 
dispatch overseas in the event of a war. The roles of the COs and staff officers of the Eastland army were 
taken by one Major-General, five Colonels, six Lieutenant-Colonels, ten Majors and four Captains.62 The 
ride started on 7 October and finished on 12 October, and began with officers writing appreciations of the 
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situation and issuing orders. The 8th was spent on reconnaissance, and further orders were issued. The 9th 
was spent working out in detail the tactical and administrative issues thrown up by the orders issued the 
day before. The pattern repeated itself, and reconnaissance and orders on the 10th were followed the 
next day by solving the tactical and administrative problems that resulted. A general conference to 
discuss the ride took place on the 12th.63  
 Broadly similar patterns of work were repeated in staff rides and tactical exercises right down to 
battalion level, with the units and types of engagement becoming progressively smaller-scale. A staff ride 
conducted by the 3rd Division, for example, placed officers in command of three infantry brigades, two 
cavalry regiments, and their supporting ASC and Royal Field Artillery (RFA) units. The first day of the tour 
focused on the strategic situation, the second on reconnoitring ground, and the final two days on working 
through tactical matters on the ground where contact with the enemy was most likely to occur based on 
the orders given.64 A tactical exercise without troops at brigade level took a form similar to a staff ride, 
but might take place in a single day and focus on rapid appreciations and orders and tactical decisions. 
One such exercise in the 9th Brigade, on 14 November 1911, involved a detached force of two battalions, 
one battery, and half a company of mounted infantry ordered to defend the flank of a larger force. 
Officers were presented with four situations as the exercise unfolded, which required them to set out an 
order of march, react to reports of initial contact with the enemy, make plans to get around the small 
enemy force encountered, and then react to the approach of a larger enemy force. Orders from above 
directed the detached force to hold its position against the stronger enemy for twelve hours and then 
retire at 0400, which required officers to establish defensive positions, make dispositions for the 
continuing defence of the position after dark, and arrange the withdrawal of the troops in the middle of 
the night. Rapid work was required in the exercise where it would be required in real life—two of the four 
scenarios allowed officers only ten minutes to make their decisions and communicate their orders—and 
discussion of the points raised took place after each scenario, as well as in a conference held at the end.65 
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The exercise thus worked officers through many of the competencies they would need to show in battle, 
and replicated the time-pressures of battle when appropriate. More broadly, each of the exercises 
discussed, regardless of the level of command involved, followed a similar format. Particular professional 
skills would be tested, and then there would be a conference at which officers and umpires would discuss 
the course of events, what had gone well or badly, and the lessons to be taken from the experience. This 
was how officers were expected to practice and hone their skills.  
The skills that officers and men developed in training went well beyond the tactical, although that 
was naturally an important and recurring focus. The range of aptitudes exercised tended to be broader 
for more senior officers than for subalterns, so while practical training at the company level was largely 
tactical, it also included various related skills as well as some logistical considerations. In the 9th Infantry 
Brigade, for example, Company Marches had several objectives. Officers commanding the companies 
would be practiced in ‘manoeuvring as opposed to field day fighting [emphasis in original]’, sending 
scouts and cyclists in the proper direction, weighing the value of intelligence and reports, protecting their 
transport, and issuing new orders in response to developments. They would also be ‘working “on their 
own” as regards purchase of rations from local sources, [and] administrative and sanitary duties in 
camp’.66 The senior officer of each company would be detached from it during the march, and would 
arrange the training exercise for his company. This would give them practice in setting schemes and 
making them instructive, and in ‘giving useful criticism on each day’s operations.’67 Officers commanding 
companies would benefit from a tactical engagement if the march brought them into contact with the 
other company taking part, but this was not a necessary part of the scheme—sometimes suitable ground 
was simply unavailable. However, the instructions warned that, even if suitable ground was available and 
companies were permitted to use it for a mock fight, directors were not to ‘nurse’ units onto the ground 
selected as the most likely point of collision. Indeed, if the directors had not calculated well enough and 
no encounter took place, the instructions observed that, ‘if so they [the directors] at all events will have 
benefited by the exercise’, having learned, in other words, to plan their training exercises more carefully 
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in future.68 Where a tactical encounter did take place, officers were reminded that ‘it should not be 
allowed to degenerate into a scrimmage’ but should be ended as soon as troops became too close for 
realism.69 Company officers were thus required to demonstrate not just tactical knowledge, but an ability 
to direct reconnaissance and react to changing circumstances. Issuing suitable orders to their unit and 
arranging for the mundane but essential supply of food and materiel to their men was also included in 
their work. Here, too, the desire to avoid unrealistic situations in training was evident, as was the desire 
to ensure that officers did not merely complete the exercise, but would take lessons from the discussion 
and critique at the end of each day’s work.  
Exercises with larger formations showed many of the same features, although battalion and 
brigade-level training for officers was more likely to take the form of staff rides and thus be conducted 
without the presence of troops. Staff rides were conducted on the ground, and required participants to 
conduct reconnaissance, issue orders, and react to intelligence or changes in the situation. Where the 
imaginary forces clashed with those of the enemy, officers could meet on the ground in question to work 
out the tactical issues and determine the outcome of the engagement. While the largest-scale rides could 
involve the participation of a dozen generals and a large number of subordinate commanders and staff 
directing the movements of several imaginary divisions, rides involving junior officers typically covered 
problems in small unit tactics. However, it is worth noting that even the largest-scale rides involved 
Majors and Captains (often psc men), who quite often took part as brigade majors or assistant directors. 
Large rides, which drew men from across the army, were typically directed by the Chief of the General 
Staff—later the Chief of the Imperial General Staff—and involved forces roughly the size of the planned 
Expeditionary Force. The ride held by General Lyttelton which was discussed above is a good example of 
this.  
At battalion level, a staff ride might focus on protecting lines of communication by means of 
defended posts and a flying column, with initial work on the quantity of transport involved and the care 
required at river crossings, followed by the selection of ground suitable for defended posts and working 
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out the details of their construction.70 Although such an exercise would not actually involve any staff 
officers, it was still typically termed a staff ride, although the description ‘Tactical Exercise Without 
Troops’ was beginning to be used to describe such training.71 Similar work could be conducted even 
within battalions, employing forces of a company or two. Haig ordered COs in the Aldershot Command to 
assemble their junior officers once or twice a month to work out short tactical schemes with small forces 
on nearby ground. Officers would be given General and Special Ideas and then asked to produce an 
appreciation in five or ten minutes. After this was repeated three or four times in an hour, a conference 
would discuss the various solutions suggested. Haig instructed that ‘young officers should be encouraged 
to give their views and the reasons on which they are based,’ as this would train them to carry out their 
orders intelligently and to use their initiative.72 Here again the need to supervise training, while also 
encouraging intelligent initiative among junior officers, is apparent, as is the conference which concluded 
even the smallest-scale and briefest of exercises. Haig’s scheme was not strictly speaking a staff ride, but 
the lessons to be learned were similar even if the format was truncated.  
The practice that staff rides were intended to give, and the lessons officers were meant to draw 
from them, were logistic, tactical, and communication skills useful on the battlefield. More broadly, 
however, many staff rides were also designed around scenarios the army considered most likely to 
confront officers in the future. The North West Frontier of India was a particular favourite, and both 
Scotland and Wales were used as analogues of the Himalayas. One such ride, in May 1906, envisioned a 
British punitive expedition in reply to the murder of several British officers by tribesmen, and was acted 
out on a patch of terrain of roughly 65 square miles north of Crianlarich. Instructions required that no 
maps be consulted before or during the exercise, save for the one provided, which showed in the area 
beyond the border of the notional British territory only the largest geographical features and patchy 
information on one or two roads. As will be discussed in the section on active service, a map of that 
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quality was something officers were quite likely to encounter in imperial campaigning. The General Idea 
listed several tribes of varying bellicosity and the state of relations between them and Britain, as well as 
positing a kingdom much like Afghanistan some distance to the north of them.73  
A similar ride held in Wales for six days in September 1905 was based on a punitive expedition 
against the Afridis. It was deemed necessary for the expedition to remain in their territory ‘for some little 
time’ so at least one line of communication had to be held open throughout the exercise. Certain changes 
to the existing ground were stipulated; railways and roads suitable for wheeled traffic ‘are not supposed 
to exist. Fair mule tracks may be supposed where the main roads are’. Existing towns and villages were 
either imagined to have disappeared, or to be only clusters of fortified houses, easily reduced by 
mountain artillery. Notes listed the local tribes and detailed their weapons and typical tactics.74 These 
rides provided officers with the usual practice in writing an appreciation, composing orders, conducting 
reconnaissance, and working out tactical issues on the ground, but they also reflected the army’s 
assessment of where officers were most likely to be in action in the foreseeable future. Given the 
frequency of campaigning on the North West Frontier, this was a simple and pragmatic way to increase 
the realism of exercises and to remind officers that the purpose of training was readiness for war. 
 Battalion and brigade training, like company training, gave officers practice commanding their 
units, issuing orders, exercising fire control and fire discipline, using proper formations, and directing an 
engagement. Battalion training in the Black Watch in 1913, for example, ran for some six weeks in May 
and June, with more than a dozen field day exercises in that time. The first of these involved scouting an 
area to locate the enemy and then delivering an assault, but was intended primarily to rehearse everyone 
in the fundamentals of the job. The instructions stipulated that it was ‘a drill attack, slow, halted when 
necessary to point out mistakes; repetition when necessary.’75 Much like winter lectures on training 
subjects, this was an effort to ensure that officers and men were clear on exactly how to conduct an 
attack properly, because there was little benefit in rehearsing the wrong method. Each subsequent field 
day focused on a specific operation or skill, like night operations, cooperating with artillery, fighting an 
                                                          
73
 JSCSC. Papers of Captain A H Marindin. Staff Ride in Scotland. 
74
 JSCSC. Papers of Captain A H Marindin. Staff Ride in Wales September 1905.  
75
 JSCSC. Papers of Captain A H Marindin. The Black Watch: Battalion Training 1913.  
 120 
 
encounter battle, and assaulting or defending an entrenched position. Each exercise was intended to 
highlight certain points. The cooperation with artillery exercise, for example, put troops through an attack 
on an enemy position, supported by their own artillery and opposed by enemy artillery. Friendly artillery 
support was indicated by an umpire showing flags when ‘bursts of fire’ were falling on the enemy 
position, and hostile artillery was simulated by one or more actual guns in the enemy position which 
would fire a single round to indicate that they had observed poor formations among the attacking 
infantry. After the attack was over, the artillery officer gave criticism on the infantry formations used. 
Attention was also called to the need for communication between attacking infantry and their supporting 
battery.76 This discussion of the particular lessons to be learned from the exercise was the function of the 
conference which concluded almost every exercise of whatever size.  
 This training, and the skills it was intended to develop, is distinctly similar to the pre-war training 
of the German army described in Terence Zuber’s The Mons Myth. Zuber discusses in detail German 
training, and notes its focus on initiative, marksmanship, the use of a dispersed line of skirmishers to 
advance in action, movement by bounds covered by fire, and gaining fire superiority to allow an assault.77 
These are all concepts which were familiar to British officers, as they were key to the reforms in British 
tactics after the Boer War.78 Zuber, however, praises German training as superior to British, and argues 
that the British army was not prepared for combat with a first-rank continental power.79 He asserts that 
the British army ‘concentrated on individual training’ and that at every level from the company upwards 
training was inadequate.80 He notes that ‘doctrine and training must correspond to the most likely 
missions that the army will have to perform’ but implies that the British focused on colonial military 
duties rather than preparing for a continental campaign.81 It is difficult to reconcile Zuber’s argument on 
this point with the training discussed in this chapter, only a small portion of which focused on imperial 
campaigning. British doctrine was largely focused on continental warfare. FSR I discussed both warfare 
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against a first-rate opponent and colonial campaigning, but of the twelve chapters and 220 pages in the 
book, only one chapter (of twenty-one pages) was devoted to ‘warfare against an uncivilized enemy.’82 It 
is difficult to see how else exercises which envisioned campaigning by the Expeditionary Force in Belgium 
or the dispatch of a punitive expedition on the North West Frontier could be described except as 
corresponding to the missions the army considered to be most likely in the foreseeable future. Just like 
the company and battalion training already discussed, exercises conducted by higher formations focused 
on many of the same issues.  
 Brigade training also rehearsed officers and men in likely tactical scenarios. The 9th Infantry 
Brigade carried out seven brigade schemes between 19 and 26 August 1912. These exercises, unlike 
company marches, were purely tactical concerns in terms of the specified objectives, but arrangements 
for transport and for feeding the men still had to be made. Each exercise was carried out by battalions of 
the brigade acting on one side or the other, accompanied by artillery from their associated artillery 
brigade and also by a battalion of the Royal Marines Light Infantry. The battalions practiced frontal and 
flanking assaults on entrenched positions, protecting river crossings, night marches and night assaults 
against entrenched positions, and consolidating a captured position and digging trenches to hold it 
overnight.83 The army’s annual training programme was not only progressive, moving as it did from 
lectures, war games, and staff rides to work in the field with troops in increasingly large formations, but 
practiced a range of operations appropriate for the modern battlefield. The emphasis placed on close 
cooperation between arms, making good use of cover and ground, supporting advancing troops with fire, 
and assaulting and defending entrenched positions was a realistic assessment of the skills officers and 
men would require in combat.  
 Lectures, war games, staff rides, and courses at Schools of Instruction constituted Edwardian 
officers’ theoretical training, and were, as has been argued, utilitarian and pragmatic means of training 
which allowed officers to practice and develop important battlefield skills, and then asked them to reflect 
on the lessons of the exercise. Many of the same skills were also required during practical training, when 
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officers took part in exercises with their men. Practical training took place at every level from the 
company to the division, although more time was available for exercises with smaller units than larger 
ones. This was partly a function of where units were garrisoned, both in relation to the other parts of 
their brigade or division and in relation to the nearest ground suitable for large-scale manoeuvres, and 
partly a function of cost. Both practical and theoretical training was explicitly aimed at preparing officers 
and men for war, and as such realism was avidly pursued.    
 There were, however, some problems with training. The money available to commands and 
formations, in the form of the Training Grant, was not insubstantial—Aldershot Command had £25,000 
available in 1907—but there were some concerns about how far it would stretch.84 Such constraints were 
recognized even in official publications; Combined Training warned that manoeuvres were undertaken on 
fixed budgets and the greater expense of supplying mobile troops might require employing fewer of them 
than would otherwise be the case.85 Instructions for Company Marches, for example, noted that officers 
directing the exercise should ‘arrange for, or, if necessary, hire camping grounds in suitable localities,’ 
and hinted that farmers were more likely to provide ground for camping free of charge if the officer 
agreed to purchase provisions from the farm.86 Directors were told to find suitable ground for 
manoeuvre. If government-owned ground was not available, they were to seek permission to use private 
ground, but ‘hiring must not be resorted to.’87 Quite apart from not involving troops in lengthy outdoor 
work during the coldest and dampest times of the year, one of the benefits of winter training for officers 
was that it could be done quite cheaply; while the Aldershot Command spent roughly £14,500 annually 
on command manoeuvres, it spent a total of only £2,000 on winter tours for divisions, brigades, the Royal 
Engineers, and the RAMC.88 Even training without troops, however, still sometimes hit boundaries of cost. 
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Officers attending a staff ride in Wales in 1905 were issued written notes warning them to move their 
luggage from Carnarvon to Beddgelert by road ‘as railway prices are ruinous.’89 These financial 
constraints were not severe, but the quantities of blank and practice ammunition available were also an 
issue. Units taking part in the Aldershot inter-divisional manoeuvres in 1910, for instance, were able to 
distribute 60 blank rounds to each infantry rifle, 30 to each cavalry rifle, and 350 to each machine gun. 
Skeleton units taking part in command manoeuvres, however, were given only ten blank rounds per 
rifle.90 It is perhaps unsurprising that more than one officer published thoughts on how to best use the 
limited allocation and the proportions of the ammunition allowance that ought to be devoted to range 
firing or field training.91  
Of more immediate concern for officers who were in the midst of manoeuvres, some exercises 
were brought to an unexpectedly speedy conclusion by the unanticipated action of a participant. Richard 
Meinertzhagen, taking part in an exercise shortly before the Boer War, was acting as a guide for a patrol 
sent to locate the enemy camp at night. The patrol found the camp, discovered that it had no outposts to 
its rear and approached it unobserved. Meinertzhagen drew his sword and led the whole patrol ‘yelling 
like Red Indians’ on a charge through the sleeping camp, which caused all of the enemy’s horses to 
stampede. The patrol feared that this action might bring down a heavy rebuke. But when Meinertzhagen 
returned to his own camp to report what had happened, the commander, John French, was delighted 
and ordered an immediate attack. The exercise, however, was cancelled at 6 a.m. when the attackers 
discovered ‘the entire enemy camp roaming the countryside, dismounted and unarmed, trying to catch 
their horses.’92 George Barrow, while in temporary command of a cavalry regiment, did something similar 
during brigade training in India. He took his regiment across the river Jumna, with the men and horses 
swimming and the equipment on rafts. They ‘surpris[ed] the enemy asleep at the first streak of dawn, 
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and [brought] the exercise to an abrupt and unintended termination.’93 Events like these doubtless upset 
some carefully arranged schemes set out by more senior officers, but they still taught valuable lessons to 
the participants, even if those lessons were not necessarily the ones the exercise was intended to 
illustrate. As French remarked to the commander of the camp Meinertzhagen had charged through, 
‘”Lucky for you it was not the real thing.”’94 
 The training of both officers and men was made more engaging by an element of competition. 
Much like the inter-company contests at Sandhurst discussed in Chapter One, these were intended ‘to 
promote a healthy spirit of rivalry between companies during section, half-company and company 
training’.95 There were several such contests, which pitted units against each other in trials of 
marksmanship, leadership, field-craft and physical fitness. The Evelyn Wood Competition put teams of 38 
officers and men through a march of about eleven miles in three hours and collective firing at unknown 
distances. The Smith-Dorrien Competition was an exercise in attack or defence which included firing at 
surprise targets, and was intended to test ‘the methods of training and compare the results of firing in 
collective field practices.’96 The Connaught Ambulance Shield and the Connaught Shield Obstacle Course 
were for stretcher-bearers and infantrymen respectively. 97 The Douglas Shield put a half-company 
through an advance on a hostile position, testing the unit as a whole on its field-craft, fire discipline, and 
mobility, and the officers on their conduct of the advance, mutual support, and training of their men. This 
last aspect was crucial, as the rules stipulated that ‘the half-company commander and both section 
commanders will be put out of action by the Umpire during the exercise,’ and the men and remaining 
NCOs had to continue without them. The team which passed through the battalion and brigade tests and 
won the final competition was awarded the Challenge Shield, presented by General Sir Charles Douglas 
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himself, along with prize money of 10/- for each man and one pound for the half-company commander.98 
These competitions helped to give a focus to training, and it seems likely that, besides the cash prizes and 
the trophies, being able to bring credit to their regiment by demonstrating military skills was an incentive 
to officers and men alike.99 Kitchener instituted a competition ‘in every form of military training and 
operation’ to award a cup to the best two British and Indian battalions in India, and Smith-Dorrien felt 
that these ‘Kitchener Tests’ had ‘raised the standard of military efficiency to a far higher plane.’100 
 The training which officers undertook once they had joined their units occurred year-round. It 
involved classroom and outdoor components, exercises with and without troops, and tactical and logistic 
considerations appropriate for the unit or level of command being trained. Officers had to prepare 
themselves and their men for battle, and this meant being an effective instructor as well as an effective 
learner. Realism and conferences to discuss the lessons of exercises were constant themes. Training was 
not free of problems, but it kept officers engaged in preparing themselves and their commands for war, 
and required constant practice of professional skills. 
 
Active Service 
 Besides training and exercises, some officers in the Edwardian period had the opportunity to 
hone their skills on active service. The turn of the century provided numerous opportunities for active 
service, which included, besides the Boer War, an uprising in Matabeleland and Mashonaland in 1896, 
and in 1897 an insurrection on the North West Frontier, a mutiny in Uganda, and the dispatch of an 
international force to Crete.101 There was further imperial campaigning during and after the Boer War, 
and the memorial tablets in the Chapel at Sandhurst record officers killed on active service in northern 
Nigeria in both 1898 and 1903, Central Africa in 1899, Ashanti in 1900, West Africa in 1901, Somaliland in 
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1903-4, and the North West Frontier in both 1902 and 1908.102 There were also campaigns in Tibet in 
1903-4, on the North East Frontier of India in 1911, and in Sudan in 1912.103 In addition, Richard 
Meinertzhagen saw active service in Kenya between 1902 and 1906, Edward Steel saw active service in 
Nigeria between 1904 and 1907, Tom Bridges saw action in Somaliland from 1902-5, and Adrian Carton 
de Wiart fought against the Mullah there in 1914.104 Indeed, Somaliland was an imperial hot-spot in this 
period. Campaigning began in 1901 with the employment of 1,500 local troops and seventeen British 
officers, and escalated by 1904 to a field force of 6,000 regulars and more than 1,000 irregulars, complete 
with artillery.105 After several years of a tense peace, further campaigning was undertaken in 1914 and 
was not concluded until 1920.106 Although the Army was not necessarily quite as busy with imperial 
commitments as it had been at times during Victoria’s long reign, Repington’s complaint that the ‘royal 
road of active service was closed to us all for want of wars’ is clearly rather wide of the mark.107 
Besides experience of combat, many colonial campaigns provided officers with first-hand 
experience in logistics, planning, and sanitation, often in severe environments. Extremes of temperature, 
terrain, and precipitation were common. Few campaigns, however, can have been prosecuted over 
terrain quite as stark as the Tibet expedition of 1903-4, which began in the depths of winter and involved 
advancing across, and subsequently maintaining a logistical train through, mountain passes at elevations 
up to 15,000 feet. Such feats were merely the necessary preliminary to the fighting which involved battle 
in a pass above 16,000 feet and on mountain-sides at altitudes up to 20,000 feet.108 Unsurprisingly the 
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troops were equipped and clothed in a manner suitable for ‘Arctic conditions.’109 In some cases, 
expeditions advanced into areas virtually unknown to Europeans; a map published to illustrate a 
campaign in southern Sudan has several entirely blank areas and carries a prominent notice that ‘None of 
the hills have been surveyed and are placed roughly only in their approximate positions.’110 More than 
one area marked with the legend ‘swamp’ is also marked with a ‘?’. Similarly, two expeditions mounted 
on India’s North-East Frontier in 1911 departed from their base of operations on an ‘adventurous march 
through practically unknown country of the wildest possible description.’111 Even on the more familiar 
North West Frontier, the scene of decades of almost incessant skirmishing and frequent large-scale 
expeditions, there were broad swathes of territory which were still being surveyed at the very end of the 
Victorian period.112 As already discussed, it was thus appropriate for staff rides simulating the North West 
Frontier to issue patchy maps lacking most details beyond the boundaries of British territory.  
Most of the campaigning after the end of the Boer War was small-scale and involved 
comparatively few officers, but some indication of how common active service experience was for junior 
officers is given by a comparison of the Army List from January 1903 and from June 1914.  
Figure 8. Active Service Experience, 1903 and 1914 113 
 January 1903 June 1914 
Second-Lieutenant 35.4% 0% 
Lieutenant 59.8% 5.3% 
Captain 65.8% 49.6% 
Major 75.9% 73.9% 
Lieutenant-Colonel 85.9% 79.4% 
 
The proportion of subalterns who had seen active service had, by 1914, dropped precipitously 
from the end of the Boer War, but the number of Captains who had seen active service remained 
substantial, and the number of Majors who had seen active service remained virtually unchanged. While 
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the great majority of such experience was from the Boer War, some fourteen percent of officers with 
active service experience had seen action more recently in smaller-scale colonial campaigning. The details 
of this active service experience are in A ppendix Five.114 The lessons of these smaller campaigns would 
not necessarily have been limited to the men who took part, as both lecturing within units and 
commands, and the sharing of experiences in professional literature, allowed lessons to be spread more 
widely, as discussed later in the chapter. In terms of first-hand experience, the number of Captains, 
Majors, and Lieutenant-Colonels who had seen action ensured that there would have been very few units 
without at least one such man, and most units would have had several—an important consideration, 
given the emphasis the Army placed upon making exercises and manoeuvres as realistic and as close to 
war conditions as possible. Among the battalion COs of the Expeditionary Force in 1914, 88 percent had 
had previous active service experience, seeing an average of 1.7 campaigns each.115 At the beginning of 
1914, the 1st battalion of the Worcesters enjoyed widespread combat experience, with their CO, all of the 
Majors, and all but one of the Captains having seen active service. None of the Lieutenants or Second-
Lieutenants had seen active service, but overall a third of the battalion’s officers had combat experience 
to draw upon when arranging training schemes, or indeed when leading their men into battle.116  
Active service taught valuable lessons, some of which would have been impossible in even the 
most realistic exercises. Shelford Bidwell’s observation that ‘being fired at with ball ammunition by a man 
who really wishes to kill you is excellent training for soldiers, whatever label is attached to the type of 
war’ seems a fair comment on the actual experience of combat in ‘small wars’.117 Tom Bridges’s baptism 
of fire was in South Africa, and ‘in a crowded hour I learnt how to distinguish between the plick-plock of 
long-range fire and the whip crack of point blank, and the difference in sound of a rifle shot aimed at 
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oneself or at someone else. Useful lessons for a scout, quickly learnt and never forgotten.’118 The small 
scale of much imperial campaigning required initiative and confident self-reliance from officers. In July 
1902, Meinertzhagen recorded in his diary that he and two other officers, with 20 local troops and 50 
local police, were 68 miles from any reinforcements or possible medical aid, with responsibility for 
administering and policing a population of some half a million; ‘we are responsible for the security in an 
area the size of Yorkshire’.119  
The logistical challenges were often equally daunting. Edward Steel was, at the age of 32, 
promoted Major and made Chief Commissioner of the Commission delineating the frontier between 
Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo.120 He had been surveying for the Commission for a year prior 
to his promotion, constructing observation platforms atop trees and hills, avoiding crocodiles and hippos, 
and dealing with rains, and heat, and grass fires.121 After his promotion, he solved the logistic problem of 
keeping more than four hundred men ‘in a practically uninhabited and foodless country for fifteen 
months, the farthest point of which was 350 miles or twenty-eight days’ journey from our rail-head at 
Beya.’ Part of his supply line ran through tse-tse fly country, which made using animal transport there 
impossible, and native bearers could make journeys of at most fourteen days’ duration. He solved his 
difficulties by employing a traction engine borrowed from a local mine, building a base camp just beyond 
the range of the tse-tse fly, and cutting a road through a forest. Later in the same expedition he 
constructed a bridge over the Lunga River.122 Experience like this was invaluable. Meinertzhagen, 
reflecting on his career during his Staff College course, wrote that: 
I never cease realising what immense benefit to me has been the last fourteen years of 
regimental soldiering, more especially the experience and confidence I acquired during my five 
years with the King’s African Rifles. I look on that period as the basis of my career.123 
 
Experience of active service was not universal, and was indeed quite limited amongst subalterns by 1914, 
but imperial campaigning was still an important part of the professional experiences and learning of the 
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officer corps as a whole. The number of Captains and Majors who had seen active service, either in the 
Boer War or in more recent imperial campaigning, remained very significant. This experience was 
professionally important to those officers, but also provided a source of experience that their units and 
officers who had not seen active service could draw upon, particularly in making exercises as realistic a 
preparation for war as possible.  
 
Edwardian Military Literature 
 The Army produced official books to guide and inform officers, and required that all officers 
‘possess the latest editions… and will produce them at all inspections.’ Every officer needed copies of 
Field Service Regulations Part I, Combined Training, King’s Regulations, Manual of Military Law, Field 
Service Regulations Part II, Regulations for Mobilization, Field Service Pocket Book, and War 
Establishments.124 Further books were required for each arm or corps of the service. Infantrymen, for 
example, also needed Infantry Training, Musketry Regulations, Manual of Military Engineering, and 
Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching, while gunners of the RHA had to have Field Artillery 
Training, Cavalry Training, Musketry Regulations, Manual of Military Engineering, Manual of Map 
Reading and Field Sketching, and Animal Management. The Royal Engineers had nine corps-specific 
manuals.125 The fact that officers all owned their own copies of the relevant publications does not, of 
itself, guarantee that they read them—although, as will be explored below, officers were examined on 
them and had to demonstrate a knowledge of their contents in order to qualify for promotion. Moreover, 
as will be discussed below, the number and variety of unofficial works on military subjects which were 
explicitly aimed at officers suggests that not only did officers read official manuals but also that a 
significant proportion of them desired to read more.  
 There is a considerable quantity of British military literature from the Edwardian period. Brian 
Holden Reid argues that ‘military intellectual’ was a contradiction in terms in the army before 1914, but 
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does acknowledge the influence of both G. F. R. Henderson and Charles Repington, and a growing 
impetus for reform within the officer corps.126 This argument is unduly critical of British officers. Besides 
the writings of Henderson and Repington, there is strong evidence that many officers were intellectually 
engaged with their profession and with related topics. The contents of the service periodicals in this era 
do not at all suggest a blinkered and unthinking officer corps, but rather an engaged group of men 
grappling with the problems of modern warfare and new developments in technology. Articles on the 
development of aviation and on the possible applications of aircraft and airships to warfare appeared 
regularly in several different journals. To offer just one example, the Journal of the Royal Artillery carried 
six articles on aviation between April 1911 and March 1912. These included discussion of anti-aircraft 
defences and showed an awareness of developments in both Germany and France, including a technical 
article on shell fuzes that would be sensitive enough to detonate on contact with the external skin of an 
airship or the canvas of an aircraft’s wing.127 Some of the journal articles were purely practical, setting out 
for a military audience the key recent developments in aviation. This was, perhaps, not intellectual in 
itself, but these articles were still important, as they kept officers abreast of relevant advances in a field 
that was constantly progressing. Some articles, however, did theorize, and considered the possibilities of 
aerial bombardment, reconnaissance both tactical and strategic, and the aerial transportation of 
troops.128 In terms of more general military writing, while J. F. C. Fuller was neither famous nor 
iconoclastic before the Great War, he had already begun his publishing career, writing on both historical 
subjects and contemporary issues like training.129 There was certainly space for intellectual activity in the 
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Edwardian officer corps. More broadly, it is important to understand what the military literature of the 
period suggests about its intended audience. The primary aim of these works was not to delve deeply 
into theory, but rather to be of practical use to their readers. 
 Many publications addressed promotion exams, while others were how-to guides which aimed to 
help officers with a part of their duties or to provide a convenient handbook referring to portions of the 
official manuals. Whatever the subject matter, many such books were regularly revised and reprinted 
with new editions to keep pace with changes in the examinations or updates in the relevant official 
publications. For example, S. T. Banning’s Organization and Equipment made easy (Subject “G” for the 
Promotion Examinations) was first published in 1899, and by 1903 was in its third edition.130 A work 
entitled Military Law Made Easy, by the same author, was in its sixth edition in 1912.131 Other books also 
went through multiple editions.132 The target market for such publications was hardly enormous—the 
regular officer corps numbered some 12,738 men in 1914—but enough copies of each edition must have 
sold to make revision and reprinting profitable.133 The market, however, was augmented by men in the 
auxiliaries, for whom an expansive list of titles was available, many of them explicitly aimed at men of the 
Territorials and Special Reserve, although certain works were of equal use to both regulars and 
auxiliaries.134 The sheer number of works on military subjects strongly suggests that British officers 
purchased books on professional topics on a regular, even a prolific, basis. The end of one Gale and 
Polden book has forty pages of advertisement for military goods, some thirty pages of which are for other 
Gale and Polden publications. This includes a table listing the works the publisher considers most useful 
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to officers of various branches, specifying 39 books for cavalry officers, 34 for Royal Artillerymen, 36 for 
Royal Engineers, and no fewer than 44 for infantrymen.135 Each book is identified both by its title and by a 
number, the latter intended to make it cheaper for officers to order from the company by telegram; the 
fact that the numbering system runs to well over 300 is an indication of the profusion of works available. 
Neither the books themselves nor the delivery was particularly expensive. One book on musketry, for 
example, cost only 9d, with postage to anywhere in the world included in the purchase price.136 Even 
books which did not need to be updated regularly ran through multiple editions, suggesting they were 
very popular. Henderson’s posthumous The Science of War was first published in 1905, and sold so well 
that new impressions were made in 1906, 1908, 1910, 1912, and 1913. Several further reprints were 
made after the Great War.137   
There was enough of a market for military books that some publishers specialized in the subject 
and produced whole series of military works; Gale and Polden did so, as did Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner 
& Co., who had printed sixteen military handbooks for officers and NCOs by 1907.138 Forster Groom and 
Co. Military Publishers were also active in this period, and by 1914 had produced more than 70 military 
titles.139 Similarly, some authors were prolific; Thomas Maguire, one of the best-known ‘crammers’, had 
at least forty one separate books to his name as author or editor, not including titles which were reprints 
or updated editions of earlier publications.140 The crammer to which he lent his name, Dr. Thomas Miller 
Maguire & Co., employed at least one man who was himself an author of military works.141  
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Despite the comparatively small target audience for such works—after all, civilians were most 
unlikely to buy the Handbook for Proficiency Pay: Royal Garrison Artillery (Manning Fixed Armament) or 
to wish to educate themselves on the intricacies of Courts Martial—it was evidently a market with 
sufficient scope to allow publishers to produce a large numbers of texts. Some books were written by 
crammers like Macguire, but others were by men who had put together sets of notes for use within their 
own units or their own command, and later decided to publish them. Captain Allan was an officer of the 
Black Watch, and while attached to the 10th battalion of the Royal Scots, wrote up a set of notes to assist 
those Territorial officers with their exams. A preface from Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, commanding 
the 10th battalion of the Royal Scots, explains that ‘numerous applications having been made for copies of 
the notes, it has been suggested to their author that he should make them available to a wider circle by 
having them published.’142 Officers’ desire for reading material was also noted by the General Staff. In 
1911, Captain Yate told the General Staff conference that when officers sitting tactical exams asked him 
for a reading list, he recommended Griepenkerl’s Applied Tactics and Colonel Crowe’s Problems in 
Manoeuvre Tactics, as well as the official manuals, but he felt that a longer reading list than this would be 
better.143 The number of serving or retired officers who authored such works suggests that Captain Allan 
was not alone in publishing something originally written to assist brother officers in a local command. 
Equally, the number of publications strongly suggests that Allan was hardly the only man who found that 
his fellow officers desired useful military texts and were willing to pay for them.  
It is important to note that this profusion of military writing was not a contentious outpouring in 
conflict with official publications or the army’s established procedures and doctrine. These were revision 
guides and condensed handbooks drawing from past exam papers and official publications, or which 
sought to allow others to draw upon an officer’s experience, and not symptoms of unrestrained 
heterodoxy. Books typically listed the official publications on which they were based; the third edition of 
Banning’s book on the (g) exam, for example, lists a full page of references including numerous official 
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works.144 Captain Harding-Newman’s book on the (c) examination notes in the preface that it condenses 
elements of Combined Training, Manual of Map Reading and Military Sketching, and the Manual of 
Military Engineering in order to assist officers with their preparations.145 Although many books offered a 
précis of various army manuals, they were not intended as stand-alone summaries. Instead, many 
suggested further reading. One work on military history and strategy advised readers to use it in 
conjunction with Hamley’s Operations of War, adding that any student who wanted to know the subject 
well ‘will doubtless go further afield.’146 Some military histories aimed at officers preparing for exams 
provided a list of the standard works on the campaign and battles in question.147 It is almost impossible to 
explain the large number of frequently-updated military books, and the publishers who remained in 
business by specializing in military texts, unless it is accepted that at least some Edwardian officers 
desired professional reading material and were perfectly happy to pay for it, often in considerable 
quantities. 
As well as studying the available literature, some men paid to attend crammers as part of their 
preparation for examinations. Crammers, in common with some other aspects of junior officer education, 
are seldom discussed in modern scholarship.148 Studies which do mention crammers tend to regard the 
institutions, and the men who used their services, with some suspicion. Bowman and Connelly, for 
example, describe crammers as ‘curious educational establishments’ which were ‘often resorted to after 
an initial failure’, although they also note a defence of crammers in comparison to universities and public 
schools advanced by Dr T. M. Macguire.149 Contemporary opinion was not uniformly positive about 
crammers, but certainly there was no shame in using one, otherwise attendance at a crammer would not 
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be mentioned with almost monotonous regularity in memoirs and autobiographies.150 Some officers 
deprecated the use of crammers and felt that short periods of intense study might assist a man through 
an exam but not properly educate him. Writing in the United Service Magazine (USM), Captain Brind 
argued that crammers were a poor means of preparing men to be officers, as the experience made men 
disinclined to study in the first few years of their military careers. Although he added that even men who 
disliked study still ‘take a great interest in, and work hard at, the practical part of their profession,’ his 
article was still a strong denunciation.151 Brind was not a lone voice, and there was an effort to encourage 
steady and sustained professional study rather than short, intense bursts of work; two years before 
Brind’s article appeared Sir John French had warned against ‘the “cram” which aims at success in 
examination’ and contrasted it with the accumulation of knowledge that would bring success in battle.152 
The Akers-Douglas Report had similarly expressed the opinion that exams were poorly written if the 
questions encouraged the ‘cram’ of a mass of facts and figures rather than a thorough understanding of 
general principles.153  
However, crammers were often presented as one of the legitimate choices a man might make 
when studying a subject; an article in JRUSI which discussed the work necessary for the examinations for 
entry into the Staff College noted that a man might travel abroad to bring his languages up to the 
necessary standard, or that he might ‘obtain the assistance of a crammer’. There was no suggestion that 
the latter option was any less valid than the former. Other references to crammers were undoubtedly 
positive. An article in JRUSI on the education of auxiliary officers noted that while private study of military 
subjects was available to all men who cared to undertake it, the sustained individual effort could be 
lonely and perhaps feel less efficient than study directed by set coursework. The author, W. H. Ames, a 
Major in the Volunteers, offered study with a crammer as a remedy; ‘there are crammers who impart 
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instruction by correspondence; this is an excellent method in itself, and the student has his mind directed 
to the cardinal points of his subject’.154 This echoes some of the evidence given to the Norfolk 
Commission; as discussed in Chapter Two, the Commission heard that militia officers who had attended a 
crammer were, as a result, sufficiently knowledgeable in key military subjects that retaining their service 
in the militia for several years would justify a considerable financial outlay by the Treasury.155 
Officers who desired to engage the services of a crammer did not have far to look, as military 
books and periodicals often carried advertisements from such establishments. 156  Crammers were not, 
however, a purely military phenomenon—even those which advertised in the military press.  The 
advertisement for the establishment of a Captain James, psc, late of the Royal Engineers, announced that 
resident and non-resident pupils would be prepared ‘for the Navy, Army, Civil Service Examinations, and 
Universities’ and noted that while the staff included ten tutors in military subjects, ‘the civil staff 
embraces thirty-seven’. Another advertisement, on the same page of the Royal Engineers Journal, advises 
readers that Captain H. M. Johnstone and his staff would prepare candidates for ‘Woolwich, Sandhurst, 
Militia Examinations, Navy, Universities, School Scholarships.’157 This suggests that while some in the 
Army might deplore crammers—or, rather, the poor attitude to study that they felt crammers 
encouraged—these establishments were widely accepted within the force and within contemporary 
civilian society as well. They were thus a legitimate option for men to improve their professional 
education—an option which a significant number of officers took.   
The widespread desire among officers for professional education is further indicated by the 
number and variety of military periodicals available to Edwardian officers. The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institute (JRUSI), although perhaps the most prestigious, was just one among a proliferating 
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selection. The Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps was founded in 1903, the Army Service Corps 
Quarterly first appeared in 1905, The Cavalry Journal began publishing in 1906, and the first issue of The 
Army Review came out in 1911. Other professional military periodicals like the Royal Artillery Journal, the 
Royal Engineers Journal, the United Service Magazine, as well as the Professional Papers of the Corps of 
Royal Engineers, were published throughout the period. Chapter Four discusses the subscribers to JRUSI 
in detail, but it is worth stating here that roughly a quarter of the regular officer corps subscribed, and 
that junior and senior officers, and officers from each corps and arm of the service, subscribed at rates 
broadly commensurate to their proportions in the officer corps. Unfortunately, surviving records do not 
offer the same level of detail about the subscribers to other journals of the time. There are, however, 
various indications as to the level of interest officers showed in these military periodicals and how easily 
officers could access them.  
Issues of The Army Review were available for purchase by officers, as well as by NCOs and men, 
for one shilling, with free postage. Copies were also provided in all Officers’ Reference Libraries and Mess 
Libraries.158 There is no concrete information on how many officers were regular readers, but an officer 
writing about the School of Musketry did give an indication of the Review’s reception in the Army by 
commenting that ‘as The Army Review is now widely read by N.C.O’s., space may perhaps be found for a 
brief allusion to the pay and prospects [of NCOs posted to Hythe]’.159 More definite information is 
available for The Cavalry Journal, the second issue of which reported that not only had His Majesty the 
King graciously subscribed, but also that the first issue had sold well within the mounted branches and 
had also found ‘extensive support from other branches of the Service’.160 By 1910 there were enough 
subscribers to produce a ‘substantial increase in the credit balance of the Journal’, and after attracting 
208 new subscriptions in 1913 the Committee was able to report that in most cavalry regiments every 
officer received the Journal.161 Pleased but not yet satisfied, the Committee remarked that a few 
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regiments still had ‘a comparatively small number’ of officers subscribing.162 That a majority of cavalry 
officers, and a significant number of officers from other arms of the service, had subscribed is a strong 
indication of broad interest in professional reading matter.  
Further indications of officers’ reading habits can be found in these journals, which regularly 
reviewed new books and articles on military subjects and related topics, or produced lists of recent 
publications likely to be of interest. The Cavalry Journal tended to keep a comparatively close focus on its 
overseas counterparts. In January 1911, for example, it reported on recent articles in Revue de Cavalerie, 
Kavalleristische Monatshefte, and the Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association, but also on topics of more 
general interest appearing in Spectateur Militaire, Militär-Wochenblatt, and The Army Service Corps 
Quarterly.163 Likewise, the Royal Engineers Journal certainly covered items likely to interest sappers, with 
eight pages of ‘Notices of Magazines’ in January 1905 covering items in Nature, Bulletin of the 
International Railway Congress, The Railway Engineer, Revue d’Histoire, and Militärische Blätter. But it, 
too, also noted items of more general military interest, listing new books on subjects including the US 
Civil War, the Royal Navy, the Indian Army, and medical arrangements during the Boer War.164 The Army 
Review took a more expansive interest and reported on a very wide range of publications indeed—an 
appendix in the first issue listed abbreviations for no fewer than 112 other periodicals, of which 36 were 
published in Britain or the Empire. A handful of the foreign publications were from the United States, but 
the majority were in other languages and drawn from all of the major, and several of the minor, powers 
of Europe. Besides being intended for the army as a whole, and thus needing to cater to the interests of 
officers from various arms and corps, The Army Review likely included such an extensive list of other 
publications because it was the successor to an official periodical entitled Recent Publications of Military 
Interest.165 JRUSI carried a quarterly feature, communicated by the General Staff, intended ‘to draw the 
attention of Officers to British and Foreign publications of Military interest which are likely to assist them 
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in their professional work.’166 In January 1908 this list ran to 31 pages, covering books and magazine 
articles, as well as official publications issued by the War Office to Reference Libraries.167 British and 
Imperial publications figured prominently, but, as with The Army Review, a large number of French and 
German writings were listed, with others from the United States, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Russia, 
Switzerland and Spain also mentioned.168 That such extensive compilations of available reading material 
were made by multiple publications is a strong indication of the desire of British officers for professional 
literature. The fact that the General Staff was active in highlighting and promoting professional reading 
material is indicative, and again suggests an army and an officer corps rather more keen on study and 
professional development than typically thought.  
The existence of several military periodicals in the United Kingdom and the establishment of 
several new ones during the Edwardian period is, in itself, a further indication of the demand for military 
literature. Unsurprisingly, these journals aimed to foster professional knowledge among officers and 
publish material likely to be of interest. The editors of The Cavalry Journal were explicit about their 
ambition to ‘be of practical use, especially to young officers and non-commissioned officers in gaining 
knowledge of their profession.’169 The preface to the first volume of the reorganized Royal Engineers 
Journal noted that it would be freely available for purchase, and would ‘contain articles of interest to the 
Army at large as well as those of a technical character.’170 The Army Review was established  
with the objects of keeping the officers of the Army more in touch with the military tendencies 
and developments of modern armies, of assisting in the discussion of important strategical and 
tactical problems, and of placing at their disposal the results of the most recent research into 
military history…171 
 
Just like the military books of the era, the articles published were not a contentious collection of 
challenges to army policy or doctrine, but generally accepted existing policy and principles, or at least 
kept critiques of existing policy within moderate bounds. It is important to note that divergence from the 
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official line was not forbidden; The Army Review, for example, made clear that articles should not be 
taken as expressing the Army’s view ‘unless expressly so stated’. This left a good deal of room for officers 
to express their views, although the editors did reserve the right to make ‘reservations… as required’.172 
While disagreements and critiques were typically minor, these publications did allow scope for forthright 
exchanges. G. B. C. Rees-Mogg, a Veterinary-Captain, published a robust, indeed withering, critique of an 
article on shoeing by a Lieutenant-Colonel. Rees-Mogg condemned the article, writing: ‘the whole paper… 
describes a practice of shoeing founded on error and opposed to all principles’, ‘this is a most astonishing 
statement to make’, ‘I think this is a good example of the cure being worse than the disease’, and ‘thus 
the writer confesses that his cure may cause lameness for months’.173 Rees-Mogg had taken care to make 
a water-tight case. He cited reports from the Army Veterinary Service to show that the incidence of 
laminitis among the horses of the Lieutenant-Colonel’s regiment was remarkably high, and while writing 
the article he consulted with several Fellows of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, including a 
Major-General and a Professor of Surgery at the Royal Veterinary College.174 Rees-Mogg’s article was 
atypical in the intensity of its argument, but it illustrates the leeway available to junior officers to put 
forward their views in the professional press, even in the face of opposing views held by more senior 
officers.  
 The editorial control of publications does not appear to have greatly influenced the extent of 
participation by junior officers. Editorial work on the Professional Papers was handled by the Royal 
Engineer’s Institute, and was thus at arm’s length from official army control, while The Cavalry Journal 
and The Army Review were both official publications sanctioned by the Army Council, with editorial 
oversight exercised by the Imperial General Staff and Major-General Baden-Powell, Inspector General of 
Cavalry, respectively.175 This did not mean, however, that day-to-day editorial control was in the hands of 
men quite so senior, although junior officers were not involved. While Baden-Powell had ‘general 
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control’, Colonel Birkbeck edited The Cavalry Journal until 1910, when Major-General Byng took over. 
These men were supported by ‘colonial editors’ who were typically also Colonels.176 
 That junior officers were able to express their views is partly a function of the fact that journals 
readily printed them. These periodicals were certainly not the sole preserve of senior officers. It is true 
that junior officers, particularly subalterns, were not published in journals at a rate commensurate with 
their numbers in the officer corps. However, Captains and Majors were well represented. Indeed, in both 
the JRUSI and The Cavalry Journal, more articles by men ranked Major and below were published than by 
all higher ranks, while men of those ranks contributed nearly two thirds of the material in the United 
Service Magazine. In The Army Review, the number of articles from subalterns, Captains, and Majors is 
almost exactly equal to the number from all higher ranks (see Figures 9 and 10). If Generals and Colonels 
comprised a disproportionately large share of the contributors, so too did Majors. Professional 
periodicals, in other words, were a forum in which comparatively junior officers were both willing and 
able to participate, albeit not necessarily on a completely equal footing.  
 Unfortunately, besides the subscription figures for JRUSI, which, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Four, show a broad and generally representative interest in the Journal from all commissioned ranks, 
there is comparatively little evidence to indicate the ranks of those who subscribed to the various 
journals of the period or the total number of subscribers they attracted, at least for the more general 
publications.177 But, as articles written by Captains and Majors were more or less equally common across 
several different journals, and there is nothing to indicate that JRUSI was an eccentric outlier in terms of 
the interest it attracted from junior officers, it is reasonable to assume that other journals were, like 
JRUSI, attracting subscriptions from officers of all ranks in numbers broadly proportional to the officer 
corps as a whole.  
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Figure 9. The number of articles published, by rank of author, 1902-1914 
  
Sec. Lt. Lt. Captain Major Lt-Col. Colonel 
Generals & 
Field-
Marshals 
 
 
Total 
 
 Cavalry Journal 0 20 62 68 32 64 26 272 
 
 Army Review 0 5 36 41 27 28 40 177 
 
JRUSI 1 14 63 68 37 57 43 283 
 USM 6 45 170 177 80 118 26 622 
 
All original articles which list a named author are included. Articles from civilians, naval officers, foreign 
contributors, or those by pseudonymous authors, are not included in these totals. Translations of articles originally 
published in foreign journals are also excluded. 
 
Figure 10.  The proportion of articles contributed by officers of each rank, 1902-1914 
  Sec. Lt. Lt. Captain Major Lt-Col. Colonel 
Generals & 
Field-Marshals 
 
Cavalry Journal 0.0% 7.4% 22.8% 25.0% 11.8% 23.5% 9.6% 
 
 Army Review 0.0% 2.8% 20.3% 23.2% 15.2% 15.8% 22.6% 
 
JRUSI 2.3% 4.9% 22.3% 24.0% 13.1% 20.1% 15.2% 
 USM 1% 7.2% 27.3% 28.5% 12.9% 19% 4.2% 
         
 
Officer Corps 9.5% 27% 35.7% 16.5% 6.7% 3.4% 1.1% 
 
Figures for JRUSI and the USM are drawn from the period 1902-1914, while figures for the other journals are drawn 
between their first issue and 1914. For comparison, ‘Officer Corps’ indicates the proportion of the entire officer 
corps holding that rank. 
 
The bulk of Edwardian military writing contained little which could be called theoretical, but 
much which was practical and pragmatic. The large number of available book titles, the regularity with 
which many of them were revised and updated, and the growing number of available military periodicals, 
suggests that despite the comparatively small target audience, there was a healthy market for such 
material. The books produced often drew heavily from official manuals and thus complemented, rather 
than contradicted, the Army’s considered opinions on the topics covered. Many were aimed at assisting 
officers with their daily duties, or at preparing for promotion examinations. Neither the books nor the 
journals suggest an officer corps fixated on military theory or abstract thought, but they do strongly 
suggest an officer corps intent on mastering the skills of their profession, preparing for promotion, and 
fitting themselves to command competently on a modern battlefield.  
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Promotion 
 Promotion examinations are perhaps the clearest indication that, regardless of the other criteria 
which might influence advancement, an officer had to meet agreed standards of professional 
competence before he was eligible to advance in rank.178 It is important to note that the examinations 
were conducted in such a manner as to prevent senior officers influencing the outcome in favour of a 
protégé. The regulations for the written examinations require all candidates to be given a number to 
allow for anonymous marking, and state that ‘the name of a candidate under examination is on no 
account to appear on his worked paper.’179 The same anonymity was not possible with oral or practical 
exams, but those which involved an interaction between the candidate and a board of officers assessing 
him were typically conducted at only a few places in the UK, which meant that ‘as a rule… officers to 
whom the candidate is more or less unknown’ set and marked the exam.180 
 Promotion exams covered a set of subjects very similar to those which gentlemen cadets studied 
at Sandhurst and Woolwich. The exams were designated by letters from (a) to (j). Exams (a) and (b) were 
on regimental duties, and drill and field training, respectively. The former was both written and oral, and 
the latter purely practical. Men seeking promotion to Lieutenant had to pass both.181 Exam (c) was in 
three parts covering ‘practical map reading, field sketching, and reconnaissance’, ‘practical military 
engineering’, ‘practical tactics’, and, for those officers who did not belong to a mounted corps, also 
involved a riding exam.182 Exam (d) was in four parts, all written, and covered military engineering, tactics, 
map reading, field sketching, and reconnaissance; military law; administration, organization and 
equipment; and military history. Officers seeking promotion to Captain had to pass exams (c) and (d), and 
officers who did not belong to the Royal Army Medical Corps or the Army Veterinary Corps (AVC) had to 
pass the Sanitation (j) exam as well—as the men of the RAMC and AVC had a greater knowledge of 
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Sanitation than was demanded from combat officers, this was not an unreasonable exception.183 Exams 
(e) to (i) were specific to particular branches of the service, and officers of those branches had to pass the 
relevant specialist exam as well as exams (c), (d), and (j), before they were eligible for promotion to 
Captain.184  Besides the subject matter, from 1912 onwards officers risked a ten percent penalty if their 
papers contained bad spelling, handwriting that was not clearly legible, or showed a ‘want of power of 
clear and concise expression’.185 Officers who failed exam (c) twice ‘[would] not, as a rule, be permitted 
to remain in the service.’186  Officers who failed any one of the sub-sections of (c) would have to re-sit all 
three sub-sections, but officers who failed only in the fourth, riding, sub-section, were permitted to apply 
to re-sit that sub-section only.187 There is no provision made in the regulations for officers failing other 
exams to be dismissed from the service, which suggests that the Army regarded the practical skills of map 
reading, sketching, reconnaissance, military engineering, and tactics as particularly important. These 
exams governed promotion up to the rank of Major. 
The focus on tactical skill remained important beyond the rank of Captain, and indeed became 
paramount. Officers who sought promotion to Major had to first pass a Tactical Fitness for Command 
examination, because ‘the most satisfactory test of an officer’s practical proficiency is made by observing 
how he handles troops in the field’.188 This test was divided into theoretical and practical parts—the latter 
of which was made as realistic as possible by conducting it on a piece of ground with troops. The 
theoretical portion placed a candidate in command of an imagined force of up to a brigade of infantry 
with a brigade of artillery and a cavalry regiment, supported by mounted infantry, Royal Engineers, and 
ASC, and presented him with a tactical problem. He was given three hours in which to write a general 
appreciation of the situation, then decide upon his course of action and the orders necessary to execute 
his plan.189 The practical portion involved a force of all arms, composed of at least ‘one battalion of 
infantry, a battery of artillery, and one squadron of cavalry, to which may be added, at the discretion of 
                                                          
183
 Ibid. pp. 162-163.   
184
 Ibid. 
185
 The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1912 (London: HMSO, 1914 [1912]). p. 194. 
186
 King’s Regulations 1908. p. 164. 
187
 Ibid. p. 164. 
188
 Ibid. p. 167. 
189
 Ibid 
 146 
 
the board, a proportion of mounted infantry and R.E.’.190 The candidate commanded this force in the field 
and executed ‘any minor tactical operations which may be ordered’.191 Men generally had to pass the 
theoretical portion before sitting the practical portion, although both parts might be done one after the 
other. This prevented an officer who failed the theoretical portion from wasting the time of the troops 
who took part in the practical section.192  
Both portions of the exam were marked by a board, and the regulations laid out the allocation of 
marks. Each portion was worth 100 marks, with the theoretical carrying 40 marks for the appreciation 
and 30 each for the proposed actions and the orders issued.193 The practical carried 30 marks for the 
appreciation, ten for a clear explanation of the proposed action, and fifteen for the written orders and 
their form and the care taken in their composition. There were fifteen marks for the commander’s 
‘general bearing on receipt of information, and on gaining contact with the enemy’, ten marks for 
‘decisions during the fight, clearness of orders issued thereon’ and the way that those orders were 
issued, and 20 marks for ‘initiative, maintenance of influence on the course of the fight, non-interference 
with detail, non-encroachment on sphere of subordinates, &c.’.194 The board set the initial General and 
Special ideas, and could, during the exam, instruct the candidate that the military situation had changed, 
‘requiring the candidate to conform and to issue fresh orders’.195 King’s Regulations instructed board 
members to give credit for ‘intelligence, judgment, common sense, and readiness of resource in making 
the best of any situation’, and warned that because tactical problems often had more than one solution, 
a candidate’s views might differ from those of the board, and that this was acceptable provided those 
views were ‘supported by sound reasons.’196 The board was also instructed that, if the military situation 
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required it, rapid action could be demanded from candidates, but that otherwise time should be allowed 
for ‘reflection and deliberate calculation.’197 
The promotion examinations give a clear indication of what the Army regarded as important. 
Officers had to be competent in a range of professional skills, foremost among which was tactics. Once 
they had advanced in their career, tactical knowledge remained important but had to be balanced with 
an ability to ‘grip’ a situation and communicate orders and intentions to subordinates without interfering 
in their decisions. In other words, officers had to demonstrate an ability to exercise command. While only 
the (c) exam would end the career of an officer who failed it twice, any exam failure would inhibit a man’s 
career advancement. Successfully passing exams was not an absolute requirement for promotion, but the 
chances of avoiding examinations were slim; an officer on active service or made ‘medically unfit by 
reason of wounds or disease contracted on active service’ could be promoted without first sitting the 
required test, provided that no prior chances to sit the examinations had been missed.198 Even then, that 
officer’s promotion would be provisional, subject to passing the relevant exam ‘at the first available 
opportunity’. A failure meant a return to his old rank, unless the Army Council deemed his service ‘of so 
exceptional a nature as to justify his being given one other trial.’199 There was also a chance that the Army 
Council might, ‘under very special circumstances’, exempt officers who had given distinguished service or 
‘shown marked ability and gallantry in the field.’200 Given that the objective of officers’ training and 
education was to prepare them for successful performance on the battlefield, this was hardly a loophole. 
An officer promoted under the provision was reaping the reward for proven professional competence.   
The regulations made some allowance for the exigencies of service, or for the recognition of skill 
shown in combat, but could hardly be considered lenient. In 1914 Adrian Carton de Wiart failed his 
Military Law exam and knew that this denied him promotion to Major. Only the outbreak of the World 
War shortly afterwards changed the situation; ‘how lucky that wars wash out examinations and I have 
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never been asked to do another since.’201 De Wiart was unusual in avoiding the consequences of an exam 
failure, but rather less unusual in failing an exam; in 1908, although the failure rate at promotion exams 
had fallen, from 22 percent to 13 percent, it is clear that they were anything but a formality.202 
References to exams in officers’ correspondence often note the time spent preparing; in October 1907, 
George MacMunn wrote to Edward Alexander apologising for a tardy reply, but noting that as his (d) 
exam had taken place on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of that month, he had had ‘little or no time to spare and 
rather less inclination to sit down again and write.’203 Recently arrived in Africa for a new posting, Edward 
Steel wrote to his parents that ‘I am sorry I did not bring all my books, as I require them to work up for 
my exam, for which the Col wants me to go up at Lokoja, but it can’t be helped.’204 That officers would 
work hard to prepare for exams is not surprising. The exams could hardly be avoided, and passing was 
not a foregone conclusion. 
Failing a promotion exam would prevent an officer from advancing further in his career, or might, 
in the case of the (c) exam, bring his career to an abrupt end. Conversely, passing exams with high marks 
allowed an officer to gain a special certificate. The pass mark for almost all exams was 50 percent, the 
exception being the (c) exam which required a minimum of 50 percent in each subsection but an 
aggregate of 60 percent overall to pass.205 A special certificate was awarded to officers who passed all of 
their exams with a high mark, of either 75 percent or 80 percent depending on the exam, provided that 
they passed every subsection in one sitting.206 Officers who passed at this higher standard were also 
publicly recognised in Army Orders.207 Just as with the pass mark, the (c) exam required officers to 
achieve the slightly higher standard of 80 percent if they wished a special certificate. Where the risk of 
failing provided a punishment for poor preparation, the chance of passing well and gaining a certificate 
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provided a positive incentive for officers to study their profession. A special certificate was something 
which would help an officer to gain more rapid promotion, as will be discussed below.  
Promotion exams and their contents were discussed at the highest levels. The Tactical Fitness for 
Command exam, in particular, was extensively discussed at the General Staff Conference in January 1914. 
On 12 January, Brigadier-General Gough spoke positively of the (c) and Tactical Fitness exams and 
suggested that more training in the same vein should be undertaken.208 Major-General Robertson noted 
that he and Gough had often discussed the subject at Camberley, as they had felt that more needed to be 
done to prepare officers for command in war.209 Tactical Fitness exams were debated on 15 January, after 
Colonel Maude suggested that the format was inadequate. Being examined by officers unknown to the 
candidate was, in his view, a drawback because the short exam ‘cannot therefore be said to be an 
exhaustive enquiry as to an officer’s capabilities’.210 Instead, Maude proposed that a candidate be 
observed by three senior officers during the collective training season, and if necessary put through ‘such 
tests in the field in command of troops’ as might be required, in order to make clear his abilities.211 He 
noted that a recent examination board at the Curragh saw fourteen officers, of whom only three were 
known to the examiners. Most of the candidates were from other units; indeed, six had come from the 
Scottish Command.212 In this fairly typical situation, the board had no information beyond the few hours 
of the exam to form an opinion of the capabilities of the candidates. 
Various objections were raised; Colonel Gordon felt the current exam gave ‘uniform and 
generally satisfactory results’, while the suggested changes could lead to differing standards between 
divisions in the UK and a separate method for officers in overseas postings where no divisions were 
available.213 The Army felt that uniformity in exam outcomes was sufficiently important to warrant 
periodically attaching General Staff Officers to examination boards as ex-officio members, precisely to 
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help maintain similar standards across the army.214 Colonel Boileau observed that the current exams did 
much good, as shown by ‘the flutter to be seen in many a dovecote as the time for them approaches’; 
Brigadier-General Montgomery noted that officers read their books and prepared themselves.215 
Brigadier-General Gough remarked that soldiers exist to fight if necessary, and that of all the 
examinations, Tactical Fitness was the most important.216 Major-General Robertson concluded that, while 
it was not perfect, it was a workable system for assessing any officer. A lengthy period of observation 
would be impossible for men of the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA), or the ASC, for men in battalions or 
batteries stationed alone, or officers posted to the War Office. Any attempt at lengthy observation would 
create a two-tier system which ‘has already been tried and rejected.’ He reminded the conference that 
the exam was not the sole determinant of promotion, as an officer’s confidential reports were also 
important.217 
Confidential reports were written by commanding officers, who submitted annual reports on the 
officers in their unit. Each report would recommend the man in question for one of three options: ‘for 
accelerated promotion (which may be given either in his own unit or extra-regimentally)’, ‘for promotion 
in the ordinary course’, or ‘for promotion to be delayed.’218 An officer whose annual report fell into the 
third category in two consecutive years would be the subject of a further, special, report written by the 
three senior officers present with his unit ‘stating whether they think it desirable that the officer should 
be retained in the service.’219 An officer in that position would have been warned of the need to improve 
his conduct, as a confidential report which mentioned faults ‘which affect an officer’s character as an 
officer and a gentleman, or his fitness for his present position, or for promotion to a higher one’ was to 
be read to the officer in question by his brigade commander, who would also provide the officer with a 
written copy, and offer his own thoughts on the officer’s capabilities in so far as they were personally 
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known to him.220 Commanding officers could also recommend a subordinate for accelerated promotion, 
but the regulations stipulated that such recommendations should be ‘sparingly made, and should apply 
only where the officer is exceptionally gifted, or where he has displayed special ability in the performance 
of his duties.’221 Such recommendations carried greater weight if the officer in question had already 
passed the relevant promotion exams and had obtained a special certificate.  
It is important to note that, while promotion exams were unavoidable, promotion and postings in 
the army were not decided purely on merit. An officer’s seniority within his regiment was an important, 
but not a determining, factor. Peter Hodgkinson notes that between 1911 and 1914, fifteen percent of 
CO appointments were made over the head of a more senior major.222 There is very little to indicate that 
promotion of junior officers was based on patronage or who knew whom. However, this is not to say that 
no personal interventions took place, or that all promotion and appointment took place exclusively 
through official channels, as there is some evidence of personal interventions influencing appointments. 
In the opening months of the First World War, Edward Alexander had clearly written to people he knew 
asking for a staff post. A reply told him that: 
it would be impossible to get you here as a Staff Officer at present, as all staffs are bang full up 
and GHQ [General Headquarters] are down on one like a knife if numbers are exceeded… 
however your name has been put down on [the General’s] “pet” list and if an opportunity occurs, 
he will most certainly do his best to get hold of you, as he well knows your abilities. 
This is a clear example of an officer circumventing official channels, but two points should be clarified. 
Given the date of the reply, 25 November 1914, this was an instance of Alexander doing his level best to 
get himself nearer to the front line and not, necessarily, soliciting for a post more advantageous to 
himself. It is also pertinent that he wrote to a General who already knew him, not just socially, but 
professionally. The letter is less an attempt to pull strings than an effort by Alexander to contact an 
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officer who is aware of his professional skills and ask to be employed somewhere more directly relevant 
to the British war effort.223  
In a similar vein, Tom Bridges was returning to the Continent in 1915 after convalescent leave 
because Robertson, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had asked him to propose a combined 
offensive with the Belgians. When Bridges was already on board the ship at Folkestone, he received a 
telegram ordering him to Bristol immediately to sail for the Dardanelles, to command a brigade of the 
29th Division. He phoned Fitzgerald, a friend of his in the War Office, and told him why he shouldn’t go: 
1. I was urgently required in Belgium. 
2. I was not at war with the Turks. 
3. I had not been passed by a medical board and still had an open wound in my shoulder. 
Fitzgerald spoke to Kitchener and the order was cancelled. Bridges related the story to Robertson, who 
‘wagged his eyebrows disapprovingly at me and said, “This is the sort of war where you do as you are 
told.”’224 Although Bridges was also using unofficial channels to secure, in the face of orders to the 
contrary, what he felt was his proper posting, his action shows an awareness of where he could best 
serve. Both of these officers acted outside the regulations but cannot legitimately be accused of self-
seeking behaviour, or of seeking to turn personal relationships into career advantage. Indeed, some 
personal interventions in promotion and selection were made on behalf of another officer, sometimes 
without the knowledge of the officer being recommended. Capper, while Commandant at Sandhurst, 
wrote to the War Office to recommend J. A. Bell-Smyth for a placement at Staff College, as Bell-Smyth 
was 
a tactful whole-hearted successful instructor of Gentlemen Cadets. He holds a Brevet for service 
in the field, and I feel confident that he would prove a very valuable staff officer. Should this 
letter of mine be irregular I would beg that it may not be counted against Major Bell-Smyth, as 
this recommendation is entirely unsolicited on his part, though I am aware he would be only too 
glad to find himself selected to join the Staff College.225 
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In this instance, Capper was aware both of Bell-Smyth’s interest in Camberley, and of his suitability, and 
while his representations may have been unofficial, it is difficult to find anything underhanded or 
unprofessional about them. Similarly, Nevil Macready became aware of a Second-Lieutenant Childs in 
1902 when Macready saw Childs deal quickly and sensibly with a disturbance in a camp of new recruits, 
defusing the situation before it turned serious. Macready ‘made a mental note of the initiative and 
resourcefulness displayed by this young officer, and a few months later was able to offer him the 
appointment of Garrison Adjutant of Capetown, a position in which, as in many others since those days, 
he more than justified my anticipations.’226 This was certainly an instance of a man appointing an officer 
based on his personal knowledge, but hardly an improper one, as there is no indication that the 
appointment was solicited by Childs; in any case, Macready chose Childs for his professional aptitude.   
Examples of string-pulling or the improper use of personal connections are not easy to find in the 
lower commissioned ranks of the Edwardian army, although they are not entirely absent. Horace Smith-
Dorrien mentions in his memoirs going duck-hunting with ‘my A.D.C. (and nephew), Eddy Dorrien-
Smith.’227 He is silent on how his nephew gained that job, but it is probable that Eddy owed that post, 
directly or indirectly, to the family connection. Most studies which have considered aspects of promotion 
in the Edwardian or the late Victorian army have tended to focus on senior officers, and while there are 
clear examples of patronage and the influence of personal connections on promotions and appointments, 
it is not at all clear that these influences on preferment at the top of the officer corps were the same at 
the bottom, even if they were not entirely absent.228 Arthur Burnell’s Colonel, impressed by what he had 
seen of the subaltern’s work, advised Burnell that he should aspire to become the Adjutant in the future, 
and promised to facilitate this by sending Burnell on whichever training courses he might wish to attend. 
Only a month later, the Colonel appointed Burnell as acting Adjutant while the man holding the post was 
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ill and his assistant away on training. Burnell was thrilled with the ‘great charge’ he had been given.229 
While the Colonel was certainly using his personal influence in determining the appointment, it was also 
an instance of a promising young officer being offered expanded responsibility and a chance to improve 
his professional experience.  
Bowman and Connelly examine the question of patronage in the army’s promotion system and 
conclude that, while it was not unknown, senior officers had ‘very limited powers’ to further the career of 
a protégé, and that even at the level of battalion COs, recommendations and efforts to influence future 
appointments were not particularly successful.230 Owing to the system of promotion examinations 
already discussed, and the means by which these were marked, it is difficult to see how patronage could 
be exercised to influence the career of a junior officer, at least directly. An officer who could not pass his 
exams would advance no further, however influential a patron he might possess. However, appointments 
like ADC or battalion Adjutant brought useful experience and a certain professional cachet, and these 
appointments were not subject to any set entry requirements. They were, therefore, more amenable to 
the exercise of personal influence, as seen above. It is clear that appointments like Adjutant and ADC 
could be determined on meritocratic grounds or on the basis of personal connection, but the available 
evidence does not allow any firm conclusions to be drawn about which was more common.  
The Army was aware that some men attempted to circumvent proper channels and took a dim 
view of this. Army Order 89 of May 1904 forbade officers from writing personal letters to War Office 
officials on matters ‘such as promotion, appointments, postings, transfers, &c’ and warned that: 
Attempts to obtain favourable consideration of any application by the use of outside influence 
are forbidden, and, if resorted to, will be regarded as an admission on the part of the applicant 
that his case is not good on its merits, and it will be dealt with accordingly.231 
 
While this indicates that some attempts to curry favour did take place, it is also clear that the Army strove 
to eliminate such behaviour in pursuit of a meritocratic officer corps. Some junior officers sought no 
favour, and indeed would be careful to reject any if it was offered. While he was preparing for his Staff 
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College exams, George Barrow received a letter from Ian Hamilton, Military Secretary to Sir George 
White, saying that White had placed Barrow on a nomination list. Barrow, however, ‘preferred to pass on 
my own merit if possible and leave the nomination for someone else’, and did so, placing a very 
creditable fifth in the order of merit.232 Similarly, some senior officers, despite the accusations of 
partiality which have been levelled against the upper ranks of the Edwardian army, were determined to 
avoid not only favouritism but also even the appearance of favouritism. After serving in South Africa, 
Macready took an appointment at the War Office, where Sir Charles Douglas was Adjutant General until 
1909; Douglas was so anxious to avoid injustice and partiality that he nearly rejected Macready’s 
appointment, on the basis that they were both from the same regiment and accepting him might smack 
of partiality. But in fact, their time together in the regiment amounted to only a few weeks.233 So, while 
Travers and others have written of the personal connections, relationships and rivalries at the top of the 
army in this period, there is little to suggest that this applies to junior officers. Indeed, there is good 
evidence to suggest that it does not apply to the promotions of men lower down the chain of command.  
The Army’s system of promotion for junior officers is one of the strongest indications of the 
professional nature of the officer corps. Men had to meet set standards of professional skill in order to be 
eligible for advancement. This requirement was not absolute, but only in very exceptional circumstances 
would a man be able to avoid an exam altogether, and even then it would be an exemption won in battle. 
The exams themselves, at least in the case of the written papers, were handled such that the marking 
was impartial. Practical realities meant that many examinations conducted face-to-face were similarly 
unlikely to be affected by partiality. The Army felt that the system of examinations was not perfect, but 
that it was the best that was feasible. The exams were complemented by the confidential reports written 
by commanding officers on the fitness for promotion of the men serving under them. The system was 
neither perfect nor entirely free from personal interventions, but it operated on recognizably meritocratic 
lines and demanded that whatever other attributes an officer might possess, he must prove his 
professional competence in order to advance in his career.  
                                                          
232
 Barrow, The Fire of Life. p. 40. 
233
 Macready, Annals of an Active Life Volume I. p. 135. 
 156 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The process of gaining a commission was just the beginning of an officer’s professional training. 
After joining their unit, officers were involved in a training regime explicitly intended to prepare the army 
for war through realistic exercises. Men worked through the winter to hone their skills and to broaden 
their military education, and then applied this during the summer in exercises with their troops. Officers 
were expected to be competent professionals, which meant having both the appropriate military skills 
and the ability to instruct their men. Schools existed to teach a variety of skills and to produce officers 
able to effectively instruct their men. Promotion required both a satisfactory report from a man’s 
commanding officer and passing marks in the specified promotion examinations. In certain cases a failed 
promotion exam would end a career. Consequently, officers took their promotion exams, and their 
preparations for them, seriously. This was reflected by the courses laid on within units and commands for 
officers preparing for promotion, and in the body of unofficial guides and revision aides meant to help 
officers ready themselves. The body of military literature available to officers was not confined to 
promotion, but included studies of historical campaigns and details of day-to-day soldiering, including 
training. A number of junior officers in this period saw active service and drew important lessons from 
that experience. The men who saw combat between 1902 and 1914 were a small proportion of the whole 
officer corps, but there were enough of them, combined with veterans of the Boer War, to ensure that, in 
1914, half of Captains and a preponderance of Majors had previously seen active service. Annual training, 
the demands of promotion examinations, the experience of active service, and the availability of a wide 
variety of military literature all helped to ensure that officers continued their military training and their 
professional education after being commissioned. These aspects of professional development were open 
to all officers. Other facets of professional improvement, and other drivers of professionalism, were also 
important.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ACTIVITY, WORK ETHIC, AND THE PREVALENCE OF THE PROFESSIONAL MINDSET 
 This thesis approaches the question of professionalism very largely through the prism of 
education and training, as these are the essential bases of trained expertise. They are not, however, the 
only influences on professionalism, and this chapter will seek to present officers’ training and education 
within the wider professional context as it was understood at the time. The chapter is divided into six 
sections. Firstly, it considers the sporting activities of officers and the professional and military benefits 
that they drew from these, as well as how this activity was viewed by contemporaries. This chapter 
recognizes the strong interest in sporting pursuits among officers, but argues that there were good 
military reasons for this interest, and that these reasons were widely recognized by contemporary 
society, both military and civilian. Secondly, it considers the time that officers devoted to their duties, and 
the length and frequency of leave which they enjoyed. Thirdly, it considers mess culture, and the 
influence that this had on the discussion and study of military subjects. Fourthly, the membership of the 
Royal United Services Institute is explored to provide a quantitative picture of the prevalence of 
professionalism across the officer corps as a whole, as well as within different branches and regiments of 
the service. Fifthly, it examines officers’ expectations of acceptable standards of military knowledge and 
professional capacity, both for themselves and for other officers. This includes a discussion of officers’ 
work ethic and the pride they took in their own achievements, and the respect they accorded the 
achievements of their peers. This chapter argues that, while officers may have taken a comparatively 
leisurely approach to their military duties in the 1880s and 1890s, this was no longer the case after 1902 
and officers worked hard within a military culture that deprecated idleness. Lastly, it considers the 
benefits that officers saw in promotion, the ways in which they sought to improve their chances of 
advancement, and what officers and the army understood to be a suitable application of the meritocratic 
principle. 
Officers had a variety of roles and duties to fulfil, and while discussions of professional 
competence and military ability can often revolve around questions of tactical thought and awareness of 
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current military developments, there were other facets to the professional life of an officer. The 
maintenance of discipline and morale are the two central themes of Gary Sheffield’s Leadership in the 
Trenches. His discussion of officers’ leadership style recognises the class-divisions underpinning it; 
contemporaries felt that a public school education was a near-essential prerequisite to good leadership.1 
This idea carried with it strong paternalistic obligations for officers, for whom care of their men was a key 
responsibility.2 Although paternalism played a role in the maintenance of discipline and morale, which 
were essential, it does not fit comfortably with the idea of ‘trained expertise’. It was, however, something 
that the army expected officers to display as an essential part of their professional role; on one of his first 
marches with his battalion, Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt and a fellow subaltern were told by the CO that 
‘no officer ever gets himself a drink or something to eat, until the men have had their dinners… You two 
boys will always remember that.’ Beaumont-Nesbitt did remember it, and noted that ‘the principle ran 
through everything: Look after the men: They are every officer’s first responsibility.’3 As Sheffield 
observes, even during the war, officers spent only a portion of their time commanding in battle.4 This is 
not to imply that tactical competence and other areas of trained expertise were unimportant, but rather 
to acknowledge that officers had legitimate professional responsibilities beyond those categories, and 
that a full picture of officers’ professionalism must consider those other capabilities and attainments.  
This is particularly true of officers’ sporting pursuits. The sporting pursuits of officers of the time 
are discussed in various works, usually, but not invariably, in a negative manner. Bidwell and Graham, for 
example, note how frequently officers played polo or went hunting, and take a dim view of them doing 
so.5 Mark Connelly notes that in the Buffs, the officers and men ‘indulged in sport to an almost obsessive 
level.’6 He does not, however, condemn this, and instead notes that these pursuits fostered a cohesive 
regimental spirit.7 It is Connelly’s assessment which is much closer to contemporary judgments. Hunting 
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and other such sports were considered to be good preparation for war, and, parallel to Badsey’s 
argument that rich officers were no more likely to be incompetent than poor ones, sporting officers were 
no more likely to be incompetent than sedentary ones, although they were certainly better equipped for 
other aspects of military life. The discussion which follows will present several facets of the officer’s life 
and professional duties and obligations as they were then understood.  
 
Sports and Activity 
Officers spent a lot of time engaged in sporting activity, and their letters and diaries often give 
prominence to efforts and achievements in that sphere, both their own and those of others. The 
subaltern Edward Steel wrote home from India in April 1901 that he was organising the battery football, 
and that ‘the men are getting quite keen; we hope to win the Cup, which comes on soon.’ He wrote 
approvingly of a fellow officer who had spent his leave hunting in the jungle, and had returned with two 
tigers as well as various other trophies, and Steel frequently sent similar news to his family.8 Reginald 
Kentish described his efforts to greatly expand the sporting facilities available to troops as one of ‘the two 
big things in my life’, the other being the foundation of the National Playing Fields Association after he 
retired.9 Such examples could easily be multiplied, but this keen pursuit of sport was hardly a trait 
exclusive to the officer corps or to the army. Siegfried Sassoon, in his fictionalised memoirs, wrote that 
prior to joining the army, he ‘had been ambitious of winning races because that had seemed a significant 
way of demonstrating my equality with my contemporaries.’10 Wider British society of the time deemed 
sporting ability to be important, and relatives who compiled collections of letters or diaries as published 
memorials of an officer lost during the war often took care to highlight particular pursuits their loved one 
had excelled at or enjoyed. In the preface to the memoirs of John Darling, his mother and siblings noted 
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that he loved hunting and shooting, and was ‘A very good shot… at driven grouse.’11 Charlotte Maxwell, 
widow of Frank Maxwell, wrote that ‘love of sport and games (pig-sticking and polo) played a great part 
in his life.’12 A fondness for physical activity and an admiration of achievement in that sphere were 
widespread, and on a superficial examination this can make officers seem more interested in a good day’s 
polo than in a good day’s work.  
But physical activity was more than simply an enjoyable way to spend time, and officers were 
perfectly capable of doing a full day’s work while still pursuing their game of choice. Reginald Kentish is 
quite a good fit for the stereotypical idea of a ‘sports-mad’ officer. Describing himself in the preface of his 
unpublished book of army vignettes, he listed his positions as an Honorary Secretary of the Army Football 
Association and on the Committee of the Army Fencing Union, and his foundation of the Army Modern 
Pentathlon Association, alongside his time as regimental Adjutant and his commands during the First 
World War, appearing to give the two equal weight. But he took his profession very seriously, and 
delivered lectures on leadership, morale and esprit de corps at the Third Army Infantry School in 1915. He 
had entered an essay for the Gold Medal from the Royal United Services Institute in 1913 on a similar 
topic, and was published in The Army Review in 1911.13 In any case, he had very sound military reasons 
for his sporting enthusiasm. Before his efforts to secure better facilities on behalf of his men, they had 
access to recreational spaces for only six days a month, and consequently sought their own 
entertainment the rest of the time. That this usually took the form of drinking and womanising was not 
only bad for discipline, but bad for military efficiency, strictly defined, because of the number of men who 
ended up in hospital as VD cases. Kentish described the prevalence of syphilis as ‘appalling.’14 
                                                          
11
 (no author), Memoir: Lieutenant-Colonel John Collier Stormonth Darling D.S.O. (Kilmarnock: The Standard Press, 
1923). pp. 8-9. 
12
 Maxwell, Charlotte, (ed.) Frank Maxwell Brigadier-General, VC, CSI, DSO: A Memoir and Some Letters Edited by his 
Wife (London: John Murray, 1921). p. vii. 
13
 IWM. Papers of Brigadier-General R J Kentish, 98/12/1. Kentish, R. J. The Maxims of the Late Field-Marshal 
Viscount Wolseley K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G. and the Addresses on Leadership, Esprit de Corps and Moral, p. 35; Kentish, 
R. J. ‘Route Marching’ The Army Review. Vol 1, No 1, July 1911. pp 125-132. 
14
 IWM. Papers of Brigadier-General R J Kentish, 98/12/2. Unpublished manuscript chapter describing his sports 
fields scheme, pp. 3-4; the troubles the army had with VD are discussed in Duncan, ‘Resistance and Reform’. pp. 58-
9. 
 161 
 
Kentish saw this as a serious problem. He made a great effort to rectify matters and between 
1908 and 1911 the facilities available at Aldershot were considerably expanded, at which point he 
successfully lobbied Sir Edward Ward, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, to have similar 
efforts made right across the UK.15 Kentish is a good example of the fact that an officer could be both a 
committed sportsman and a conscientious and effective professional. Edward Steel, as mentioned above, 
often wrote to his family about the achievements of his battery’s football team, which he both organized 
and played with, and his training for and competition in athletics races, as well as spots of hunting. But 
again, this activity was only one side of the man; Steel rapidly distinguished himself professionally, 
publishing an artillery manual called The Horse and Field Artilleryman’s Handbook, about which a colonel 
wrote a most complimentary letter to Steel’s uncle.16 Steel was capable not only of winning every running 
event in an athletics meet, but also of designing a new rangefinder, and passing an exam in Hindustani.17 
He took the mental side of his profession very seriously, taking a variety of courses and making 
commendable efforts to keep abreast of new developments, even those not immediately connected with 
the artillery. Steel’s sheer breadth of professional activity may have been atypical, but his ability to 
balance his job with his sports was not. Arthur Burnell often mentioned his polo matches, his ponies, and 
his efforts to train his company football team in his letters home, but also wrote of undertaking an hour 
of study of Hindustani each day and working hard for his promotion exams, and although he was still a 
junior subaltern, he made enough professional progress that his Colonel made him Acting Adjutant.18 It is 
important, then, not to view a strong sporting streak as evidence of an unthinking officer.  
It is also important not to create a distinction between an officer’s professional competence and 
his sports, because even when they were pursuing their own sporting interests, rather than those of their 
men, officers saw themselves as developing skills with military application. Hunting is the most obvious 
example, and so explicit was this link with military skills that Major-General Alderson wrote an entire 
book on the subject, arguing that ‘no man takes so readily to soldiering as a sportsman, and particularly a 
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man who rides well to hounds.’19 Hunting certain animals carried particular risks, and was a demanding 
test of courage, skill, and quick thinking. Frank Maxwell wrote to his wife in April 1914 from Gwalior, 
India, to tell her about hunting a man-eating tiger which attacked the elephant he was on, knocking it 
over and depositing the passengers onto the ground. As the only rifle to hand was unloaded, Maxwell ran 
to a nearby building to collect another one, and then returned on foot to where he had last seen the 
tiger, only to find it had succumbed to wounds from his earlier shooting.20 Thinking clearly and acting 
calmly and boldly when necessary in a potentially lethal situation are, allowing for different 
circumstances, key skills for an officer. Charles Repington noted that his interest in ‘field sports [was not] 
a very bad preparation for the wars to follow.’21 Officers needed to be able to judge terrain, and riding 
was seen as the perfect way to develop that ability. His family wrote that John Darling was ‘a magnificent 
horseman, extraordinarily strong in the saddle… and while fear did not enter into his composition, sound 
judgment did—what more is wanted to make a fine horseman one good to hounds, or a good soldier?’22 
On occasion, sport was explicitly incorporated into official training; one cavalry subaltern took three of his 
NCOs out hunting, and afterwards asked them to describe their experience of the day in writing as it 
‘makes them take notice of country.’23 An article on training in The United Service Magazine stated that ‘if 
an officer does devote a portion of his day to active sports, he is, in an important sense, keeping himself 
professionally fit for his duties.’24 Contemporaries who were neither soldiers nor the family of soldiers 
also believed that sports helped to prepare a man for combat. A ceremony in Leominster to greet 
Llewelyn Price-Davies on his return from South Africa in 1902 included a speech from the Chief Steward 
of the Mayor, who said of the action in which Price-Davies had won the Distinguished Service Order 
(DSO):  
I often wonder if experience in our national field sports comes to your aid at such times. A fox 
goes away, you cram on your hat; a big fence is in your way but it does not stop you. At cricket 
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you follow your captain’s silent finger, and take up your position in their field. You wait and watch 
till opportunity comes, and jump in. You obey the umpire without a word. In your case you heard 
a bugle call or a word of command—your guns were in danger—you led, and saved the crisis.25  
The suggestion that sports were good preparation for battle, and perhaps also that they fostered the 
gallantry which resulted in the award of a DSO, was fully in keeping with contemporary culture, both 
inside and outside the Army, and officers who filled their spare time with sports were seen, by 
themselves and others, as honing skills directly relevant to their profession. 
Being physically fit is perhaps the most basic of all military attributes, and officers identified it as 
one of the objects of their physical activity; in June 1916, Frank Maxwell wrote to his wife that, ‘this 
morning I was out riding early for air and exercise.’26 Charles Repington noted that all the riding he and 
his fellows did kept them ‘very fit.’27 Even today, the Army deems physical fitness to be an essential 
prerequisite for a problem-solving officer.28 But sports helped to maintain discipline as well as fitness, by 
giving soldiers, just as much as their officers, something constructive to do with such spare time as they 
possessed. Sport was also a way for an officer to develop his relationship with his men, and seek to 
improve his leadership, or rather the likelihood of his men following his lead. Reginald Kentish told a 
padre who found himself unable to relate to the men that ‘I believe the men like me; if they do, it’s 
because from the day I joined the Regiment, I interested myself not only in their work, but also in their 
play, and any little success I’ve achieved since I joined, I put down mainly to taking an interest in their 
sports and games, whether I play them or not.’29 Very similar advice appeared in print during the First 
World War, in A General’s Letters to his Son on Obtaining His Commission. General Pilcher wrote that 
‘men love an officer who enters into their sport with them… If time admits, start a company football 
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team.’30 Passion for sports knew no boundaries of class, so sharing that interest was one way for an 
officer to form a bond with his men.31  
Participating and excelling in the culture of sporting endeavour was a way to gain admiration and 
respect which made leading men a bit easier. John Baynes notes that an officer in the 2nd Scottish Rifles in 
1910 made a bet that he could run a mile, swim a mile, ride a mile and row a mile, all within the space of 
an hour. He did so with seven minutes to spare, collected on his bet, and gained considerable prestige in 
the battalion by doing so.32 The reputation thus gained could help an officer to secure a place for himself 
in a new posting, especially if he was recently commissioned. A shy, newly-arrived officer who consented 
to take a ‘brute’ of a horse that nobody else wanted for a steeplechase, and then rode to ‘a good third… 
was made quite a hero of that night at Mess, and at once became a favourite with us all.’33 Such ability, 
while not professional in itself, nevertheless still contributed to professional function when it helped 
officers to better relate to each other and to their men. 
Officers, then, had a variety of reasons for engaging in sport, and gained a series of military and 
professional benefits from their activity, ranging from the essential if mundane maintenance of physical 
fitness to fostering a relationship with the men that they had to lead. They were well aware of the 
beneficial results of their sporting activities, which allowed them happily to mix enjoyable pastimes with a 
certain level of professional preparation. There was certainly a lot of room in the ethos of the pre-war 
British officer corps for athletic achievement, and officers saw this as an undoubted positive. Officers 
prized action and activity, and sought always to engage themselves in what was going on. Frank Maxwell, 
writing to his mother from the North West Frontier in April 1895, related how he had been ordered to 
deliver a message to his Colonel and three companies, which were up a hill. He climbed up and realised 
that they were ‘under showers of bullets.’ He delivered his message and then, ‘finding myself there, I jolly 
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well stayed there, and a most exciting time we had.’34 Although he was on active service, had recently 
fought in one engagement and very soon found his company in action again, Maxwell was still keen to be 
in the centre of the action at that moment.  
It was a sentiment widely shared among his fellow officers, in war and in peace. Pilcher sternly 
advised ‘Never waste your time. Either work, play, or sleep, but don’t idle or loaf.’35 Sir George MacMunn 
complained to a friend that he was ‘rested and more than rested and bored stiff with the gentle work of 
history,’ and later that he was ‘very fit, and just pining for a decent hard job wiah [sic] lots to do, though I 
am busy enough.’36 Kenneth Henderson, recuperating from a wound and deemed still unfit for duty by a 
medical board, felt that ‘it was impossible for me to pass three months doing absolutely nothing.’ He 
applied to the War Office, which gave him permission to attend a mounted infantry course at Aldershot 
‘provided it involved no expense to the public.’ He attended Aldershot, paid his own expenses, and was, 
moreover, separated from his fiancée for the duration of the course. This was a price he willingly paid to 
keep himself occupied, even while he was still convalescing.37 A similar hunger for action (and distaste for 
convalescence) prompted Tom Bridges to request permission ‘to proceed direct to China to join the 
expedition then setting out for Pekin’ despite having recently been wounded through the lung and 
temporarily paralysed at the battle of Jidballi, and then carried 250 miles on a litter.38 This desire never to 
be idle was powerful, and was an important part of the mental makeup of British officers of the period. 
Importantly, it was not merely an excuse to engage in sports in every spare minute, but extended into all 
facets of their life and could contribute to a powerful work ethic.  
Charles Repington felt that the officers of the 1880s were not particularly professional, observing 
that ‘soldiering in the eighties of the last century was not so strenuous as it became a few years later. We 
thought that we received half a day’s pay for half a day’s work, and all but a few enthusiasts acted upon 
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this principle.’39 He did, however, see the professionalism of officers increase as changes gave subalterns 
of all arms greater responsibilities, something that he says had previously been true only of artillerymen. 
Certainly there is evidence that officers in the first decade of the twentieth century took soldiering 
seriously, and sometimes worked very hard at it indeed. Henry Shortt, looking back on his time as a 
medical officer, recorded his thoughts on Claude Auchinleck (later Field-Marshal), who had served in the 
same battalion in 1910, noting that his social and sporting efforts didn’t impede his career: 
He was a dedicated soldier and although he took part in all of the activities of the regiment, 
physical and social, it was obvious at once that his real interest was bound up in his military 
duties. He was a professional soldier par excellance [sic] with a whole hearted absorption in the 
efficiency and welfare of all ranks. This was necessarily reflected in every aspect of the regiment’s 
activities so that duties and personal relationships alike at all levels worked harmoniously.40 
It is hardly surprising that a man who rose to the highest ranks was so committed, but it is his ability to 
balance that level of professionalism with an active social and sporting life which is the relevant point. 
Edward Steel’s professional commitment has already been noted, but if his achievements were 
particularly noteworthy, the time and commitment he gave—writing during a course at Woolwich 
Ordnance College that ‘My time is scarcely my own just now’—were hardly unusual.41 Frank Maxwell 
served as an Instructor of Light Horse in Australia for a short period, and wrote that ‘eight hours a day 
and I haven’t much in common. Seven a.m. till midnight or later, with about half an hour out for three 
meals, makes more than eight; but I’m jolly fit and looking forward to to-morrow week. After to-morrow, 
however, it won’t be quite such a grind, as I shall have finished my lectures.’42  
It was not only officers appointed to an important post, or who had gone on a course, who found 
themselves heavily occupied. In 1896, the newly-commissioned Kenneth Henderson came back from 
three weeks of manoeuvres and ‘settled down seriously to three things, to learn Hindustani, to learn 
polo, and to finish my drills.’ The first of these he did with great success, studying for four months and 
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then passing a demanding exam.43 This required a considerable commitment of time and effort, because 
although exams were an important part of an officer’s life, being necessary for promotion and sometimes 
for receiving full pay (as in the case of Hindustani or Urdu exams for officers serving in the Indian Army) 
officers were expected to find the time to prepare for them while discharging all of their usual duties.44 
George Boys-Stone wrote to his father to thank him for the gift of a Hindustani book, before noting that 
he had assistance from: 
a very good munchi [a native teacher]… I think I am making very fair progress with the language, 
but it is often very hard to find time, as ones military duties are very much more exacting than 
they were at York, or even at Blackdown, where I thought they worked us pretty hard… here the 
whole division is kept in constant training.45 
Officers were no strangers to hard work, and were quite prepared to work long hours to master the skills 
they needed for their profession. 
There was an expectation that officers knew their business and knew it well. Major-General 
Henry Wilson addressed the Oxford University Officer Training Corps in February 1910 and his notes 
include the jotting ‘wars won by peace preparation… wars won before shot fired.’46 The necessity of 
preparing for war before it arrives was a theme of his; notes for a speech given in February 1909 
emphasise that the British army must be ‘at least as good as our friend the enemy’ and listed a whole 
series of fields in which the army could excel. But the most important thing, he argued, was that the army 
have ‘a highly trained, highly educated, loyal and patriotic corps of officers.’47 Wilson, insisting upon well-
trained and well-educated officers, was not a lone voice. A month after arriving at Fort Bovisand, Arthur 
MacGregor wrote to his mother about his adventures sailing around Plymouth harbour, and in his next 
letter, replying to what appears to have been a letter of maternal concern, wrote ‘I like your insinuations 
about the boatman teaching me all about the tides and channels. I don’t know what you imagine His 
Majesty’s Royal Garrison Artillery do, if they don’t do that very thing themselves. In fact as we passed the 
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fort I was able to tell the boatman a good deal, though he knew rather more than me of the rest of the 
harbour.’48 MacGregor appears to have taken even the suggestion of ignorance as a professional affront, 
and wanted his mother to know how thoroughly he knew his work.  
 
 Daily Schedule and Frequency of Leave 
 One aspect of officers’ work ethic and professionalism was displayed not when they were on 
active service, or participating in manoeuvres, or attending a course, but rather in the work they did 
every day with their units. There is no blueprint of an officer’s typical day, and it would, in any case, have 
been subject to alteration throughout the year as the format and scale of training progressed. However, 
it is possible to set out some indications of how an officer might spend a typical day, and the time 
commitment that soldiering required. George Brunskill was serving in India, and recorded his daily 
schedule in his diary, noting that most men adopted work patterns that allowed them to sleep during the 
hottest part of the day. He woke up at 5:30am, when he drank a glass of iced milk and went to the 
barracks. From 6:30 he attended parades, then breakfasted in the mess at 10:30. After this he spent 90 
minutes working with a munchi, then slept for two hours between 12:30pm and 2:30pm. He ate a snack 
lunch before doing another hour of work, and followed that with an hour of hockey, polo, or tennis, 
depending on the day of the week. At 6:30 pm his day’s work was complete, and he then dined in the 
mess and played bridge until around midnight, when he retired.49 A cavalry subaltern stationed in Britain 
offered a week of his diary for examination by readers of The Cavalry Journal, to demonstrate that the 
belief among some civilians that officers did little to earn their pay was unfounded. His schedule varied 
from day to day, but not markedly. On 6 February 1912, he was orderly officer, and began his day at 
6:30am with an hour in the stables. From 8:30 to 10:30am he conducted troop training, after which he 
attended stables again then ate lunch. At 2pm he gave his troop an hour of instruction in swordsmanship, 
with the aid of dummies for them to strike at. Immediately afterwards he gave a short lecture on 
reconnaissance and the movement of a reconnoitering patrol. Between 5 and 6pm he was in the stables 
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again, and at 11pm he went round and visited all of the guards and sentries. On 9 February, between 8:30 
and 11am, he was riding with the men and horses of his troop, then did a short training scheme with his 
NCOs. After that, he spent 45 minutes riding one of his own horses in the riding school. From noon he 
spent an hour in stables, checking shoeing problems with his squadron leader. At 2pm he began an hour 
of work with his troop on aiming drill, and followed this with a short lecture on ‘dismounted action; fire 
discipline and control.’ In the evening he did work for his (d) exam. He did have an interest in presenting 
himself as busy and hard-working, as he had written to the Cavalry Journal to make exactly that point, 
but he also noted that the week in question was during the ‘leave season’ and thus not as busy as it might 
have been.50 These schedules suggest that an officer could expect to do roughly eight hours of work each 
day, interspersed with meals, sport, and time in the mess. Both officers were preparing for examinations 
at the time that they recorded their schedules, and both men managed to find time for the necessary 
study while carrying out their usual duties.  
 The frequency and duration of leave for Edwardian officers appears to have varied, with the 
regiment a man belonged to, his own desire for leave, and the exigencies of the service all playing a role 
in how much time off a man might receive. Adrian Carton de Wiart recalled that ‘leave was easily come 
by and I took advantage of the leisurely pace to get better acquainted with the Continent.’ He did, 
however, describe his soldiering as ‘without ambition’ and this may go some way to explain his attitude.51 
Beaumont-Nesbitt, serving in the Guards, found that leave was apportioned unequally, with senior 
captains and subalterns given rather more than their juniors. He offered no complaint, instead noting 
that everyone understood the system, and that it gave young officers a greater chance for responsibility; 
he himself, although still a subaltern, was in charge of a company over the winter of 1913-14.52 H. Cecil 
Lowther called the army ‘a peculiar profession’, as the stagnant pay in the nineteenth century had led to 
men taking pay ‘in kind—that is to say, in leave’. He observed that this had stopped, and that in the 
Edwardian army hard work went on ‘from January to December.’53 Sometimes officers were either 
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unable to take leave, or felt that the demands of work prevented them from doing so, and at least one 
officer’s family felt that he had been given too little leave, and regarded the lack of rest after campaigning 
in South Africa and Somaliland as contributing to his death, from illness, at the age of 29.54 The picture 
that emerges of officers’ daily time commitment is a mixed one, and suggests that although daily routine 
within different units might have been broadly comparable in terms of the tasks officers undertook and 
the time given to their duties, there was greater variation in the time men spent on leave. Personal 
inclinations and the demands of active service were important influences on leave, but it appears that 
regimental differences also played a role. 
 
Mess Culture 
It is difficult to assess exactly how typical any given officer’s thoughts are, but an examination of 
mess culture sheds some light on the outlook of the officer corps as a whole. It seems that mess culture 
prior to the Boer War was not conducive to professional zeal. Richard Meinertzhagen was incredulous to 
discover in 1899 that ‘to talk “shop” in the Mess is forbidden; I was caught reading a military book in the 
Mess last week and was told to get out; if I try and discuss soldiering I am snubbed.’55 He felt that this ban 
on reading or talking shop was a ‘stupid regulation’, as did a fellow subaltern.56 But he was soon posted 
to Africa, and when he returned to his battalion in 1906, he found that ‘all the officers seem now to be 
taking a greater interest in their profession and any effort to improve one’s mind is not jeered at as it 
used to be.’57 The change was not universal—a few ‘habitual grumblers’ remained, mostly only because 
they could not afford to leave—but mess culture did change rather markedly as far as open 
professionalism was concerned, and the watershed appears to have been the Boer War. Several guides 
and handbooks for new subalterns were published during the First World War. Although they note that 
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rules varied from mess to mess, they highlight commonalities throughout the Army, like the range of 
acceptable dinner conversations.  
Most of the rules on conversation cover things like bans on mentioning a lady, and were intended 
to maintain a social atmosphere in the mess, which officers felt to be important—one reason that young 
married officers were disliked is that they dined out of mess, causing the social aspect to suffer.58 The 
guides of the time, and other publications which mention mess life, emphasise both social equality and 
showing respect to seniors. Young subalterns are advised to ‘be careful not to talk too much, or to hold 
too strong opinions.’59 Later, the same handbook indicated that talking “shop,” defined as ‘official 
business’, was frowned upon. The reason given was that, although subalterns might not mind discussing 
official matters, ‘the Adjutant, who has to talk “shop” from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. outside the mess, will mind.’60  
These guides discourage talking shop in the mess, but the definition of ‘shop’ seems a narrow 
one, confined to official business, rather than a blanket ban on any kind of military subject. Even then, 
the prohibition was justified on the grounds of respect and sociability, which suggests it could more easily 
take place among officers of the same rank, provided nobody more senior was within earshot, or outside 
the confines of the mess. Bernard Montgomery complained that it was ‘not fashionable to study war and 
we were not allowed to talk about our profession in the Officers’ Mess.’61 However, he did not regret his 
selection of regiment, as he ‘learnt the foundations of the military art in my regiment; I was encouraged 
to work hard by the Adjutant and my first Company Commander’ and there were men in his battalion 
who loved soldiering ‘for its own sake’ and would assist anyone else who felt the same.62 This was 
fortunate for him, as he rapidly concluded that to succeed as an officer he would have to master his 
profession.63 Similarly, Meinertzhagen, despite his complaints about his battalion’s mess, was able to 
discuss his professional concerns with another subaltern, and so even before the battalion’s attitudes 
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changed over the following few years, restrictions on behaviour in the mess did not prevent officers of 
that unit from discussing their work with each other.64 In July 1914, Arthur Burnell wrote to his parents 
that ‘I am reading such an interesting book now, called “Small Wars” by Callwell. His chapters on hill 
warfare are supposed to be excellent, and what is more are jolly interesting.’65 It is likely that a fellow 
officer recommended the book, and that some discussion of professional matters took place among the 
officers of Burnell’s unit (the Rifle Brigade), as they are the most likely candidates to rank the book as 
‘excellent.’  
The available evidence indicates that there were restrictions on professional discussion within the 
confines of the mess, but that there was some loosening of these restrictions before 1914. This loosening 
varied from mess to mess and regiment to regiment. Frederick Morgan found, even on the eve of war in 
1914, that in his battery mess conversation ‘was rigidly limited almost to one subject, that of “shikar.”’66 
Even in that unit, though, Morgan wrote that news of events in the Curragh ‘transformed our mess. Talk 
and fierce argument became general.’67 Despite the limits on conventional topics in some messes, 
professional interest was strong enough that the Royal United Services Institute gained a modest but 
sustained increase in membership by encouraging existing subscribers to enlist new members within their 
regiments. Membership forms were provided in each copy of the Journal for that specific purpose.68 
Similarly, Gale and Polden (the publishers of books on military subjects) were happy, even in 1903, to ask 
any officers who received a duplicate catalogue from them to leave the extra copy ‘on the Mess or 
Library Table.’69 This suggests that Meinertzhagen’s experience of reading professional material in the 
mess may not have been typical, as publishers seeking to attract a military readership were unlikely to do 
so in a manner that offended their target audience. Thus, while there were certainly limits on the 
conversation and behaviour of officers within the mess, these appear to have become looser over the 
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Edwardian period. Allowing for potentially significant variations among different messes, the restrictions 
appear to have applied more to official business than to any discussion of military matters. In any case, 
such limits were hardly insurmountable, and men like Montgomery and Meinertzhagen who took their 
profession seriously and wished to interact with others of a similar attitude were able to do so.  
 
The Prevalence of the Professional Ethos and the RUSI 
There was, across the Regular army, a broad acceptance of professionalism, at least in the sense 
that no one arm or corps appears to have been notably more or less professionally engaged than the 
others. Members of the RUSI were sent the Institute’s Journal, which was essentially a monthly 
professional magazine for military and naval officers. Membership could therefore be taken as a rough 
indication of particular professional interest. Between November 1904 and July 1914, 2,420 men joined 
the RUSI.70  Of these, 1,309 were from the Regular Army, and details of the other new members are given 
in Appendix Six. Figure 11 shows the division of these regular officers by branch of the service. For 
comparison, Figure 13 shows this information alongside the numbers and percentages of officers in each 
branch as a proportion of the entire officer corps. Figure 12 shows the ranks of the new members, 
compared to the proportion of men in each rank in the officer corps as a whole.  
 
Figure 11: New RUSI Members by Branch 
 Number of officers Percentage of total 
Infantry 780 59.6% 
Cavalry 146 11.1% 
Royal Artillery 240 18.3% 
Royal Engineers 89 6.8% 
Other 54 4.1% 
‘Other’ includes officers of the RAMC and other non-combatant corps. 
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Figure 12: New RUSI Members by Rank, compared with the Army List 
 Joined RUSI: Percentage of 
total: 
Officers, 
June 1914 
Percentage of 
total: 
Field-Marshal 0 0% 9 0.07% 
General 0 0% 11 0.08% 
Lieutenant-General 0 0% 20 0.16% 
Major-General 1 0.1% 94 0.7% 
Colonel 32 2.4% 443 3.5% 
Lieutenant-Colonel 42 3.2% 656 5.2% 
Major 154 11.8% 1962 15.5% 
Captain 523 40.0% 4255 33.6% 
Lieutenant 345 26.4% 3742 29.5% 
Second-Lieutenant 211 16.1% 1474 11.6% 
Brigadier-Generals who joined RUSI are listed here as Colonels, in order to provide a direct comparison with the 
Army List, which does not list Colonels and Brigadier-Generals separately.  
 
 
Figure 13: Comparison with Army List Figures 
 New RUSI Members 1904-1914 Army List June 1914 
 Number 
 
Percentage of 
total 
Number Percentage of 
total 
Infantry/Cavalry 926 
 
70.7% 
 
7069 
 
55.8% 
 
Royal Artillery 240 18.3% 2597 
 
20.5% 
 
Royal Engineers 89 6.8% 1069 8.4% 
Other 54 4.1% 1942 15.3% 
‘Other’ includes officers of the RAMC and other non-combatant corps.  
The regular army had 12,738 officers in 1914.71 The RUSI had 5654 members in 1912.72 If the 
Regular officers within the existing membership were in the same proportion as the Regular officers 
within the new membership who joined over the decade, then it is reasonable to conclude that roughly a 
quarter of the total officer corps were members and received the monthly Journal, which had been 
awarded the Great Gold Medal Diploma after being deemed the best military and naval journal in the 
world at the ‘Exhibition of Latest Inventions’ in St Petersburg in 1910.73 It cannot be demonstrated that all 
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those who subscribed to the Journal read it, but with such a large proportion of the officer corps 
receiving it, the ideas it presented and the debate it fostered were reaching a wide audience. 
The division of the Regular officers by arm offers some interesting points. It indicates that, as 
Stephen Badsey argued, cavalry officers were not lagging behind their colleagues. Indeed, cavalrymen 
who joined the RUSI were overrepresented compared to their numbers in the army as a whole; more 
than eleven percent of the new members were cavalrymen, when they comprised about seven percent of 
the Army.74 This is one more indication that the idea of stupid and unthinking cavalry officers is incorrect. 
The division of the new membership by rank (Figure 12) indicates that the vast majority of new 
subscribers were subalterns or Captains. There are noticeable bi-annual peaks in the monthly lists of new 
subscription, which suggests that many officers joined the RUSI virtually the moment they left Sandhurst 
or Woolwich—indeed, a handful of especially keen Gentlemen Cadets became members before passing 
out, three from Sandhurst and five from Woolwich. The large number of Captains joining suggests that at 
least some of those who did not join earlier recognised the value of doing so once they had begun to 
progress in their careers. The RUSI membership statistics indicate that there was a widespread interest in 
professional matters within the army, down to the lowest commissioned rank. There were, however, 
considerable variations within each arm; sixteen officers of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers joined over the 
decade in question, while only two officers of the Liverpool Regiment did so. Similar variations are 
evident between cavalry regiments as well. Eight officers of the 7th Dragoon Guards joined in the decade 
prior to 1914, while only two officers of the 3rd Dragoon Guards did so.  
The picture that emerges of the level of professional engagement among junior officers is a 
positive one. The interest is fairly steady across the army as a whole, with no particular divergence 
between the infantry, cavalry, sappers, and gunners. This offers some quantitative support for the 
conclusions of this chapter, as well as providing evidence that they are broadly applicable across the 
officer corps and are not limited only to certain branches of the service.  
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Work Ethic and Professional Expectations 
Many officers shared a desire to work hard and fit themselves for their profession, even if they 
did not openly announce this or confide it in their diaries; they showed their commitment to their 
profession through hard work, as discussed above. What many officers did express, however, was a 
marked intolerance of incompetence or poor work ethic. General Pilcher wrote to his son that, contrary 
to what some people had thought about the army before 1914, any ‘brainless, swaggering, dissolute 
fellow’ would soon be ejected from the army in ignominy, as such ‘vices were more severely dealt with’ 
than in any other walk of life. He identified the profession of arms as a ‘calling… amongst the highest that 
a man can enter.’75 John Darling was known for being ‘the gruff, strict disciplinarian, who certainly was an 
unpleasant person to those who were no good in character or in the carrying out of their duties!’76 The 
distinct lack of tolerance that officers had for those who were remiss in their work appears frequently in 
accounts of the period. Recalling his time at Sandhurst, Kennedy wrote about a famously rough-tongued 
riding instructor, but noted that ‘a cadet who was not deliberately lazy or inefficient had nothing to fear 
from his rebukes,’ a remark which he could equally have applied to the other instructors.77 Clearly, a 
cadet who failed to give his best effort would be in for a rough time. Kenneth Henderson, who was a 
contemporary of Winston Churchill at Sandhurst and at the crammer beforehand, was not impressed by 
the future Prime Minister, and wrote curtly that Churchill ‘would not work and did not do well in the 
exam.’78 When Henderson wrote his account in 1912 Churchill was already a figure of considerable 
political and military importance, and it is telling that instead of dwelling on their time together, 
Henderson’s mention of Churchill is brief and dismissive. In Pink and Scarlet, Alderson writes that being 
able to crack a whip properly has nothing to do with soldiering, ‘except that whatever the soldier does at 
all he must do well, and should know all the details of it.’79 Officers were expected to work hard and to 
maintain acceptable standards of professional competence. It is not easy to discern whether the 
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predominant motivation underlying this work ethic was straight-forward professionalism or a sense of 
duty.  
Duty was certainly an important consideration, and even men who were strongly influenced by a 
sense of patriotic obligation could find a regular officer’s conception of duty difficult to comprehend. 
Sidney Rogerson, a war-time volunteer company commander under Lieutenant-Colonel James Jack, 
wrote that ‘[Jack’s] sense of duty was far too strict for most of us young men to understand.’80 But 
whether the impetus to an officer’s work was a sense of duty or a more mundane awareness of career 
development opportunities, it is clear that the ethos of the officer corps expected that a man would work 
hard to learn his profession and improve his skills, and took a dim view of idleness, both physical and 
mental. As Henry Wilson said in a speech in February 1909, there were ‘quite enough chances in war 
without adding to them by ignorance, foolishness or carelessness.’81 Occasionally, men were unable to 
attain the standards required; Sidney Archibald joined a battery and found that the Major, whom he 
described as ‘stupid and lazy,’ was ‘completely out of date and ignorant.’ With a practice camp 
approaching, the Major tried earnestly to bring himself up to the necessary standard. He even went so far 
as to seek assistance from Archibald, one of his subalterns, in his effort to improve. It was no use, and 
Archibald records that the Major ‘made a hash’ of the practice camp and was thus ‘forced to resign.’82 
Things then improved under the new Major, whom Archibald praised as ‘a good gunner and a very 
knowledgeable horsemaster.’83 
It is important to note that men were not simply impelled on in their careers by fear of censure 
for incompetence. Officers took pride in their professional achievements, and gaining distinction in that 
sphere was, like sporting prowess, a way to gain the respect and admiration of colleagues. Kenneth 
Henderson, recently arrived back in India after the Boer War, ‘had a strenuous two months at Pachmarhi 
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[on a musketry course], but managed to get my D (distinguished) certificate, which was satisfactory.’84 
Arthur MacGregor’s letter to his mother, telling her that he knew more than a local boatman about the 
tides outside the fort he was stationed at, contains more than a hint of keen pride that he, only a month 
on the job, was already so knowledgeable about that aspect of his work. In December 1908, Richard 
Meinertzhagen was given command of his battalion’s mounted infantry company, a somewhat dubious 
honour as it was in ‘a bad state’. He set to work improving matters, recording in his diary that ‘I mean to 
have the best company in the regiment within six months.’ In February his CO inspected the company and 
seemed pleased with the progress, causing Meinertzhagen to write with satisfaction, but no 
complacency, that the unit was ‘ever so much better in every way than it was, but there is still great room 
for further progress.’85 M. D. Kennedy was at Sandhurst in 1913 when Field-Marshal Sir John French 
inspected the College. Kennedy wrote that French’s ‘fine work as a cavalry leader in the Boer War was 
sufficient to ensure him of a high measure of respect and admiration from the cadets who paraded 
before him that day.’86 Officers found satisfaction in doing their jobs well, and recognised and respected 
the professional attainments of other officers. Work ethic and a desire for professional competence and 
recognition helped to drive the professionalism of officers, but this was compatible with a desire for 
career advancement. 
 
The Selection of a Career and Promotion Within It 
Edwardian officers were, on the whole, enthusiastic soldiers, and had often deliberately and 
purposefully chosen soldiering as their profession. The Army was not simply an agreeable but respectable 
billet for the idiot of the family, or for an aristocratic son with a few years to while away until receiving his 
inheritance. Kennedy observed that 
It used to be said, and no doubt some still say it, that the fool of the family goes into the Army. If 
the assertion is correct, then there were at least three fools in our family and the War brought 
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the number up to four. Two of my brothers, as well as myself, had selected the Army as their 
profession even before the War had come to turn men’s mind from more peaceful callings.87 
Kennedy came from a military family, and so the career choices that he and his brothers made were 
probably no surprise to his parents. Some men, however, were sufficiently determined to take up 
soldiering as a profession that they put aside the career their family had selected for them. 
Meinertzhagen made clear to his father how unhappy he was working in his father’s bank, and recorded 
in his diary ‘I do not think I can stand this life much longer. I am wasting my life and my youth. A stuffy 
office, no exercise, complete slavery and a future ruined by an atmosphere in which gold is the sole 
aim.’88 Experience in a yeomanry unit, and a suggestion from Sir John French that he should join the 
army, made up Meinertzhagen’s mind.89 His father does not appear to have opposed this change of 
career. Edward Spears’s decision to seek a military career, on the other hand, caused a complete 
estrangement from his father.90 Even the offer of a prestigious alternative often did not diminish the 
attraction of soldiering; George Barrow was asked if he would act as private secretary to Sir Anthony 
Macdonald, Governor of the United Provinces, but declined, ‘not caring to exchange my own chosen 
trade of soldiering for any other, however long or short the term.’91 One officer, writing in The United 
Service Magazine, acknowledged that there were some wealthy officers who regarded soldiering as an 
agreeable pastime, but noted that there were few such men, and that some of them were, in any case, 
both able and committed. Far more numerous, he felt, were the keen men who would work very hard if 
offered a little encouragement and shown a little appreciation.92 One of the forms of appreciation and 
encouragement that officers desired was promotion. 
Officers identified several ways to better their chances of promotion. Charles Repington wrote 
that he began working to achieve a place at the Staff College when he recognised that it was the best 
road to advancement when the ‘royal road of active service was closed to us all for want of wars’, neatly 
highlighting the two routes that officers saw as the best way up the career ladder—campaign experience, 
and staff training and appointments.93 The desire to see action was a strong one for most officers, at least 
in part because of the promotion prospects. Fortunately for them, Repington’s suggestion that there was 
a shortage of wars after the Sudan campaign was exaggeration. When he was posted to Aden, Arthur 
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MacGregor wrote that ‘… if any trouble is brewing, Aden is a good central position,’ apparently hoping 
that his posting meant he had good odds of seeing active service regardless of where war broke out.94 
Edward Steel wrote in a letter home in early 1903: ‘I am very down on my luck again; one of my best 
friends here, Cameron… has just gone to Somaliland; it’s very sickening seeing all one’s friends go off on 
Active Service and not getting a chance oneself.’95 Steel would have been regarded by many officers as 
lucky simply to be in India in the first place, as it had a reputation for offering a better chance of active 
service than many other postings.96  
Officers weighed several factors when assessing the various stations around the UK and the 
Empire where their units might be posted. The costs of living and opportunities for sport or hunting were 
important, but so too were the local access to training facilities and manoeuvre grounds and the chances 
of seeing active service. In 1913, Philip Neame was posted to Gibraltar. He noted that ‘the military work 
[was] limited in scope to coast-defence and fortress work’ but that, as the man in control of the Upper 
Rock and the famous galleries dug into the rock itself, his own work there was rather more interesting.97 
Many of the ‘Outposts of Empire’ appear to have been regarded as less desirable garrisons for similar 
reasons. In 1906 the 2nd battalion of the Sherwood Foresters was ordered to move from Singapore to 
Bangalore, and a subaltern with the unit recalled that ‘we were all very glad of the move,’ because at 
Singapore ‘the climate was humid and the facilities for training very limited to say the least.’ Bangalore 
was seen as a great improvement, albeit not quite as desirable as a posting to the North West Frontier. 
Bangalore had good facilities for sport, and the presence of several other units made for a pleasant social 
life. Moreover, it also had good countryside for training nearby, and ‘the presence of other units made 
training much more ample and in addition far more interesting.’98 The reason that the North West 
Frontier would have been preferable was because the unit would then be that much closer to hand if 
troops were needed for a campaign.  
While seeing active service was felt to be important, it was certainly not the only way for an 
officer to position himself for career advancement. George Boys-Stone wrote a lengthy letter to his 
parents, setting out his thoughts on his prospects. It was a subject that he had given serious 
consideration.  
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from my own observations +  from what I have been told, I am fully convinced that it is a matter 
of supreme importance to belong to a good regiment, if one has any hopes of advancement or 
preferment, especially in the ‘Political’ line. As you probably know the I.A. [Indian Army] is very 
mixed: there are some Regts. to belong to which would spell ruin to one’s career as a soldier, 
Regts. which never leave the spot where they are enlisted... While on the other hand there are 
others which are just the reverse.’ 
Boys-Stone had met the Colonel of the 7th Lancers (Indian Army), who told him that he would make a 
good cavalry officer, and he jumped at the chance, telling his parents that it was his best prospect for 
getting into a good regiment—a chance not to be missed.99 Other officers came to the same conclusion as 
Repington, and sat the exam for the Staff College. George MacMunn advised his friend Edward Alexander 
that after gaining admission to Staff College he should work as hard as possible, as his final report would 
have a great influence on the rest of his career, and if he did well he would have good prospects.100 When 
Alexander accepted a posting in New Zealand, MacMunn wrote to congratulate him, because ‘this job 
may very much widen the scope of your future career.’101 However they saw fit to improve their career 
prospects, it is apparent that officers did take their career in the Army seriously, and aspired to climb the 
ladder of promotion. 
The financial side of promotion was a factor, because while many officers could rely on some kind 
of private income, many could not, and so the increased pay that a promotion might bring was often an 
important incentive to professional attainment. Arthur MacGregor complained to his mother in 1913 that  
I will gain nothing by the new Army Estimates… I shall be made a 1st. Lieut. when the estimates 
are passed, as 2nd. Lt. is being done away with, but I shall still receive 2nd. Lt pay. Of course I 
escape one Promotion Exam, which is useful, but do not get 1st. Lt.’s pay for 3 years, whereas at 
the present rate I should have got it probably after 2 or 2 ½ years.102  
 
MacGregor seems to have judged that he had a better chance of increased pay if left to advance by his 
own merit than if the pay structure were to be amended, and accordingly was displeased with the 
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proposal. Financial reasons were one of the considerations for officers assessing the desirability of a 
particular posting. India was attractive because of the chance of active service, but also because an 
officer could live on his pay there. A man in the Indian Army could look forward to a good pension at the 
end of his career as well.103 It was unusual, but not unheard of, to advance professionally but 
simultaneously fall behind financially, and when this occurred, men felt aggrieved. Kenneth Henderson 
passed out of Quetta in 1908, but found that his financial situation worsened rather than improved. 
Initially, his pay on the staff did not compare favourably with the pay he would have received in his 
regiment, while his new position meant he had to bear the costs of buying staff uniform and keeping two 
chargers instead of one. He complained that, without support from his parents and brother, ‘I could not 
have survived it, and must have applied to return to regimental duty.’104 With financial considerations in 
mind, officers were alive to factors which might expedite or impede promotion; after successfully passing 
the exams to enter the regular army from the militia, J S Wilkinson was gazetted to the Sherwood 
Foresters, but only after ‘very undue delay’ caused by lost paperwork. This ‘cost me a place of seniority in 
the Regiment—in the long run however it made no real difference, but at the time it was a heartbreak.’105 
The financial aspect of their profession was something that many officers considered, and which 
influenced their choice of career and their decisions at various stages of their career path.  Sidney 
Archibald’s father advised him to select a profession which would bring a pension, as the family could not 
provide private means, and Archibald opted to enter the Army.106 Bernard Montgomery was very 
disappointed to narrowly miss entry to the Indian Army, as Chapter One noted. This was because the pay 
in the Indian Army was better than in British service, and the costs of living lower, an important 
consideration for Montgomery as his parents could not afford to continue his allowance of £2 a month 
once he was commissioned. His second choice was the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, as it had a regular 
battalion stationed in India, and because it was a ‘good, sound English County Regiment and not one of 
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the more expensive ones.’107 Men who did enjoy private incomes were less constrained in their career 
choices, although this was not unconditional. Adrian Carton De Wiart found that a change in his father’s 
fortunes brought his private income to an end. This prompted De Wiart to seek service in Somaliland as 
‘he [the Mad Mullah] was a godsend for officers with an urge to fight and a shaky or non-existent bank 
balance.’108 Even career decisions like whether to apply to Staff College could be heavily influenced by 
monetary concerns; Kenneth Henderson had felt the cost of attending Camberley was beyond him and so 
had given up on it despite ‘long cherished visions of trying for the Staff College.’ However, when Quetta 
opened he saw a renewed opportunity and began working towards the entry exam.109 It is true that many 
officers enjoyed private incomes which rendered such concerns less pressing, but this did not necessarily 
inhibit professionalism. One cavalry subaltern openly stated that he indulged his ‘sporting tastes… as far 
as the £500 a year that I have, in addition to my pay, allows’ but immediately added that ‘I am also fond 
of my work, and honestly do my best at it.’110 Some officers had sufficient private means to make the 
financial side of promotion less relevant, but this did not prevent them from displaying professional zeal. 
However, for those with modest resources, or with none, the increased pay that promotion would bring 
was an incentive, and influenced officers’ attitude to their work. As discussed in Chapter Three, an officer 
was required to demonstrate the requisite knowledge and trained expertise in his promotion exams 
before he could reasonably entertain aspirations to higher rank.  
There were a number of official inquiries into promotion and related issues, which suggests that 
the army took the subject as seriously as the officers did. In 1905, Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood chaired 
a Committee on accelerated promotion in the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers, and Major-General 
William Franklyn oversaw a Committee reporting on promotion in the RAMC.111 The first of these 
concluded that promotion by selection should be practiced more often, and should be increasingly 
dominant over promotion by seniority the higher a man advanced in rank, and also offered the 
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suggestion that promotion by selection should be more common throughout the army. The second 
Report sought, in a slight contradiction, to align RAMC promotion regulations more closely with those of 
the army as a whole, while also adjusting the regulations which placed an RAMC Captain who failed his 
exams for promotion to Major onto half pay, pending a second attempt.112 The recommendations of the 
first report were accepted by the Army Council pending the results of another Committee’s enquiries, but 
were ultimately not acted upon. The second report was accepted in full.   
A report on promotion and retirement for regimental officers followed in 1908.113 This concluded 
that while promotion up to the rank of Captain should remain on the current system—namely, promotion 
by seniority tempered by rejection of the unfit—the selection of men for the rank of Major and 
Lieutenant-Colonel should be purely by selection, albeit still largely within the regimental system. The 
report offered the analogy that ‘one of our great business institutions’ would select men for important 
jobs in exactly the same way, giving due weight to the age and seniority of candidates, but ultimately 
choosing the man best able to do the job. It argues that the Army ‘cannot do better then [sic] model our 
arrangements on what takes place in the great open professions of civil life’ and notes that the date a 
man was called to the bar had no bearing on his professional position.114 The Committee was not alone in 
advancing such a view. In fact, debates on promotion were a live issue in the military press at the time. 
Some men went further than the Report, and advocated for an end to regimental promotion altogether, 
on the basis that advancement very largely within the regiment produced a situation in which subalterns 
in some regiments had more experience than Majors in other regiments.115 This was not, however, the 
universal view, and some men argued against selection, on the basis that if a man at the top of his 
regimental list were passed over in favour of an outsider, it would not be conducive to maintaining an 
officer corps ‘who take an interest in their profession, and who look with pride upon their work as a 
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profession.’116 There was a divergence of opinion on the weight that should be given to seniority and 
selection, but, crucially, each suggested system of promotion was advanced on the basis that it would 
best ensure a professional officer corps.  
The men of the Edwardian officer corps, then, were soldiers by desire rather than default, and 
sought ways to distinguish themselves in pursuit of advancement within their chosen career. The 
potential financial benefits of promotion were often a consideration, and although some officers were 
insulated from the pecuniary concerns of their peers, this did not preclude them from an active 
engagement with their work. Active service and the Staff College were widely regarded as the best ways 
to ‘get on’ in the Army, as they were both means of demonstrating particular professional ability. Officers 
and the army did not agree on what the ideal mix of selection and seniority would be in the promotion 
system, but argued about the impact that the options would have on a professional officer corps. There 
was a move towards selection, and parallels were drawn between the profession of arms and the great 
civilian professions. Although officers did not agree on all of the details, the larger picture—that soldiers, 
like doctors, were embarked on a professional career—was quite clear.  
 
Conclusion 
 The ethos of the officer corps was one centred on professional attainment, broadly defined. 
British officers of the Edwardian army discharged a variety of professional duties by employing a variety 
of professional skills. Not all of these skills were directly related to their education, although their training 
and education were central to their acquisition of trained expertise. Many officers were keen sportsmen 
and hunters, and this brought them several important military benefits. Officers’ pursuit of sporting 
endeavour did not prevent them from working hard and thinking seriously about their profession. Men 
worked and studied because competence and an ability to properly discharge their duties were expected 
of them by their fellow officers. They were also driven by a sense of duty, as well as by an awareness of 
the more mundane fiduciary advantages that came with career advancement. There were limitations on 
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‘talking shop’ in regimental messes, but these were relaxed somewhat during this period, and officers 
who complained about the restrictions found that they were still able to engage with interested 
colleagues despite those limits. The officer corps of the time was relatively homogenous in its level of 
professional engagement, without any great variations between different arms and corps, and so the 
ethos of the officers appears to have been broadly similar across the army. Soldiering was often a 
purposeful career choice, whether born of an affinity with the lifestyle or an awareness of the financial 
benefits, and men sought ways to enhance their professional prospects with an eye to promotion and 
higher pay.  
The picture that emerges of the British officers of the Edwardian period is a positive one.  The 
officers of the period were considerably more thorough in their work than is sometimes recognised, 
particularly in older scholarship. They took pride in their own attainments and respected the 
achievements of others. Many officers were just as keen and devoted to every facet of their profession as 
they were to their sports. Perhaps most importantly, officers expected to advance in their career on the 
basis of merit. Active service and entry to Staff College were both eagerly sought by men seeking to set 
themselves apart, and this is significant—the first was a chance to give a practical demonstration of 
professional competence, and the second was the Army’s highest level of formal officer education. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STAFF COLLEGE 
 The Staff College at Camberley, and the Staff College at Quetta in India which opened in 1905, 
provided the most advanced military instruction and education available. The number of men who 
attended Camberley or Quetta grew between 1902 and 1914, but the officers who had passed Staff 
College, and thus possessed the letters psc after their names on the Army List, remained a very small 
proportion of the officer corps—among Captains in 1913, some 3.5 percent were psc men, and there 
were only 447 psc men in the army in 1914.1  However, because the Staff Colleges drew their students 
from among the most able and ambitious men in the army, and because of the number of psc men in 
comparatively senior positions, especially those closely involved with training, the content of the courses 
and the focus of study had an impact on the army greater than the small number of graduates would 
otherwise suggest. This chapter will address the value of the Staff College as both a means of producing 
trained staff officers and of preparing men for senior command in the future, and assess the reputation 
of the College as the pinnacle of the army’s formal system of education and training. It does not challenge 
Brian Bond’s conclusions, but rather seeks to build upon his study by making a closer examination of 
certain aspects of Camberley, which it will address in three sections. Firstly, it will examine the means of 
entry into Camberley or Quetta and the number of officers who passed through during this period, the 
growth of the directing staff, and the syllabi at the Colleges, particularly those subjects which had the 
greatest bearing on the training and professionalism of the wider officer corps. Secondly, it discusses the 
changes to the curriculum which took place over the period. These were adjustments rather than major 
alterations, but were still significant, as the theatre of campaign envisioned in large schemes shifted, in 
tandem with shifting strategic realities, from the North West Frontier to the plains of Belgium and 
northern France. Thirdly, it considers the content and value of the staff training offered, including those 
aspects which related to the instructional and supervisory role that staff officers played in the training of 
regimental officers. This chapter concludes that the Staff College was both a driver and a symbol of the 
increasingly professional outlook of the officer corps. 
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The Staff, the Students, and the Quality of Instruction 
 The Elgin Commission took evidence on staff officers and the staff work done during the South 
African war, and found little to criticise about Camberley apart from the number of officers who passed 
out of the College each year, which it deemed insufficient to the army’s needs. The Commission did 
identify problems with the work and the organisation of the staff in South Africa, but regarded these as 
stemming from the number of men without any formal staff training who were hurriedly drafted into 
staff posts, rather than from any failings of the Staff College or its graduates. The officers questioned 
were not unanimous in their praise of Camberley, but most of the complaints about staff officers were 
directed elsewhere. Colonel Douglas Haig, General Sir Redvers Buller, and Major-General Sir Henry 
Colvile, for example, all told the Commission that there had not been enough properly trained staff 
officers available to the army during the Boer War, and all felt that the Staff College was the best place 
for staff officers to be trained.2 Haig, himself a graduate of Camberley, was more moderate in his praise 
than Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny who testified that ‘my own experience of Staff Officers is 
entirely favourable’ and that he had been ably served by his staff both in Aldershot and in South Africa. 
Haig considered that the individual staff officers were good, but were held back by the limitations 
imposed on the scale of exercises in the United Kingdom.3 Colvile was effusive, both in his written 
evidence and the subsequent questioning. He had not experienced staff training personally, but of its 
results he said, ‘I cannot speak too highly.’ He had ‘no hesitation in saying that for staff work a Staff 
College officer is simply invaluable, and I would never willingly take an officer on my staff who had not 
been through the College.’4 Buller’s only complaint about Camberley was the very small number of 
officers it produced, but he was satisfied with the quality of their training. Indeed, he seemed to feel that 
the training of psc men was perhaps overly thorough; he told the Committee that the students ‘are 
longer in [Camberley] now than they need to be’. He suggested that the Staff College course could be cut 
from its current length of two years to just one, because ‘we want a staff Officer [sic] with a certain 
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amount of all-round knowledge, but we do not want him to be an expert in all things.’5 Of the educational 
establishments which the Commission examined, Camberley emerged head and shoulders above the rest 
in terms of its performance.  
Perhaps the most marked change in staff training after 1902 was the increasing number of 
officers who benefited from it. When the Boer War ended, Camberley was producing 32 graduates a 
year, which grew modestly to 43 graduates annually by 1908.6 A more significant growth in capacity came 
in 1905 when a second Staff College was established. The entrance exams were held in mid-May, and it 
opened at Deolali, in India, on 1 July, before moving to permanent buildings at Quetta when these were 
completed in 1907.7 While Camberley in 1904 had 64 students, split equally between the Junior and 
Senior Divisions, the new college in India admitted 24 men into its Junior Division. This meant an increase 
slightly greater than a doubling of staff graduates: 67 psc men a year by 1913 instead of just 32. Apart 
from the somewhat smaller size of the Indian establishment, every effort was made to ensure that the 
two Colleges were as near to identical as possible. Modifications to the syllabus were necessary in 
geography and administration, to allow for local conditions in India, and the optional language courses 
included Urdu, Persian, Pushtu, and Arabic, which were not available at Camberley.8  Battlefield visits, 
which were a feature of the instruction in the UK, were not generally possible in India, because nowhere 
closer than South Africa or Manchuria was deemed suitable.9 However, in 1907 twenty students, 
accompanied by the Commandant and another member of directing staff, were able to make a three 
month visit to the Manchurian battlefields.10 Otherwise the instruction was as similar as possible, with 
the intention of ensuring that Camberley and Quetta were, in effect, a single institution on two 
campuses.  As Brigadier-General Braithwaite, then the Commandant of Quetta, expressed it in 1912, 
despite minor variations to adapt to local conditions, ‘the underlying principles [of the course]… differ in 
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no particular’, and ‘uniformity in training and instruction, and similarity of thought, between the two 
Colleges is a fundamental principle at Quetta, and it may safely be said that there is but one school of 
thought common to the two Colleges.’11 Owing to the fact that the available documentation largely 
concerns Camberley rather than Quetta, this chapter will focus on Camberley. The evidence that is 
available, however, suggests that what is true of the instruction at Camberley in this period is true of the 
instruction at Quetta also. Where the institutions appear to have differed, this will be highlighted. 
Unsurprisingly Quetta, unlike Camberley, drew the greater part of its intake from officers of the Indian 
Army. However, roughly a third of Quetta’s intake was from the British Army, and Indian Army officers 
could attend Camberley if they wished.12  
All four of the initial staff at Quetta were psc men, and the appointment of staff was intended to 
secure the closest possible connection between the sister institutions. Nine months after the College 
opened the initial Commandant, Brigadier-General A. W. L. Bayly, was promoted. His replacement was 
Brevet-Colonel Thompson Capper, who had very recently completed a three year appointment at 
Camberley.13 He was, in turn, succeeded by Colonel Walter Braithwaite, who was made a Brigadier-
General upon taking up his post—another man fresh from a teaching post at Camberley.14 In 1911, 
Lieutenant-Colonel George Barrow took up a teaching post at Quetta; he, too, had recently completed an 
appointment at Camberley.15  
 The men who attended Staff College were drawn from among the most able and professionally 
ambitious in the army, and gaining entry was a demanding process.  Richard Meinertzhagen, while 
employed on an expedition against the Nandi in Kenya, wrote in his diary in January 1906 that 
I have recently been considering the advisability of presenting myself at an examination for the 
Staff College. While walking through the forest today I determined to have a try some time in 
1912, which is the last year my age permits for entrance. So as soon as this expedition is over I 
shall begin to work for it.16 
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It was, perhaps, excessive to spend six years preparing for admission, but, as Meinertzhagen’s long-term 
planning suggests, the process was neither quick nor easy. Admission to Camberley was by competitive 
examination, which ensured that the College drew from the most able men. As will be seen below, a 
demanding standard was exacted from applicants.  
 The examinations were, however, only the final part of the process; officers had to meet several 
criteria before they were permitted to sit the exams. King’s Regulations laid out the six certificates which 
were required of any officer who wished to apply to Camberley. An aspiring staff officer was required to 
hold certificates declaring that he was no older than 35 on the date of the examination, and that he had 
served for at least five years at that point. He had to hold the rank of Captain or higher, or to have 
qualified for promotion to Captain. He required a medical certificate of good eyesight and hearing and 
good physical health. He had to be a good horseman. His CO had to certify that he was ‘in every respect a 
thoroughly intelligent and good regimental officer,’ and that the CO would gladly have the officer in 
question on his own staff.  The General Officer Commanding the officer’s division or garrison had to 
certify that he had ‘personally made himself thoroughly acquainted with the professional qualifications 
and character of the officer; and that he considers him in all respects fit for employment on the staff’. 
Any GOC who was unable to do this was required to attach the officer to his staff until he was able to 
make the necessary report.17  
The officer’s CO also had to complete a confidential form which asked, among other things, ‘Are 
his disposition and temper such as to enable him to perform his duties with tact and discrimination, and 
in a manner calculated to ensure cheerful obedience of orders conveyed by him?’ and ‘Does he display 
zeal, activity, intelligence and discretion in the performance of his duties, and take an interest in his 
profession?’.18 It was not possible for an aspiring staff officer to collect the necessary certificates until his 
name had been on his unit’s list of officers suitable for the Staff College for a least a year. If a CO or GOC 
was not sufficiently diligent in making his recommendations, and allowed an officer unsuited to staff 
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duties to sit the examinations, King’s Regulations explicitly warned that ‘this fact will be noted by the 
Army Council as showing a want of judgment and capacity in the officers who recommended him’.19 
These requirements meant that officers who presented themselves at the examination had already 
cleared several hurdles.  
The number of men competing for entry, and thus the pool of men from which the College was 
able to select its students, grew markedly between 1902 and 1914. This was particularly noticeable 
immediately after 1902. In the years from 1902 to 1905, the number of officers competing for entry in 
the annual examinations was 60, 81, 98, and 116.20 The number of applicants continued to grow, and the 
officers examined from 1906 to 1909 numbered 108, 129, 154 and 150.21 Competition then became even 
stiffer; no fewer than 185 men sat the entrance exam in 1913.22 This increase in numbers did not bring 
any reduction in the ability of applicants or the thoroughness of their preparation. Indeed, the number of 
officers who passed the exam and were thus ‘qualified’ for admission to Staff College (even though many 
of them, surpassed by other applicants, were not subsequently admitted) stayed fairly steady despite the 
increasingly large pool of applicants, as shown in Figure 14.  
Figure 14: Applicants to Staff College, 1902-1909 23 
 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 
Applicants 60 81 98 116 108 129 154 150 
Percentage 
who qualified 
70% 83% 70% 49% 65% 55% 71% 80% 
Vacancies 32 32 32 32 32 32 43 43 
Percentage 
admitted 
53.3% 39.5% 32.6% 27.6% 29.6% 24.8% 27.9% 28.7% 
 
 The entrance examinations were not the same throughout the period, and changed in 1905 and 
1906. In 1905, the examiners noted that because Geography had become a compulsory subject and the 
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number of marks for Military History and Strategy had increased, passing the exam was more difficult 
than previously. Moreover, what had been purely a Strategy exam now included Military History for the 
first time; many of the failures in 1905 took place in this paper.24 The marking of the exams changed 
slightly in 1906, as what had been single papers in some subjects were split into two papers, and the 
minimum pass mark of 0.5 was then applied to each individual paper, and no longer just to each subject 
heading. From 1906, candidates were restricted to sitting two language exams in the voluntary subjects, 
rather than three. The obligatory subjects were Military Engineering, Topography, Military History and 
Strategy, Tactics, Law, Administration, and Geography.25  
 Officers who passed the examination outright with a sufficiently high score secured themselves 
one of the 24 competitive places available each year. However, one quarter of the places available at 
Camberley were open to nominees, because a further eight places were filled each year by nomination. A 
man was eligible for nomination if he sat the entrance exam and achieved at least 37.5 percent of the 
marks in each paper, a lower standard than those seeking to gain entry by competition, who had to gain a 
minimum of 50 percent of the marks to qualify.26 This, however, changed in 1908, and to be eligible for 
nomination, a man had to secure 50 percent of the marks in each paper to qualify, just as did any man 
seeking entry by competition.27 The examinations, then, were not purely competitive, but nominees were 
held to an equal qualifying standard, at least in the second half of the period. There is little to indicate 
that this relaxation of strict competition was harmful, despite deviating from selection by merit. The Elgin 
Commission did not remark upon it in their Report, and the presence of nominees among the officers 
attending Staff College did not impede the work of the College or the rise of its reputation in the army. 
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Some historians, however, regard nomination as dubious; Paul Harris describes it as ‘highly 
questionable’.28 
How officers themselves regarded nomination is difficult to discern, although there are a few 
indications that it was not regarded as equal to exam success. George Barrow attended Camberley in the 
mid-1890s, and, as noted above, later taught there and at Quetta in the Edwardian period. He began 
preparing while with his regiment in India, then took a year’s leave in the UK and spent much of it 
working very hard for the Camberley entrance exams; he ‘put in ten solid hours work every day for six 
months.’ Barrow was told that a nominated post at Camberley was available to him, but he ‘preferred to 
pass on my own merit if possible and leave the nomination for someone else.’ He succeeded and passed 
in fifth.29 The scrap-book of Llewelyn Price-Davies, who attended Camberley in 1909-1910, contains some 
pieces of comic writing about Staff College. One piece divides the student intake into two classes: ‘The 
[Exam] Fiend’ and ‘The Nominee’. The former is portrayed as a swot who sits in the front row of every 
lecture, regards examinations as ‘the crucial test,’ and feels that ‘if he can ride a quiet horse on the flat at 
six mile an hour, he is amply mobile.’ The latter, however, feels ‘lucky to get in,’ and regards himself as ‘a 
man, not a book worm.’ He puts himself at the front of the drag, not of the lecture hall, and feels that an 
examination is no way to find a man who will be useful in a crisis. He is inclined to leave the paperwork of 
official routine to clerks because ‘an ounce of practice is worth a pound of theory.’30 These are evidently 
caricatures, but they suggest that there were at least perceived differences between nominees and the 
other entrants. These differences may not have been particularly great, but the lists of officers admitted 
to Staff College, published annually in Army Orders, clearly distinguished between those men who 
succeeded in the competitive exam and those who merely qualified and were subsequently nominated.  
Whatever the attitude of the officer corps to nomination, the fact that some officers entered by 
that route did nothing to impair the work, or the reputation, of the Staff College. The desirability and 
utility of Staff College training seems to have been widely recognised within the officer corps. Moreover, 
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this interest in advanced professional instruction predated the Boer War. Charles a Court Repington 
attended Camberley in the 1880s, and even then regarded it as the best road to advancement if he was 
not able to find active service somewhere in the Empire.31 After the Egyptian campaign, Lord Wolseley, 
admittedly a keen supporter of Camberley, told John Adye that passing Staff College was the ‘surest 
avenue to professional advancement’.32 In 1899, Richard Meinertzhagen received advice on a career in 
the Army from Colonel Lenthall, a friend of Meinertzhagen’s father. Besides noting that ‘there is lots of 
active service if you look for it’, Lenthall told him that ‘you must aim at the Staff College.’33 Placing staff 
training almost on a par with active service was, in the late-Victorian army, high praise indeed. Gaining a 
place at the Staff College was, even before the Boer War, a notable professional success for an officer, 
and the letters psc remained prestigious during the Edwardian period. James Whitehead concluded that 
‘in order to get on in the Army, it was essential to pass through the Staff College,’ and duly sat the exam 
in 1912.34 The report of a committee investigating promotion within the Royal Engineers and the Royal 
Artillery noted that Staff College regulations imposed a limit on the number of officers from these corps 
who could attend, and that this prevented able men from becoming psc and thus ‘obtaining a certificate 
which contributes materially to an Officer’s advancement.’35 
The same was true of appointments to the College’s directing staff; Bond concluded that these 
postings were seen as ‘highly commendable steps in the careers of future divisional commanders and 
chiefs-of-staff.’36 The later professional attainments of Camberley staff of the era, and the alacrity with 
which men accepted proffered postings, supports Bond’s assessment. When, in 1910, he was offered the 
appointment as Camberley’s Commandant, William Robertson was pleased to accept ‘one of the most 
important positions which an officer of my standing could in peace times be called upon to hold’ although 
he was less pleased that it was, like many other postings, ‘greatly underpaid’. Still, he recognised it as 
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‘possessing many attractive possibilities… a promising opening’.37 Unsurprisingly, given the professional 
cachet of the postings, the staff were highly capable. The number of directing staff at Camberley grew 
significantly over the period, partly to keep up with the increased number of students, but largely to 
address the heavy burden of work on the existing staff in the early Edwardian period. While there were 
only five professors and one instructor in 1904, which Bond calls ‘severely understaffed,’ there were 
seventeen directing staff by 1912.38 Bond notes that the staff who subsequently made names for 
themselves included Hubert Gough, Richard Haking, Launcelot Kiggell, and Thompson Capper (who rose 
during the 1914-18 war to be commander of Fifth Army, commander of XI Corps, Chief of Staff to Haig, 
and commander of 5th Division respectively).39 There were also John du Cane (commander of XV Corps), 
and Walter Braithwaite (Commandant of Quetta 1911-14, Chief of Staff to Hamilton at Gallipoli, and 
subsequently commander of XXII and then IX Corps).40 Later in the period, Louis Bols, George Harper, and 
Johnnie Gough (respectively Chief of Staff to Allenby in Palestine, divisional and corps commander, and 
Chief of the General Staff to First Army) also taught at Camberley.41 There can be little doubt that the 
teaching staff were selected from among the best and that such appointments were stepping-stones of 
professional advancement.  
The Staff College enjoyed a high reputation within the Army by 1914 for providing the highest 
available level of professional education, delivered by a carefully-chosen and able directing staff to 
cohorts of students who were themselves the result of a rigorous selection process. Gaining an 
appointment to the directing staff or admission as a student was a mark of professional ability and a 
strong indication of bright future career prospects. The College had come out of the Boer War with its 
reputation in good condition, thanks to the high opinion that senior officers had formed of the value of 
men who had graduated from there. The professional quality of the education provided by Camberley 
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was thus widely recognised. The details of the syllabus, and the objectives of staff college training, give 
important indications as to why the letters psc were so sought-after.  
 
Changes in the Syllabus 
 The syllabus at Camberley was not reformed in the way that the syllabus at Sandhurst was. This is 
hardly surprising, given that the Elgin Commission praised the work and the abilities of Camberley 
graduates, and bemoaned only their scarcity. However, the syllabus did not remain static during this 
period, but was altered and improved in ways which reflected both wider changes in the army and Staff 
College efforts to remain thoroughly up-to-date. There were also changes in emphasis brought about by 
each new Commandant, although these appear to have been in the nature of minor adjustments and 
improvements rather than anything more substantial. The instruction naturally involved a significant 
proportion of staff work although the scope of the syllabus included a great deal of other subject matter. 
Given the roles which staff officers played in the training of the regular army and the auxiliaries, as noted 
in chapter three, the syllabus was appropriate for men who needed to be competent across a range of 
military disciplines.  
The instruction included military history, geography, intelligence, tactical matters, Imperial issues, 
military and international law, naval matters, and the composition of the British armed forces and those 
of major foreign Powers. The course also covered strategic issues in the broadest sense, although 
explicitly political issues were often—but not always—avoided. During his time as Commandant, Henry 
Wilson oversaw various exercises envisioning the dispatch of a British force, often of four divisions and 
one cavalry division, to fight in northwestern Europe. One of these, entitled ‘The Belgian Scheme’, first 
appeared in 1908. Although the description of the scheme emphasized that it was fictional, it presented a 
scenario in which Germany, seeking to break the Anglo-French entente, had embarked on a war, and was 
likely to violate Belgian neutrality if it would further her ends. News of this leaked out, and Wilson 
claimed that there were questions in Parliament about whether the Staff College should be ‘permitted to 
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hatch malicious plots against the harmless, peace-loving Germans.’42 Wilson was evidently unabashed, 
for the scheme was also set in 1909 and 1910, albeit with the additional stipulation that the scheme and 
all work connected with it ‘must be regarded as SECRET.’43 Despite potential political issues, in other 
words, consideration of how best to employ a British Expeditionary Force in support of the French army 
in Europe, fighting against the Germans, quite possibly in defence of Belgian neutrality, went on 
uninterrupted.  
In the Belgian Scheme, men of the Senior Division considered the courses of action available to 
Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium, and had to explain the principles behind the employment of the 
British forces with ‘sufficient clearness to be understood by the members of the Cabinet,’ as well as listing 
all of the steps the government would have to take to put the proposed British actions into effect.44 It 
seems that William Robertson’s time as Commandant was marked by a similar careful toeing of the 
political line. In his final address to the Seniors in 1912 he referred to the conscription debate, and 
assured his students that it was only natural for men like them, who had studied modern warfare so 
closely, to have strong opinions on the subject. He advised them, however, to be cautious in expressing 
those opinions unless in reply to an official request for advice or thoughts.45 Similarly, he exhorted the 
Seniors to direct their energies towards ‘fighting the most probable and most formidable adversary for 
the time being.’46 He noted in his autobiography that the students knew very well which country was 
meant. Germany had been discussed regularly, if not often explicitly, as London had long since made it 
clear that Camberley was not to interfere with matters which could, as Robertson put it:  
give offence to a friendly (!) Power, and possibly lead to “diplomatic complications.” “Mum” was 
the word, therefore, in regard to all work—and there was a great deal—which was designed to 
assist the students in studying the conflict which threatened us.47 
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In other words, topics which were politically sensitive were approached with some caution, but they were 
hardly out-of-bounds. Indeed, Robertson’s remark that there was a ‘great deal’ of such work is indicative 
of the determination to ensure that staff officer training was, despite political concerns, both of the 
highest quality and distinctly practical. Tailoring training and contingency planning to the current British 
strategic position could hardly have been undertaken without some consideration of political matters; 
given the improvement in British relations with France, the alliance with Japan, and, to a lesser extent, 
the improvement in relations with Russia, it was only realistic for exercises envisioning a continental war 
to pit Britain against Germany. This pursuit of realism in the coursework at Staff College was very much of 
a piece with the army’s wider efforts to inject realism into its training exercises, as already discussed. 
 Some of the biggest changes in the syllabus over the period mirrored developments in Britain’s 
political relationships and her strategic realities. Thus, in 1904, the Senior Division were told that ‘the 
result of the outrage of the Baltic Fleet in the North Sea has not terminated peacefully and for purposes 
of the present scheme it is assumed that England has joined her ally Japan and is at war with Russia.’ The 
students were asked to draw up a plan of campaign for the defence of the Indian frontiers.48 But in 1905, 
officers had to make a strategic study of Belgium as a potential theatre of campaign. The supposition was 
that Germany invaded Belgium during a war between Germany and France, and the United Kingdom 
intervened to repel the Germans and secure Belgian neutrality—an indication that the contents of 
Wilson’s controversial scheme were neither a new nor unusual aspect of the syllabus.49 While the focus 
of work did not change overnight—the students in 1905 also devoted considerable effort to an exercise 
on the defence of the North West Frontier—there is a clear shift towards considering the employment of 
an Expeditionary Force in Belgium and northern France and away from considering scenarios which were 
less likely after 1905.50 The Seniors in 1913 submitted papers on the casualties which might be expected if 
the expeditionary force were employed in northwest Europe against a first-class opponent. They made a 
thorough examination of the likely casualty levels after one, three, and six months of fighting, having first 
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assessed the quantity and character of combat they considered most likely.51 That significant, sustained 
consideration had been given to questions like this in the decade before 1914 must rank as an important 
strength of the Staff College curriculum.  
Equally, consideration was given to naval and nautical matters as the naval arms race with 
Germany went on. In 1906 the Senior Division were issued with a table listing the stations of British 
battleships and the forces that other leading naval powers maintained in the same waters, and another 
table listing all the naval vessels of Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, and the United States.52 In 1907 
students were given information on the distribution of British warships of all classes, and information 
specifically on the German navy.53 Documents on the size and composition of British and foreign 
mercantile marines, the value of the British import and export trades, and the numbers employed in 
various British industries were also provided, all of them specially compiled for use at Camberley.54 In 
1908, a chart listing the battleship strength of the leading naval powers in ‘dreadnought units’ was 
issued.55 In 1909, the Senior Class were issued with a summary of the raw materials and foodstuffs stored 
in the UK but not produced domestically, as well as how long these stocks would last at current 
consumption rates; petroleum would last six months but grain and flour would be exhausted within 
seven weeks.56 These documents avoided purely political issues, but they otherwise explored naval and 
strategic questions of the broadest scope, and any officer who was not already fully aware of the Royal 
Navy’s vital importance in the event of a European war would certainly have had that lesson forcefully 
driven home. Men studying at Camberley were thus kept informed about the capacities and the 
responsibilities of the Senior Service. Moreover, the syllabus also involved them in close cooperation with 
their naval colleagues.57  
                                                          
51
 JSCSC. CR/1913/2: 6. 
52
 JSCSC. CR/1906/2: 50, 83. 
53
 JSCSC. CR/1907/2: 41a, 107. 
54
 JSCSC. CR/1907/2: 10, 11, 22. 
55
 JSCSC. CR/1908/2: 6.  
56
 JSCSC. CR/1909/2: 32. 
57
 Andrew Lambert argues that the Naval War Course served as a semi-official staff and planning organ for Jackie 
Fisher. Beyond the links between Camberley and the War Course which Lambert discusses, there is nothing to 
suggest that the Staff College was functioning in a similar fashion for the Army. Lambert, Andrew, ‘The Naval War 
 201 
 
Connections between Camberley and the Royal Naval College were not entirely new in this 
period; an exchange of visiting lecturers addressing combined operations and Imperial defence had taken 
place in 1901, and by 1903 the conduct of naval landings and the planning behind them was being 
covered in some detail.58 However, ties became closer after 1906, when officers from each service 
attended the College of the other, and staff tours on combined operations were held annually as a joint 
exercise between both institutions.59 In 1910, for example, the Combined Naval and Staff Tour, held 4-6 
April, was overseen by Rear Admiral Bayly and Brigadier-General Wilson, and the directing staffs of each 
syndicate included both military and naval officers.  Altogether nearly 100 officers of both services took 
part, including several senior naval officers who were ‘attached [to the army groups] to study the 
situation’.60 The tour itself required planning the landing of an infantry division and a cavalry regiment at 
Sandown Bay on the Isle of Wight, issuing the necessary joint operations orders, allocating troops and 
horses to transports, and issuing the orders for the disembarkation, including allocating the various ships’ 
boats available for landing men and horses.61 Before the tour was held, Captain Baird RN delivered a 
lecture at Camberley on amphibious landings, complementing the other instruction that students 
received on the subject, which covered the command arrangements, the staff arrangements, and the 
boundaries of naval and military responsibility during the landing itself.62 Such work was important not 
only for ensuring that the army was able to operate in the manner that might be required in a future war, 
but also that staff officers were able to turn their hand to any military matter with equal success. As 
George Barrow later wrote, the instruction at Camberley was not aimed at cramming officers full of facts, 
but rather at producing officers able to do efficient military work of any kind in any place, under any 
conditions, against any enemy, however armed or organized, and to ‘teach them to think; to think 
logically and express themselves clearly.’63 This emphasis on thinking and communicating clearly appears 
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repeatedly in varied portions of the syllabus, and was one of the key skills that Staff College imparted to 
its graduates.  
As with the shift in focus from the North West Frontier to Belgium, other changes in the syllabus 
kept the instruction as contemporary as possible. Even in the spring of 1906, officers of the Junior 
Division were required to include references to Manchuria when explaining their thoughts on the 
development of artillery tactics brought about by smokeless powder and the increased range and rate of 
fire of modern weapons, as well as the lessons to be learned about entrenchment.64  Students regularly 
did work on machine guns; one paper instructed officers to ‘Discuss the general principles which govern 
the employment of machine guns in War’ and expand on those principles by examining the employment 
of machine guns on the battlefield, and suggest the best way to organize this. They were issued with a 
paper on the principles of machine guns as then taught at Hythe, although the directing staff ‘hoped that 
the paper generally will be taken as merely an expression of one opinion and as such freely criticised.’65 
The impact of modern weaponry on casualty rates was also considered. As noted above, the Seniors in 
1913 considered the likely wastage in an expeditionary force committed to combat in northwestern 
Europe, having first assessed the impact of quick-firing artillery and modern rifles and the likely nature 
and duration of battles.66   
Given the focus in the syllabus on modern conditions and contemporary developments, it was 
only natural that aircraft also featured in the instruction. Within a year of first setting eyes on an 
aeroplane, Wilson had instructed Thompson Capper to give two lectures on the subject.67 Thereafter, it 
became a regular, if not a salient, part of the syllabus. In 1911, the Juniors considered the role aircraft 
could play in a scheme on reconnaissance before an attack, and had to report suitable places for aircraft 
to take off and land, the means of signifying the latter, and ‘any R.A. arrangements deemed desirable for 
attacking hostile air craft, should they appear.’68 In the same year, the Seniors engaged in a tactical 
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exercise which also included aircraft reconnaissance. Students were told the pilot had ‘very little military 
training’ and so had to issue instructions on what to observe and how to report it. The students were 
reminded of the need to select and clearly mark out a suitable landing ground for the aircraft’s return.69 
In 1913, the shoe was on the other foot, and students reconnoitred an area of ground with the intention 
of hiding a division of troops from aerial observation during the day, and made the arrangements 
necessary for a night march to begin that evening, so that the division’s movement would be concealed 
from the enemy.70 Beyond individual exercises like these which included aircraft alongside the regular 
work of the College, the syllabus of Strategy and Tactics had, by 1912, been modified to include coverage 
of ‘the developments taking place in Aeronautics’.71 The students at Quetta also received lectures on 
Aeronautics.72  
In 1911, Robert Brooke Popham, himself a member of the Senior Division, gave a lecture to the 
Junior and Senior divisions on military aviation. While the lecture thoroughly covered the technical details 
of the machines and outlined the possible size and structure of the army’s Air Battalion in wartime, there 
was no discussion of how aircraft—either aeroplanes, dirigibles, balloons, or kites—might be used in war, 
or what tasks they would undertake.73 On the basis of the work done at Camberley, however, it seems 
fairly likely that this was because it was understood that aircraft would be employed for reconnaissance. 
When Brooke Popham spoke, it was not quite eight years since the Wright brothers had made the first 
powered heavier-than-air flight in history, and both the embryonic nature of aviation, and its very rapid 
development, were readily apparent from the lecture’s contents.74 Although there were only twelve 
military aeroplanes in Britain, six were ‘out of date… suitable for training purposes only’, and of the other 
six, army pilots were as yet unqualified to fly three of them.75 That such a new and rapidly-changing 
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technology was included in the syllabus is a further indication that the instruction at Camberley was kept 
as relevant and modern as possible.  
Beyond the lessons of the Manchurian campaign, the development of aircraft as potential 
influences on warfare, and the shift in strategic focus from Afghanistan to Belgium, the rest of the 
syllabus remained broadly similar across the period. One of the purposes of Staff College, as has already 
been noted, was to produce competent officers able to tackle any military problem efficiently, anywhere 
in the world against any enemy. Thus, alongside the instruction on staff duties, there was general military 
education. Only the salient points of some subjects will be discussed here, but Military History will be 
examined more closely. During their time at Camberley, officers visited and trained with other arms, after 
which they compiled thorough reports on the daily routine, discipline, equipment, horses, training, 
musketry, sanitation, mobilization, supply, and appointment of officers in that branch of the army.76 
These postings gave officers practical personal experience beyond their own arm, providing them with a 
broad understanding of the workings of parts of the army they might not otherwise have seen. The 
supporting services were not neglected; for example, the Senior Division was able to work in the field 
with signal service units.77 Students did their own practical military engineering including demolitions and 
bridge-building, and visited Aldershot to see the Royal Engineers at work.78 The study of strategy and 
tactics was also kept as practical as possible—lectures were augmented by the lessons of exercises on the 
ground and staff tours.79 The instruction laid stress on the importance of firepower, inter-arm 
cooperation, discipline, and mobility. This broader military education that Camberley provided, alongside 
the more narrowly ‘staff’ training, played a role in fitting staff officers for their future posts. To that end, 
it did not attempt to produce experts, but well-rounded military minds with a solid foundation in various 
subjects and a good grasp of key principles.  
The syllabus for Military History and Geography covered the same themes and principles 
throughout the period, taught via a selection of the major conventional campaigns of the preceding fifty 
                                                          
76
 JSCSC. CR/1905/1: 31. 
77
 JSCSC. CR/1913/1: 92. EXAMINATIONS. Syllabus for examination in “Military Engineering.” 
78
 JSCSC. CR/1905/1: 50. Syllabus of examination in Subject B. 
79
 JSCSC. CR/1913/1: 92. EXAMINATIONS. Syllabus for Examination in “Strategy and Tactics”. 
 205 
 
years. The US Civil War, particularly the campaigns of ‘Stonewall’ Jackson, and the 1866 campaign leading 
to Koeniggratz were perennial features, as were the Waterloo and 1870 campaigns, although the latter 
tended to replace the former as the period went on.80 The Russo-Japanese war was included in the 
curriculum, at least once the information available was more accurate and reliable than the initial 
reporting.81  It had, however, appeared earlier in other subjects; in 1905, the Military Engineering 
curriculum already included study of the Manchurian campaign, with a particular focus on Port Arthur.82 
Some of the battlefields studied, namely those of 1870, were visited regularly as part of the course. In 
1913, for example, the Senior Division toured Villers-Bretonneux, Worth, Spicheren, Vionville, and Metz.83  
 Brian Holden Reid is critical of the way in which military history was taught at Camberley. The 
army, he contends, regarded military history as a way to prepare for future warfare, seeing it as ‘a 
reservoir of “lessons” for the edification of military students’—a point of view that is confirmed by the 
uses made of historical battles and campaigns at Camberley, discussed below.84 This digging up of 
historical lessons is, Holden Reid notes, antithetical to an academic study of the subject, which 
approaches the past seeking to understand it on its own terms.85 But however much it may offend 
modern academic practice, seeking to learn lessons from past campaigns is not only a reasonable pursuit 
for a soldier, but a desirable one. Indeed, G. F. R. Henderson wrote with exactly that object in mind. 
Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War is a military history, a biography, and an instruction manual 
in strategy, tactics, leadership, and command; at points, Henderson pauses in his narrative to deliver little 
lectures to the reader. One such lesson reads: ‘there are few schools where strategy may be learned… a 
long and laborious course of study is the only means of acquiring the capacity to handle armies and 
outwit an equal adversary. The light of common-sense alone is insufficient’. Henderson then quoted 
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Napoleon’s exhortation to read and reread the campaigns of the great commanders.86 Similarly, 
Robertson, in his final address to the Senior Division in 1912, described military history as a source of 
experience for men who have not seen war first-hand. He reminded the students to study it properly, 
using their deductions from history as guidelines rather than dictates. Although historians often know 
more of the past than military men do, Robertson noted, historians are not considered good potential 
commanders, because unlike officers, historians don’t investigate the past ‘with the sole object of making 
actual use in war of the knowledge acquired.’87 This was the spirit in which students studied history at 
Camberley, enlivened when possible by walking the ground of the battlefields in question.  
While Military History may not have been taught in a manner that would please a modern 
academic, the students were nevertheless encouraged to approach the subject critically, albeit with one 
eye firmly fixed on modern warfare. The Junior Division of 1909 were asked ‘What lessons to be deduced 
from the Campaign of 1815 do you consider to be most valuable with regard to modern war? Give 
illustrations from the campaign in support of your statements, and show briefly how modern conditions 
would modify the application of the principles involved.’88 In 1913, Lee’s attack at Chancellorsville and 
Marmont’s attack at Salamanca were compared; officers were instructed to ‘bring out the essential 
causes of success and failure in each case and the bearing which they have upon the deployment of 
enveloping tactics in battle at the present time.’89  In 1907, the Senior Division had to explain ‘How far are 
the strategical and tactical lessons drawn from the campaigns of 1815, 1862, 1866 and 1870 confirmed, 
or modified, by the experiences of the recent war in Manchuria?’ The answers were marked on:  
power shown to grasp and arrange the subject, the judgment and acuteness shown in the 
comments and deductions, the grasp of essential details, power of sifting evidence, terseness and 
clearness of composition, and style. The most satisfactory style is one which renders it impossible 
to misunderstand the writer’s meaning.90 
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Thus, while military history at the Staff College may have been a matter of mining history to find lessons 
for the present, the critical components of historical analysis do not appear to have suffered unduly. 
These same abilities to examine a problem, form a solution, and then explain the line of reasoning and 
the subsequent course of action clearly and succinctly, were at the heart of much of the staff training at 
Camberley.  
 
Staff Training 
Students at Camberley undertook a good deal of staff work, both in the usual sense of the term 
and in the sense that they did a great deal of work to fit them for the roles which staff officers played in 
the Edwardian army, which included a role in the training of regimental officers. There were three 
elements of this staff work which were key to the development of essential professional skills among the 
students. Firstly, as has already been discussed, there was a strong emphasis on producing precise and 
unmistakably clear writing, both for orders and for reports. Secondly, intimately linked to this was a need 
for students to think clearly and logically about military problems before presenting their solutions in that 
same manner. Students were required to participate in, plan, coordinate, and direct exercises in much 
the same way as they would after graduating, when they would play a role in the training of regimental 
officers. Thirdly, students delivered lectures on various topics of military interest. Lecturing, as Chapter 
Three discussed, was one means of spreading professional education through the officer corps and 
indeed the army at large.  
Staff work was a major focus in exercises, given that preparing men to handle staff duties and 
command larger formations of troops were the two central objectives at Camberley. For that reason, 
Robertson had felt that to call the institution ‘Staff College’ was a misnomer, but he was unable to 
convince the War Office to re-designate it as the ‘War School.’91 Rawlinson felt similarly, regarding 
Camberley not only as an institution for training staff officers ‘but also with a view to higher command in 
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future.’92 Their efforts to strike a balance between these two goals were not without difficulties; 
Archibald Wavell, who attended Camberley in 1909-10, felt too much attention had been given to the 
business of command rather than to producing solid staff officers.93 While Wavell wished for a greater 
focus upon staff duties, the quantity of such work that did take place was not insignificant. 
Some of the staff work required was of a general nature; students were often asked to produce 
concise summaries of military subjects, or to produce operations orders for a plan of attack or defence 
which their commanding officer had decided upon.94 Some of the command and staff work was 
historically based. The Junior Division in 1909 wrote an appreciation of the situation for General Banks in 
the Valley campaign on 17 April 1862.95 In 1903 they wrote appreciations of the situation after the 
Russian crossing of the Danube in 1877, and orders for the advance from Tirnova on 12 July 1877.96 Such 
exercises practiced the basics of staff duty. However, more specialized aspects of staff work were also 
covered. In 1911, for example, the Junior Division worked through several railway control exercises. The 
second of these required the issue of orders appropriate for the movement of a regular division and a 
cavalry regiment by rail; tables of the men, horses, vehicles, motor vehicles, guns, and pontoons on the 
strength of these units were issued, as was a list of limitations on the length and number of axles of the 
trains employed to move the forces. Students were also instructed that the formations had to be 
entrained as rapidly as possible, although only a few men—none of them skilled labourers—and limited 
quantities of locally-obtainable materials were available to improve the small local stations where the 
troops were to entrain.97 Such exercises were a level above the basic, but still required students to handle 
writing orders, the bread-and-butter of staff work.  
New arrivals at Camberley were given comprehensive instruction on orders; what they are for, 
the difficulties of writing them, and the ‘evils’ of verbal orders. The typical contents of operations orders 
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were set out, and the form that orders were to take was laid down. In this regard, Moltke was described 
as ‘our teacher’ and the relevant sections of the manual Combined Training as ‘our Bible’.98 The students 
were given German orders from 1870 and instructed to compare them with French orders from the same 
period. Having thus been shown orders which constituted best practice and orders which did not, the 
students were able to compare them both with British orders from 1900 in South Africa.99 As elsewhere 
in the curriculum, the value of precision, clarity, and concision were heavily emphasised, and students 
were warned to avoid problematic words and phrases, including ‘should’, ‘may’, and ‘if possible’.100  It 
was repeated many times that orders and other military writing should be unmistakably clear, and the 
clarity of thought and expression which were so essential to producing good orders were regularly 
practiced elsewhere in the course.  
All writing on military subjects was done in a style similar to that of orders—clear, concise, and 
well-arranged. Students were told to keep their handwriting ‘compact and easily legible’, and to state 
facts and inferences in tabular form, numbering or lettering them in sequence so that none of them could 
escape the reader’s attention.101  Instructions for an essay in 1905 reminded students that the best 
writing style was one which was unmistakably clear, advice which appears again and again in the 
documents. Issued with the essay prompt were notes on writing reports, which advised careful thought, a 
determination to say all that needed to be said, and an independent mind: ‘try and get [sic] an opinion of 
your own, and argue it out, no matter who is against you.’102 This emphasis on the essential ability to 
think logically and express military observations or orders in perfectly clear prose was a central facet of 
the staff teaching, and was sustained throughout the period. Indeed, by 1913 the staff included a Mr 
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issued in November 1905 to the Junior Division, but it was a long-term project, not due for submission until that 
class had moved up to be Seniors.]  
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Seccombe, who taught English.103 The most basic abilities of staff work were thus well-covered, but the 
more advanced work was not neglected. 
Staff rides were a regular feature of the coursework, encompassing tactical, strategic, or logistical 
matters, and sometimes all three. In 1904, a series of exercises was held throughout the year, based on 
the progression of an imagined campaign by an army which had made a successful landing on the 
southern coast of Great Britain. This gave scope for the Senior Division to undertake work in 
reconnaissance, the logistics of supplying two Army Corps and a cavalry division by road until rail 
communications had been restored, the protection of these lines of communication by masking a 
fortress, the defence of a river line by means of entrenchments, and forcing a river crossing against 
enemy opposition. The series of exercises ended with a war game, in which some students worked out 
the arrangements for planned attacks, others marched as if with the imaginary units which were being 
manoeuvred, and a few acted as umpires. In other words, the students handled every aspect of the 
exercises, overseen by the directing staff.104 In the same year, the students also engaged in a four-day 
staff ride, working out the mobilisation and concentration of two opposing forces, their camps and 
bivouacs, the roads used for their marches, and the reconnaissance of positions selected for offensive or 
defensive operations. Where contact between the two forces occurred, students visited the locality and 
worked out the tactical issues on the ground, after which the result of engagements would be agreed by 
the directing staff. The exercise culminated in a general action, after which all officers came together for 
a conference on the battlefield.105 Such exercises were a central component of the syllabus at Camberley, 
and gave scope for the practice of both general and specialized staff duties, as well as training in tactical 
and operational aspects of command.  
The syllabus also developed the skills staff officers required to oversee the exercises and 
manoeuvres of the rest of the army. As was the case with other subjects, the students undertook a good 
deal of practical work, but were guided in this, and prepared for it, by instruction from the staff. The 
Seniors received three lectures on ‘Training and Manoeuvres’, which covered:  
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 JSCSC. CR/1913/1. Table of Contents. 
104
 JSCSC. CR/1904/2: 1, 16, 27, 63. Lines of Communication of an Army, and the continuations from this exercise.  
105
 JSCSC. CR/1904/2: 51. Staff Tour, June 6-9.  
 211 
 
1. (i) General outline of the annual course of training and the duties of the Staff in 
connection therewith.  
(ii) Administration of the Training Grant. 
2. Manoeuvres and the application of the Military Manoeuvres Act of 1897. 
3. Preparation of Schemes for Manoeuvres and Tactical Exercises.106 
This gave the students a grounding in this aspect of their duties which they subsequently applied in a 
variety of schemes and exercises. In 1910, the Senior Division drew up schemes for staff tours that the 
Junior Division undertook later in the year. During the tours, which took place from 8-10 June and 20-22 
July, the Senior Division acted as the Directing Staff, overseeing the conduct of the exercise and managing 
the necessary administration and umpiring.107 Work on training exercises and the other instructional 
work undertaken by staff officers was very common and covered a wide span, sometimes including the 
planned participation of auxiliary forces as well as regular troops. Drawing up plans for autumn 
manoeuvres of three or four days, to include three regular infantry brigades and twenty battalions of 
Militia and Volunteers, was one task set for the Senior Division in 1904. The exercise required that the 
opposing sides collide early on the third day, within the boundaries of an area selected as suitable for 
tactical exercises. Students were told that almost all ground was available, but with the proviso that it 
was preferable to use ground where compensation costs would be lower; camping grounds were to be 
selected on the basis that ‘no heavy expense in improving water supply is to be incurred.’ A 
reconnaissance of the ground helped the students to form their plans.108 That same year, the students, 
acting as staff officers for a divisional commander, drew up war game schemes for two detached forces 
each of approximately divisional strength, with a General and a Special Idea for each side. The class 
played one of the submitted war games later in the year.109  
The training and the promotion examinations of regimental officers were also covered; in 1907, 
for example, the Seniors had to create a tactical exercise for regimental officers on ground within an 
hour’s train journey of Camberley, and a Tactical Fitness for Command exam. The students were 
reminded that the object of the exam was to bring the two forces commanded by the examinees into 
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combat and so the two forces should begin fairly close together. Given a list of the infantry, artillery, and 
cavalry units available to take part in the examination, the students were required to submit a scheme for 
the outdoor work, the orders and arrangements necessary to set up the exam, and indicate a suitable 
location for the indoor work. 110 There was also practice in lecturing. Officers in 1904, for example, 
prepared a series of lectures on Combined Training 1902 for an audience of regimental officers. They 
were told that because the audience would already have studied the text, the lectures ought to 
reemphasise the key points, illustrated by the lecturer’s own experiences of war or by incidents from 
well-known campaigns.111 Planning lectures was good practice, but officers were also able to deliver 
them.  
Groups of officers were formed to collect and organise information about certain developments, 
because ‘the close study required by the Course, deprives them, to a considerable extent, of 
opportunities for thorough investigation of current international events possessing military interest.’ The 
initial topics in 1903 were Morocco, the operations in Somaliland, and the general military situation in 
Albania and Macedonia; an officer from each group lectured on their topic at the beginning of the next 
term. Provision was made for further brief lectures to give updates as required, and as military and 
political events moved on, old subjects would be dropped and new ones introduced.112 Besides providing 
relevant professional summaries to the student body, this also gave officers practice in drawing up 
instructional material and delivering lectures—again, important skills for staff officers who would have a 
role to play in the education and training of regimental officers.  
It seems likely that officers were also required to deliver lectures outside the bounds of this 
scheme, as the students delivered no fewer than 42 lectures in 1903, with subjects which often fell 
outside the remit of ‘current international events.’ There were numerous lectures on the territories of 
the Empire and areas under British influence, ranging from the North West Frontier, Egypt, and Persia, to 
Canada, and Venezuela. Several speakers addressed the Russian advance on India, the strategic position 
in central Asia, and the Russian armed forces, while others covered Germany and France. Recent British 
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campaigns like South Africa and Sierra Leone were included, along with discussion of conscription, 
indirect artillery fire, logistics, the proper role of cavalry, and non-combatants.113 The men of the Senior 
Division likewise delivered numerous lectures in 1904.114 Both the organisation and the delivery of the 
lectures, and the subjects themselves, were of practical benefit to aspiring staff officers.  
The practice of students delivering lectures appears to have continued throughout the period, if 
not necessarily on the lavish scale of 1903. Records survive of thirteen lectures outside the regular 
syllabus in 1907; most were prepared by syndicates and, given the subjects, were almost certainly a 
continuation of the student lectures on current international events which had begun in 1903. Reflecting 
the increasing focus on an expeditionary force campaigning in Europe, there were lectures on the 
German military, naval, social, and political situations, and on Austria. Others addressed aspects of the 
Russo-Japanese war or the Pacific powers and the impact of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, while one 
syndicate examined the railway network of Asiatic Turkey. Some of the lectures, however, were not 
delivered by students; Colonel Hale lectured on Vinoy’s retreat to Paris in 1870, and Major Geddes RFA 
spoke on the ‘Artillery Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War.’115 These two officers were neither students 
nor members of staff; guest lecturers were regularly invited to speak at Camberley. There were 21 visiting 
lecturers in the autumn term of 1904 alone.116 Between the guest speakers and their fellow students, 
officers at Camberley received numerous extra-curricular lectures. Sometimes the topics fell outside of 
the regular syllabus, but they were nevertheless relevant to a thorough military education. 
Graduates of Camberley received thorough training in the duties of staff officers. The 
composition of orders or of concise and accurate summaries was a crucial foundational skill, and even 
beyond the work on orders, there was no escaping the emphasis on clarity of thought, expression and 
argument which was required in every piece of written work. More complex work on logistics, the 
movement of troops, and amphibious landings further practised these skills while teaching important 
lessons in other aspects of staff work. Officers were equipped for their future role training troops and 
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regimental officers, through both the preparation and delivery of lectures, and the creation, organisation 
and management of staff rides and exercises. Men who had passed Staff College, in other words, were 
well-prepared for these aspects of staff posts.  
 
Conclusion 
The Staff College came out of the enquiries after the Boer War very well. The only complaint was 
the scarcity of psc men. In that sense, perhaps the most important change in the following years was 
quantitative. The number of students passing through Camberley itself increased modestly, but a more 
significant growth in staff college graduates came in 1905 when a second institution opened in India. This 
took place alongside a steep increase in the number of applicants; the entrance exams, already 
competitive in 1902, were intensely so by 1914. That the quality of applicants, measured by the exam 
scores, remained high is a credit both to the men themselves and to the reputation of Camberley. That a 
proportion of admissions to Camberley were by nomination, and not purely by competitive success, does 
not appear to have diminished this personal and institutional success. The directing staff were highly 
competent professionals who handled a syllabus that adapted to reflect changing strategic realities, 
modern empirical experience, and developing technologies. This was another reflection of the pursuit of 
realism shown in exercises and manoeuvres discussed in Chapter Three. The curriculum also reflected the 
army’s desire to provide practical training that would fit men for their professional duties, including both 
the technocratic and instructional aspects of staff work. The Staff College was emblematic of the 
increasingly professional officer corps. It provided the most advanced formal education that the army 
offered, and this was sought by a steadily growing number of men who felt that the strenuously 
competitive entry process was worth the effort if it brought professional distinction and accelerated 
promotion. That these men expected preferment based on skill, ability, and trained military expertise 
points strongly to the professionalism of the officer corps. The high reputation of the institution, and of 
its graduates, indicates an officer corps which valued and rewarded men who worked hard, and who 
studied, read, and thought in pursuit of professional expertise.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The British army of 1914 was committed to a continental war and found itself in action against 
the Germans, regarded at the time as the most professional army in Europe. Despite this, it is generally 
agreed that the BEF performed well in the early battles, although it was not without faults.1 There were 
failures of intelligence, coordination, and control among the senior leadership, but at lower levels the BEF 
performed well. The manner in which GHQ conducted the campaign and Haig and Smith-Dorrien 
cooperated with each other (or failed to do so) is open to criticism in a way that the performance of 
battalions and junior officers at Mons and Le Cateau is not. When put to the test in combat, the army’s 
pre-war training was proven to be effective, because its officers and men were able to perform 
successfully on the modern battlefield. This chapter summarises the conclusions of this thesis and 
examines the implications of this study in three broader areas: the nature and extent of professionalism 
in the officer corps at the beginning of the twentieth century, the debate over the nature and content of 
an ideal military education system, and the military ability and competence of the Edwardian army.  
This thesis has demonstrated that the junior officers of the Edwardian army were considerably 
more professional than is often recognised. Central to this professionalism was the trained expertise that 
officers acquired through their initial military education and then further developed over their careers. 
For most of them, that military career began at Sandhurst or Woolwich. Reformed in the wake of the 
Boer War, the courses were intended to provide men with the skills and concepts essential for a military 
professional. The curricula of both institutions made tactics a subject of central importance and linked it 
closely with topography and military engineering. The impact of firepower on the modern battlefield, and 
its consequent vital importance in tactical matters, was emphasised, as was intelligent decision-making. A 
proportion of the officer corps was drawn from the auxiliary forces, and the initial training that these men 
received, and their method of entry into the officer corps, differed from that of their regular 
contemporaries. These men were less numerous, and the military experience and knowledge they 
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possessed rather better, than is often recognised. Moreover, the standards demanded of them before 
they could gain regular commissions were higher than has hitherto been acknowledged. Once officers 
had been gazetted and had joined their units, they participated in the annual round of training, intended 
to hone the skills of officers and men and produce a force able to successfully prosecute modern warfare. 
The aim of training exercises was to approach as closely as possible to the conditions of active service, 
because the ultimate objective of all training was to ensure the army was ready for war. Many officers 
had strong incentive to make a success of their chosen career, sometimes for financial reasons but 
sometimes from sheer love of soldiering. The professionalism that these men exhibited was not confined 
to tactical matters, but was understood broadly and encompassed other military attributes like physical 
fitness and effective working relationships with other officers and enlisted men. At the highest level of 
formal education, a select few men benefited from the Staff College course which passed out highly-
trained staff officers and men fitted for future senior command responsibilities. The Army’s education 
was not without flaws; for example, financial constraints limited summer camps at Woolwich and certain 
aspects of exercises, officers entering from the auxiliaries were, despite improvements, less well 
prepared than men from Sandhurst or Woolwich, and psc men were excellent but scarce. Equally, the 
professionalism of junior officers was not unalloyed—cases of nepotism are evident in some 
appointments—but this does not greatly detract from the larger picture. 
The professionalism exhibited by junior officers was not confined merely to the formal education 
and training they received from the army, but was developed and exhibited in a variety of ways. A 
voluminous and expanding body of professional literature, both books and periodicals, offered men 
support and assistance in fostering their military knowledge and skills, whether preparing for a promotion 
exam, framing small-scale tactical exercises, or training their troops to make intelligent use of ground. 
This literature also allowed men to engage with new developments and contemporary debates, like the 
evolving capabilities of aircraft and their likely uses in warfare, or the lessons to be drawn from the 
Russo-Japanese war, or potential alterations to current methods of training which would better fit British 
troops for the modern battlefield. Military periodicals were read widely by officers of all ranks and corps, 
and, importantly, were an accessible forum for junior officers to share their experiences or express their 
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views. Professionalism was more than surface deep; men were going beyond what was required of them, 
and were earnestly studying their chosen profession. 
The ways in which men sought to demonstrate their professional ability and their suitability for 
promotion are also indicative of a professional officer corps. Active service and gaining the letters psc by 
graduating from Staff College were widely understood to be the two best ways to improve an officer’s 
career prospects. These were distinctly different routes, but both were demanding tests. Staff College 
was the highest level of formal education that the Army offered, and active service was a strenuous test 
of a man’s professional abilities—indeed, it was the very thing for which those professional abilities had 
been developed. The mechanism of the promotion system itself was a concrete manifestation of the 
professionalization of the officer corps. Every junior officer was obliged to demonstrate that he possessed 
the requisite trained expertise before he could hope to be promoted. Promotion examinations were 
conducted in a manner that made it very difficult for an individual to be given preferential treatment. 
There is little evidence of personal connections being used to improperly advance the career of junior 
officers in this period; when this did take place it was confined to appointments and postings and did not 
extend to the promotion of an incapable man. Regimental seniority was an important, although not 
determining, influence on promotion, but it operated only among men who had passed the necessary 
promotion exams, and this demonstrates the essentially meritocratic nature of promotion among junior 
officers. It is clear that the personal connections and the exercise of patronage among the senior ranks of 
the Edwardian army which existing scholarship has identified cannot be taken as representative of the 
officer corps as a whole. This suggests that there is still scope for study of the officer corps as a body, with 
an eye to distinctions and divisions within it which go beyond those already explored, like the split 
between the Wolseley Ring and the adherents of Lord Roberts, or between officers of the Indian Army 
and those of the British Army.  
By examining military education holistically, this study has identified a key theme which ran 
through the training of the Edwardian army, namely, the focus on battlefield performance. This was 
evident in the repeated emphasis by the official manuals that the objective of all training was to prepare 
for war, in the exhortations of commanding officers during exercises, in the central importance of tactical 
instruction at Sandhurst and Woolwich, and in the Staff College exercises which gave persistent attention 
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to the most likely theatres of campaign in potential conflicts. It was also evident in the widespread and 
powerful desire of officers to see active service, and in the respect shown to men who had demonstrated 
their professional ability in combat. This suggests that, in the debate over the realism and utility of the 
training undertaken by the Edwardian army, and the parallel debate over its readiness for the continental 
war that broke out in 1914, the more positive assessment offered by works like those of Spencer Jones 
and Michael Ramsay is more accurate than the strongly negative conclusions reached by Martin Samuels, 
or the more moderate and nuanced negative conclusions reached by Bowman and Connelly.2 It also 
indicates that the argument advanced by Badsey—that cavalry officers were engaged professionals who 
thought seriously about firepower on the modern battlefield, and how their arm would fight and move in 
such an environment—is true not only of the cavalry, but of the officer corps as a whole.3 
This thesis has also identified a strand of pragmatism and practicality which ran through much of 
what the army did, and which is evident throughout the process of military education. The question that 
Peter Hore asked, ‘Should theory come before practice, or after it, or instead of it, or nowhere at all?’ had 
a clear and definite answer as far as the Edwardian army was concerned; there was a strong preference 
for hands-on experience.4 The army did not eschew theory—the electrical course at Woolwich was very 
largely theoretical, and discussion of the use of aircraft in warfare had very few examples to draw upon 
and was perforce largely theoretical until 1914—but the emphasis was very much on practical skills and 
applied knowledge. This was not anti-intellectualism, as is sometimes alleged, but a realistic recognition 
that no amount of theory would be of any use to a man on the battlefield if he could not produce a 
workable tactical plan and lead his unit in carrying it out. Here, too, the focus upon the ultimate aim of all 
military preparations—victory in war—was maintained. 
Another aspect of this practicality was expressed in the form and content of officers’ education 
which, while it embraced various subjects, was narrowly professional in conception. The Army expected 
men to have completed their general education at school, and military education was undertaken on that 
basis. Kennedy and Neilson’s observation that professional militaries have always regarded ‘purely 
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 Jones, From Boer War to World War; Ramsay, Command and Cohesion; Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma; Bowman 
and Connelly, The Edwardian Army. 
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 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry. 
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 Hore, ‘Training or education: a naval dilemma over three centuries’. p. 1. 
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academic education as a luxury’ is certainly true of the Edwardian army.5 The military relevance of 
subjects like tactics and military engineering was unmistakable, but although officers also studied French, 
English, and history, each of these was taught, not as part of a broad liberal education, but as part of an 
essential military skill-set. Foreign languages enabled men to read military literature from outside the 
English-speaking world, as well as to converse with officers of likely allies or enemies on the European 
continent. Language skills were also an essential part of leadership and command in the Indian Army and 
in locally-raised Imperial forces like the King’s West African Rifles. English was taught at Sandhurst, not 
out of any appreciation of the artistry of Milton or Wordsworth, but to ensure that men’s orders and 
reports would be expressed in unmistakably clear prose, and written in a legible hand. History was mined 
for tactical and strategic lessons that officers could apply to contemporary conditions in order to better 
understand them. All of these subjects thus had a clear and direct military application, and were not 
intended primarily to continue the general education of officers. These findings offer a contribution to 
the literature on the breadth and form of military education, by indicating that at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, a specifically and narrowly military education provided primarily by other officers was 
sufficient to ensure a professional officer corps and effective battlefield performance in conflicts both 
large and small.  
The British Army of the Edwardian period faced great challenges. Some of these, like the tension 
between the realities of frequent small-scale imperial campaigning and the risks of a war against a 
European power, were familiar. Others, like developing and applying tactics suitable for a fire-swept 
battlefield, or planning for a continental commitment alongside a European ally, were new departures. 
There was much for officers to consider and grapple with, and this was reflected in some of the reforms 
of the military education system of the time. British officers may not have arrived at the best answers to 
all of the difficulties that they faced, but they had thought hard about the issues involved and had worked 
diligently towards creating and applying solutions as they understood them. The army and officers of 
1914 were not perfect, but proved able to meet the German army in battle. The trained expertise of 
regular officers ultimately had a powerful impact on the performance of the army in the Great War. 
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 ‘Preface’ in Kennedy and Neilson (eds.) Military Education: Past, Present, and Future. p. x. 
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Appendix One    
Sandhurst Final Examination Marks  
 
Final Examination Marks, by Subject, for Sandhurst Cadets 1900-011 
 Senior Division: Junior Division: 
Military Administration 300 300 
Military Law 300 300 
Tactics 450 300 
Military History and Geography 150 150 
Military Engineering 900 300 
Military Topography 800 300 
French or German 300 300 
Drill 200 Nil 
Riding 200 - 
Gymnastics 200 - 
Aggregate  3800 1900 
 
Final Examination Marks, by Subject, for Sandhurst Cadets 19042 
 
 1st Division 2nd Division 3rd Division 4th Division 
Military 
Administration 300 300 300 300 
Military Law 300 300 300 300 
Military History  300 300 300 
Tactics 350 350 350 950 
Military 
Engineering 250 250 250 450 
Military 
Topography 150 150 150 750 
Languages 300 300 300 300 
     
Riding - - 400 400 
Musketry 300 - 300 300 
Gymnastics - 200 200 200 
Drill 200 - 200 200 
Signalling - 200 - - 
Aggregate 2150 2350 3050 4450 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Akers-Douglas Report. p. 23. 
2
 Sandhurst Archive WO152/73 Box 140 90-8079. ‘The following will be the allotment of marks for the forthcoming 
Examination.’ 
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Appendix Two    
 
Allocation of Marks in Sandhurst Final Examination.1 
 
 
Allocation of Marks for the 4th Division at Sandhurst, December 1904 Examinations 
     
  
Source of marks awarded  
 
 
Company Officer 
 
Practical  Written Paper Total 
 
or Instructor Examination 
  Subjects 
    Military Administration 
  
300 300 
Military Law 
  
300 300 
Military History 
  
300 300 
Tactics 150 600 200 950 
Engineering 50 200 200 450 
Topography 150 400 200 750 
Languages 50 
 
250 300 
     Riding 
   
400 
Musketry 
   
300 
Gymnastics 
   
200 
Drill 
   
200 
     Aggregate: 
   
4450 
                                                          
1
 Sandhurst Archive WO152/73 Box 140 90-8079. ‘The following will be the allotment of marks for the forthcoming 
Examination.’ 
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Appendix Three   
Public School Influence in Sandhurst and Woolwich Intake 
Principal Schools from which Cadets joined Woolwich, 1900-1904.1 
 
   
Spring Term, 1904 
 
    Since 1900 
Cheltenham 
  
6 
  
108 
 Wellington 
  
4 
  
66 
 Clifton 
  
3 
  
64 
 Marlborough 
  
0 
  
47 
 Rugby 
  
3 
  
35 
 Bedford Grammar 
  
1 
  
32 
 Eton 
  
2 
  
31 
 Charterhouse 
  
2 
  
29 
 St. Paul's 
  
0 
  
28 
 Winchester 
  
2 
  
21 
 Harrow 
  
1 
  
19 
 Malvern 
  
1 
  
19 
 Haileybury 
  
1 
  
16 
  
Totals:  
  
26 
  
515 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The R.M.A. Magazine. Vol 5, No 17, Apr 1904. p. 5. 
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Principal Schools from which Cadets joined Woolwich, 1912.2 
 
   
             Spring term, 1912. 
Bedford Grammar 
  
3 
Brighton 
  
3 
Charterhouse 
  
6 
Cheltenham 
  
18 
Clifton 
  
10 
Eastbourne 
  
4 
Eton 
  
9 
Harrow 
  
4 
Malvern 
  
5 
Marlborough 
  
7 
Portsmouth Grammar 3 
Radley 
  
4 
Rugby 
  
5 
St. Paul's 
  
6 
Tonbridge 
  
4 
Uppingham 
  
3 
Wellington 
  
6 
Winchester 
  
3 
 
Total: 
  
103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The R.M.A. Magazine. Vol 12, No 48, April 1912. p. 113. 
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Influence of Selected Schools, 1905-1908.3 
   
Sandhurst 
 
 
1905 1906 1907 1908 Total 
Eton 26 28 30 37 121 
Harrow 12 15 8 19 54 
Winchester 8 8 6 9 31 
Cheltenham 24 26 20 45 115 
Clifton 10 13 12 7 42 
Wellington 24 46 31 47 148 
Charterhouse 7 13 9 15 44 
Haileybury 7 10 9 14 40 
Marlborough 9 11 9 13 42 
Rugby 8 11 5 10 34 
Uppingham 3 4 3 5 15 
Westminster 1 2 0 2 5 
Belford 18 19 9 21 67 
Dulwich 4 8 5 5 22 
St Pauls 3 8 4 2 17 
Other schools and tutors: 184 143 118 166 611 
TOTALS: 164 222 160 251 797 
      
  
Woolwich 
  
 
1905 1906 1907 1908 Total 
Eton 1 11 3 1 16 
Harrow 3 3 1 2 9 
Winchester 6 2 1 2 11 
Cheltenham 18 14 13 10 55 
Clifton 3 8 9 8 28 
Wellington 10 12 11 8 41 
Charterhouse 4 4 4 2 14 
Haileybury 5 1 2 0 8 
Marlborough 4 5 5 3 17 
Rugby 8 2 2 12 24 
Uppingham 2 1 0 0 3 
Westminster 1 0 1 0 2 
Belford 3 2 3 1 9 
Dulwich 4 0 0 1 5 
St Pauls 0 2 1 0 8 
Other schools and tutors: 35 24 18 22 99 
TOTALS: 72 67 56 50 250 
                                                          
3
 Churchill, A. B. N. ‘Army as a Profession, The (lecture)’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute. Vol 54, No 1, 
Jan 1910. p. 179. 
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Appendix Four 
Sources of junior regular officers not commissioned from Sandhurst or Woolwich.1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Quarterly Army List December 1913.  pp. 605-1340. 
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Sources of junior regular officers not commissioned from Sandhurst or Woolwich 
 
Combined totals for Captains, Lieutenants, and Second-Lieutenants2 
Column A indicates the total number of men who entered from each source; Column B the proportion of 
such men among all auxiliary entrants, and Column C the proportion of such men among all regular 
officers of that rank.   
 
    Entry Route A B C 
Militia 2172 67.96% 22.54% 
Volunteers 67 2.10% 0.70% 
Imperial Yeomanry 53 1.66% 0.55% 
From the ranks 362 11.33% 3.76% 
Special Reserve 328 10.26% 3.40% 
Territorial Force 44 1.38% 0.46% 
Commonwealth/Dominion Forces 79 2.47% 0.82% 
OTC 1 0.03% 0.01% 
Royal Navy 3 0.09% 0.03% 
Reserve of Officers 2 0.06% 0.02% 
Civilian Surgeons 42 1.31% 0.44% 
Civilian Veterinary Surgeons 44 1.38% 0.46% 
Total: 3196 
 
33.17% 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Quarterly Army List December 1913.  pp. 605-1340. 
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Appendix Five   
Active Service Experience.1 
This sample, of officers with surnames beginning with ‘A’ or ‘B’, has been taken from the Army List of 
January 1914. Second-Lieutenants are not listed as none had seen active service. The percentages 
indicate the relative influence of the Boer War and other campaigns among men with active service 
experience.   
    
Surnames beginning 'A' Surnames beginning 'B' 
Lieutenants 
        
  
Boer War and/or before: 
 
37 94.9% 
 
20 80.0% 
 
  
Boer War and after: 
 
0 0.0% 
 
3 12.0% 
 
  
Only after Boer War: 
 
2 5.1% 
 
2 8.0% 
 
  
Totals: 
 
39 
  
25 
  Captains 
        
  
Boer War and/or before: 
 
81 82.7% 
 
207 79.3% 
 
  
Boer War and after: 
 
10 10.2% 
 
25 9.6% 
 
  
Only after Boer War: 
 
7 7.1% 
 
29 11.1% 
 
  
Totals: 
 
98 
  
261 
  Majors 
        
  
Boer War and/or before: 
 
71 94.7% 
 
139 85.8% 
 
  
Boer War and after: 
 
3 4.0% 
 
17 10.5% 
 
  
Only after Boer War: 
 
1 1.3% 
 
6 3.7% 
 
  
Totals: 
 
75 
  
162 
  Lieutenant-Colonels 
       
  
Boer War and/or before: 
 
23 95.8% 
 
66 97.1% 
 
  
Boer War and after: 
 
0 0.0% 
 
1 1.5% 
 
  
Only after Boer War: 
 
1 4.2% 
 
1 1.5% 
 
  
Totals: 
 
24 
  
68 
  
          
  
Overall Totals: 
 
235 
  
516 
  
  
Men with post-Boer War service: 
 
24 10.2% 
 
84 16.3% 
 
          
          
  
Grand Total:  
 
751 
     
  
Men with post-Boer War service: 
 
108 14.4% 
     
  
                                                          
1
 Quarterly Army List January 1914.  pp. 2204-2302. 
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Appendix Six    
Details of new members of Royal United Services Institute.1 
New Members of RUSI, November 1904-June 1914, by Service 
      Number of new     
         members 
Percentage of total new 
Membership 
 
Regular Army 1309 54.1% 
Royal Navy 314 13% 
Royal Marine Light Infantry, 
Royal Marine Artillery 
43 1.8% 
Territorial Force, Special Reserve, 
Yeomanry and Militia 
315 13% 
Royal Naval reserves 37 1.5% 
Indian Army 176 7.3% 
Royal Indian Marine 4 0.1% 
Total new membership 2420 100% 
Neither column adds to exactly the stated total new membership, as the listed categories are not an exhaustive 
categorisation of the new membership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 These numbers have been drawn from the monthly new membership lists printed in the Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute, Volumes 48-59. 
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New Members of RUSI, November 1904-June 1914, by Rank2 
 Number joining: Percentage of total: 
General 0 0% 
Lieutenant-General 0 0% 
Major-General 1 0.1% 
Brigadier-General 3 0.2% 
Colonel 29 2.2% 
Lieutenant-Colonel 42 3.2% 
Major 154 11.8% 
Captain 523 40.0% 
Lieutenant 345 26.4% 
Second-Lieutenant 211 16.1% 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
2
 These numbers have been drawn from the monthly new membership lists printed in the Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute, Volumes 48-59. 
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